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ABSTRACT 
Denise Hill: Public Relations, Racial Injustice, and the 1958 North Carolina Kissing Case 
(Under the direction of Dr. Barbara Friedman) 
 
 This dissertation examines how public relations was used by the Committee to Combat 
Racial Injustice (CCRI), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP), North Carolina Governor Luther Hodges, and the United States Information Agency 
(USIA) in regards to the 1958 kissing case. The kissing case occurred in Monroe, North Carolina 
when a group of children were playing, including two African American boys, age nine and 
eight, and a seven-year-old white girl. During the game, the nine-year-old boy and the girl 
exchanged a kiss. As a result, the police later arrested both boys and charged them with 
assaulting and molesting the girl. They were sentenced to a reformatory, with possible release for 
good behavior at age 21. The CCRI launched a public relations campaign to gain the boys’ 
freedom, and the NAACP implemented public relations tactics on the boys’ behalf. News of the 
kissing case spread overseas, drawing unwanted international attention to US racial problems at a 
time when the country was promoting worldwide democracy. In response, Gov. Hodges 
launched a public relations campaign to defend the actions of North Carolina authorities, and the 
USIA employed public relations tactics to manage the country’s reputation overseas.  
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 This dissertation analyzes the public relations campaigns of the CCRI and Gov. Hodges, 
focusing on public relations strategies and tactics, as well as public relations outputs and public 
relations outcomes. This dissertation also analyzes the public relations tactics implemented by 
the NAACP and USIA. In addition, it examines frames in the public relations material and 
frames in letters written by members of the public. Using racial formation theory as a foundation, 
this study also explores how race was reflected in the four groups’ public relations efforts. This 
dissertation adds to the scholarship on public relations history, illustrating public relations 
practice of the 1950s and providing an example of how public relations was used for social 
change, specifically how public relations was used to help African Americans gain civil rights.  
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Where is the Jim Crow section  
On this merry-go-round,  
Mister, cause I want to ride? 
Down South where I come from  
White and colored  
Can't sit side by side.  
Down South on the train  
There's a Jim Crow car.  
On the bus we're put in the back— 
But there ain't no back  
To a merry-go-round!  
Where's the horse  
For a kid that's black?1 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: THE TABOO OF KISSING 
Introduction  
 On warm October afternoon in 1958 in Monroe, North Carolina, a group of children 
played in a culvert. Included were eight-year-old David “Fuzzy” Simpson, nine-year-old James 
Hanover Thompson, both black, and Sissy Sutton, a seven-year-old white girl.
2
 Despite a racially 
segregated society, it was not uncommon for young black and white children to play together.
3
 
During the course of play, a kissing game ensued and James and Sissy kissed one another. Sissy 
                                                 
1
 Langston Hughes, Selected Poems of Langston Hughes (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), 194. 
  
2
 The words “black” and “African American” are used interchangeably throughout this dissertation. The words 
“Negro” and “colored” are used when quoting verbatim historical documents. 
 
3
 Timothy Tyson, Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1999), 94. 
 
2 
 
later mentioned the kissing game to her mother, who was furious.
4
 Although Sissy’s father armed 
himself and searched for the boys, the police found them first. Unaware of what crime they had 
committed, the boys were jailed and held incommunicado. Six days later, they were charged with 
assault and molestation and sentenced to a reformatory for an indeterminate term, with possible 
release for good behavior before age 21.  
Robert Williams, head of the Monroe chapter of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), intervened on the boys’ behalf.  However according 
to Williams, officers at the national NAACP headquarters initially declined to get involved in a 
“sex case,” especially one involving the volatile issue of miscegenation.5 Yet Williams often 
operated independently of the national NAACP office, as he believed the NAACP’s typically 
cautious approach insufficient to affect change in Monroe.
6
 
Williams contacted New York-based civil rights lawyer Conrad Lynn, and Lynn engaged 
George Weissman, a writer and socialist active in labor and civil rights issues. In early 
November, a New York Post reporter heard of the situation in Monroe from one of the boys’ 
                                                 
4
 George L. Weissman, “The Kissing Case,” Nation, January 17, 1959, 47. Weissman interviewed Sissy Sutton’s 
parents for his Nation article. He does not provide their names, but describes her father as a “skilled worker” and her 
mother as a housewife. In addition, Weissman reported that “they hold very strong views on race issues, more 
extreme than the average Southerner.” 
 
5
 Robert Carl Cohen, Black Crusader: A Biography of Robert Franklin Williams (Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1972), 
112; Conrad Lynn, There is a Fountain: Autobiography of a Civil Rights Lawyer (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill, 
1979), 143. The North Carolina chapter of the NAACP claimed its delayed involvement in the case was because  
Williams insisted on controlling the case, as he did not want the state or national offices involved. For additional 
information, see “A report of activities of the North Carolina State Conference of Branches in reference to the case 
of David Simpson and James H. Thompson of Monroe, North Carolina” from Kelly M. Alexander, president, 
NAACP North Carolina State Conferences of Branches to Roy Wilkins, executive secretary, NAACP, December 26, 
1959. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Part III A92 (hereafter cited as NAACP papers). 
 
6
 Robert F. Williams, Negroes With Guns (New York: Marzani and Munsell, 1962), 50-74. 
 
3 
 
aunts and wrote about the boys’ dilemma.7 The NAACP maintained its distance, and so Williams 
and his allies, including Weissman, formed the Committee to Combat Racial Injustice (CCRI) 
and set a goal to free the boys. To do that, the CCRI launched a public relations campaign.
8
 
 Upon reading the New York Post story, a New York-based reporter from the London 
News Chronicle traveled to Monroe to interview the boys. After her story appeared in mid-
December, other overseas newspapers reported on what had become known as “the kissing 
case.” The increased visibility spurred NAACP leadership to reverse its position and offer legal 
assistance and financial support to the boys’ mothers, and to implement some public relations 
tactics. However, the bulk of the public relations activities on the boys’ behalf was handled by 
the CCRI. 
 As a result of the publicity and the CCRI’s efforts, hundreds of letters, telegrams, and 
petitions flooded the office of Luther Hodges, governor of North Carolina. Sensing his political 
agenda and reputation were at stake, Hodges launched his own public relations campaign to 
justify the boys’ incarceration. In the meantime, the United States Information Agency (USIA) 
stepped into the fray. During the Cold War, international attention to America’s racial problems 
undermined US foreign policy, which was intended to promote democracy and contain the threat 
of communism. Thus, the USIA employed selected public relations tactics to help manage the 
country’s reputation.9 
                                                 
7
 Ted Poston, “A Story of Two Little Boys in Carolina,” New York Post, November 10, 1958. 
  
8
 Fact sheet, “For NC Members Only To—Be Transmitted Verbally, Committee to Combat Racial Injustice,” 
December 19, 1958, reel 9, Socialist Workers Party Records, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison (hereafter cited 
as SWP records). 
 
9
 Richard G. Cushing, “USIA: A Hybrid of Public Relations and Diplomacy,” Public Relations Journal 14, no. 5 
(May 1958): article reprint—page numbers excluded. 
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This dissertation examines the public relations strategies and tactics of the CCRI, 
Governor Hodges, the NAACP, and the USIA as they relate to the kissing case, along with the 
corresponding results of those public relations activities.
10
 The purpose of this dissertation is to 
explore the ways public relations helped a grassroots organization—the CCRI—advocate for 
African American civil rights and achieve its goal of freeing the boys, while an opposing 
organization, the governor’s office, used public relations to undermine the CCRI’s efforts and 
defend the decision to incarcerate the boys.  
In contrast to the role of journalism in the civil rights era, the contribution of public 
relations has not been as well documented. Although scholarship in this area is growing, the 
public relations work by and for African Americans is largely absent from the historical record. 
The limited research tends to focus on larger, well-known civil rights organizations and leaders. 
This dissertation helps fill that gap by contributing to scholarship in this area. 
Background 
 Many historians identify the mid-1950s as the start of the modern civil rights movement, 
which emerged “in the South when large masses of black people became directly involved in 
economic boycotts, street marches, mass meetings and other disruptive tactics.”11 The kissing 
case occurred in the early years of the movement, and background on American race relations is 
essential for a full understanding of the case. This section provides information on race relations 
in the South, including detail on black/white miscegenation. In addition, this background 
                                                 
10
 The NAACP’s and USIA’s public relations work was limited to a few tactics. Those tactics are included in this 
analysis; however, most of this dissertation focuses on the public relations campaigns of the CCRI and Governor 
Hodges because they implemented the bulk of the public relations in response to the kissing case. 
 
11
 Aldon Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Free Press, 1984), 1. See also Clayborne 
Carson, Eyes on the Prize: America’s Civil Rights Years, A Reader and Guide (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 
and Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-63 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988). 
 
5 
 
includes an overview of relevant racial issues in North Carolina generally and in Monroe, North 
Carolina, specifically. 
The Racial Environment in the American South 
 Although racial discrimination existed in all US states, in the South “it was codified in 
statute and lived, every minute of every day.”12 By the 1950s, southern whites had established a 
comprehensive system whereby they exerted economic, political, and personal control over 
blacks.
13
 Employment opportunities reflected the racial caste system in which status was 
conferred or denied by race. Blacks were concentrated in the lowest paying jobs and were 
excluded from the political process. If blacks had access to health care, it was substandard, as 
was education. Even for those few blacks who had gained admittance to higher education and 
secured better employment, the most intelligent, educated, wealthy black person was always 
inferior to the poorest, illiterate, uneducated white person.
14
 Compounding the economic and 
political oppression was the racial segregation mandated by Jim Crow laws, which served as the 
legal enforcement, public symbols, and constant reminders of blacks’ inferior position.15 The 
central purpose of Jim Crow laws was to “maintain a second-class social and economic status for 
blacks while upholding a first-class social and economic status for whites.”16 In some instances, 
segregation meant exclusion. A black person in the South could not attend the same church, eat 
in the same restaurant, drink from the same fountain, ride the same elevator, read in the same 
                                                 
12
 Jerrold M. Packard, American Nightmare: The History of Jim Crow (New York: St. Martins, 2002), vii-viii. 
 
13
 Morris, Origins of the Civil Rights Movement, 1. 
 
14
 Leon Litwack, “Trouble in Mind: Black Southerners in the Age of Jim Crow,” in When Did Southern Segregation 
Begin?, ed. John David Smith (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2002), 162. 
 
15
 C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 7. 
 
16
 Packard, American Nightmare, vii. 
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public library, or use the same bathroom as a white person.
17
 Racial segregation extended to 
public transportation, hospitals, housing, orphanages, jobs, prisons, blood supply, toilets, sports, 
marriage, funeral homes, and cemeteries.
18
 Blacks were barred from most public recreational 
facilities such as amusement parks, tennis courts, swimming pools, bowling alleys, and skating 
rinks.
19
 For example in Alabama, one of the Jim Crow laws stated: “it shall be unlawful for a 
negro and white person to play together or in company with each other in any game of cards or 
dice, dominoes, or checkers.”20 
Exceptions to segregation illustrated blacks’ inferior social position under Jim Crow: 
Black servants and domestic workers were allowed into white homes; black men could ride in 
the same automobiles as whites when serving as drivers, and black nannies could accompany 
their charges into “whites only” playgrounds.21 One Jim Crow law specified that “no persons of 
any race other than the white Caucasian race shall own, use, or occupy any building or any lot, 
except that this covenant shall not prevent occupancy by domestic servants of a different race 
domiciled with an owner or tenant.”22 
At its height, Jim Crow discrimination was rigidly imposed by law enforcement agencies 
and courts, as well as “by ordinary white citizens who were neither policemen nor judges but 
                                                 
17
 Richard Wormser, The Rise and Fall of Jim Crow (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2003), xi-xii. 
 
18
 Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 7. 
 
19
 Litwack, “Trouble in Mind,” 157. 
 
20
 “Separate is Not Equal: Brown v. Board of Education,” Smithsonian National Museum of American History, 
http://americanhistory.si.edu/brown/history/1-segregated/jim-crow.html. 
 
21
 Litwack, “Trouble in Mind,” 161. 
 
22
 “Separate is Not Equal.”  
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who often took the law into their own hands as though they were.”23 To maintain their 
supremacy, white southerners used every means at their disposal, from manipulating the legal 
system, to economic exploitation and suppression, paternalism, exclusion, political deception, 
harassment, deceit, physical intimidation, violence, and murder. 
Miscegenation 
 A driving force behind Jim Crow laws was the fear of black/white miscegenation. 
Miscegenation, a term coined in 1863 to mean a mixture of the races, presented the ultimate 
threat to white supremacy.
24
 Miscegenation would destroy racial purity, as evidenced by the 
belief that merely one drop of black blood negated whiteness. The “one-drop rule” originated in 
the South in the nineteenth century, and by the twentieth century, it was accepted throughout the 
United States.
25
 The belief was that “sex relations between Negro men and white 
women…would be like an attempt to pour Negro blood in the white race.”26   
 Of all the social codes and laws that reflected the power structures and racial ideologies 
of the time, the prohibition regarding black/white sexual relationships was the most dominant. 
Literature produced by the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and similar groups usually included a demand 
to stop “race-mixing.”27 In his landmark study, An American Dilemma, Swedish sociologist 
                                                 
23
 Packard, American Nightmare, viii. 
 
24
 Sidney Kaplan, “The Miscegenation Issue in the Election of 1864,” Journal of Negro History 34, no. 3 (July 
1949): 277. 
 
25
 Joel Williamson, New People: Miscegenation and Mulattoes in the United States (New York: Free Press, 1980), 
1-2. 
 
26
 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1944), 60. 
 
27
 See, for example, “Save the White Race,” December 27, 1960 postcard; undated newsletter, The Klansman: The 
Carolina Klan; undated flyers: “Jew-Communists Behind Race Mixing;” “ Scientists Say Negro Still in Ape Stage: 
Races Positively Not Equal, Mongrelization of the Races Would Destroy White Christian Civilization;” “This is 
 
8 
 
Gunnar Myrdal found that when white Southerners were asked to rank various types of 
discriminatory practice in order of importance, the prohibition against intermarriage and sexual 
intercourse with white women ranked highest.
28
 In 1959, NAACP attorney Jack Greenberg wrote 
that the underlying reason whites opposed desegregation was their animus to sexual relations 
and/or intermarriage between black men and white women.
29
 When the Gallup Organization 
asked white Americans in September 1958 if they approved or disapproved of intermarriage 
between whites and blacks, 94 percent said they disapproved.
30
   
Intertwined with the fear of miscegenation was the veneration of southern white women. 
Myrdal suggested “the fixation on the purity of white womanhood” was in part related to how 
the puritan ethic of the South magnified the psychological efforts and “the sore conscience on the 
part of white men for their own or their compeers’ relations with, or desires for, Negro 
women.”31 Phillip Dray wrote, “Perhaps to adjust somehow for their own animalistic lusting 
after black women, whites had placed their own women on a pedestal of virtue and purity—the 
polar opposite of the regard in which black women were held.”32 In addition, white woman were 
seen as the preservers of the white race. The white southerner believed that “white women 
                                                                                                                                                             
Mongrelization: Socializing with Negroes Leads to Mixed Marriages.” James William Cole Papers, Joyner Library, 
East Carolina University, Greenville, NC (hereafter cited as Cole papers). 
 
28
 Myrdal, American Dilemma, 589-590. 
 
29
 Phyl Newbeck, Virginia Hasn’t Always Been For Lovers: Interracial Marriage Bans and the Case of Richard and 
Mildred Loving (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2004), 28. 
 
30
 Gallup Organization. Gallup Poll (AIPO), September 1958 [survey question]. USGALLUP.58-605.Q056A. 
Gallup Organization [producer]. Storrs, CT: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, iPOLL [distributor].  
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.  Note: Other than the fact that those polled were white Americans, this survey 
does not include demographic information about the respondents.  
 
31
 Myrdal, American Dilemma, 591. 
 
32
 Philip Dray, At the Hands of Persons Unknown: The Lynching of Black America (New York: Modern Library, 
2002), 70. 
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untouched and above suspicion were the key to racial purity and moral salvation. As long as 
white women were strictly separated from black men, no one need be alarmed.”33  
 Any action hinting of black male threat to white female sanctity was immediately 
addressed, within or outside the law. Any overture by a black man toward a white woman, 
whether real, perceived, fabricated or invited, risked reprisal that at its harshest was death by 
lynching. Just three years before the kissing case, fourteen-year-old Chicagoan Emmett Till, who 
was in Mississippi visiting relatives, was murdered for allegedly flirting with a white woman. 
Till’s white killers beat him with an ax, shot him, and threw his body in the Tallahatchie River.34 
Although they tied a 125-pound cotton gin wheel to his corpse, it bobbed to the surface and was 
found by a fisherman four days after his murder. His killers were tried and acquitted. Although 
they later admitted to the murder, double jeopardy prevented any legal action being taken against 
them.
35
  
 African Americans did not blithely accept their subordinate position and corresponding 
treatment by white society.
36
 Although some historians date the beginning of the civil rights 
movement to the 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education decision, in which the Supreme Court 
ruled segregated schools unconstitutional, blacks had long struggled for the equality denied to 
them.
37
 This struggle was evident in slave uprisings, organized efforts for black union 
                                                 
33
 Joel Williamson, New People, 138. 
 
34
 Dray, At the Hands, 424. 
 
35
 Gene Roberts and Hank Klibanoff, The Race Beat: The Press, the Civil Rights Struggle, and the Awakening of a 
Nation (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 86-108. 
 
36
 Morris, Origins of the Civil Rights Movement, ix. 
 
37
 See Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” Journal of 
American History  92, no. 4 (March 2005): 1234.  
 
10 
 
recognition, demands for legal redress, government intervention, boycotts, riots, and sit-ins, to 
name a few types of protest. In what Jacquelyn Dowd Hall describes as “the long civil rights 
movement,” African Americans rebelled against a social structure that regarded them as inferior 
well before the 1954 Brown decision.
38
 Although the purpose of this dissertation is not to 
document early civil rights activities, the following are a few examples among many that 
illustrate this long tradition of protest. For instance, Ida B. Wells led anti-lynching crusades in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; Mary Church Terrell began the black women’s 
club movement in the late 1800s; both Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois begin writing 
about and advocating for the advancement of blacks in the late 1800s; Marcus Garvey began the 
United Negro Improvement Association in 1911; and in 1925 A. Phillip Randolph began a 
successful 12-year battle to gain recognition for the first black union. As further evidence, 
although the 1963 March on Washington is recognized as a watershed moment in modern civil 
rights history, the March on Washington Movement began in 1941 as an organized effort to 
desegregate the Armed Forces and provide fair labor to African Americans. Spearheaded by 
Randolph, this movement resulted in President Truman’s 1948 desegregation order, although the 
Armed Forces were not fully desegregated until the end of the Korean War in 1953.
39
  
 While there were other national efforts to gain African American civil rights, much of the 
protest occurred locally in what Aldon Morris describes as social organizations “within the 
community of a subordinate group, which mobilizes, organizes, and coordinates collective action 
                                                 
38
 Ibid. 
 
39
 For an overview of African-American history, see Henry Louis Gates, Life Upon These Shores: Looking at 
African American History, 1513-2008 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011). 
 
11 
 
aimed at attaining the common ends of that subordinate group.”40 Morris provides a number of 
examples, including the work of the Montgomery Improvement Association, which was formed 
in 1955 by church and other community leaders in Montgomery, Alabama, to organize a bus 
boycott. Lasting a little more than a year, the successful boycott led the US Supreme Court to 
declare segregated buses unconstitutional. According to Morris, by the mid-to-late 1950s, local 
movements were underway in a number of Southern cities. Participants confronted the local 
white power structure and in doing so, were often threatened, beaten, or faced other reprisals. 
However their resistance endured. By the time two young boys in Monroe were sent to a 
reformatory for allegedly kissing a white girl, there were numerous local groups actively fighting 
for African American civil rights. However despite or even due to these efforts, most Americans 
in 1958 thought the situation in the South between the races would only get worse in the coming 
year.
41
 
North Carolina 
 In the mid-1950s, the national press viewed North Carolina as moderate on race relations 
in comparison to other Southern states.
42
 Although black North Carolinians faced the same 
economic, political, and social oppression as did blacks in other parts of the South, this view 
stemmed primarily from the state’s handling of the school desegregation issue.43 After the 1954 
                                                 
40
 Morris, Origins of the Civil Rights Movement, 40. 
  
41
 Gallup Organization. Gallup Poll (AIPO), September 1958 [survey question]. USGALLUP.58-605.Q054. Gallup 
Organization [producer]. Storrs, CT: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, iPOLL [distributor]. Note: This 
survey did not ask why respondents thought the situation would worsen. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu. 
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/CFIDE/cf/action/ipoll/ipollBasket.cfm 
42
 William Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle for Freedom 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 54-56. 
 
43
 Ibid. 
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Brown decision, Gov. William Umstead appointed a committee of sixteen whites and three 
blacks to study the impact of the Court’s decision on North Carolina. Umstead died shortly 
thereafter, and Lieutenant Governor Luther Hodges ascended and shouldered oversight of the 
issue. The committee’s recommendation, which became known as the Pearsall Plan, was to 
remove control of education from the state and return it to local school boards, which was a 
“clear effort to circumvent the Brown decision,” historian William Chafe noted.44 Hodges later 
appointed a seven-member Pearsall committee, this time excluding blacks. Referencing the 
previous committee, Hodges gave the following reason for this exclusion: 
 These Negro committee members were under great pressure from their fellow-Negroes, 
 many of whom felt strongly that there should be immediate integration. Mr. Pearsall, 
 others, and I discussed carefully and prayerfully the problem of the racial composition of 
 the new, smaller committee of seven. We finally decided that we would not include a 
 Negro because a Negro member of such a small group would have to work under almost 
 impossible conditions because of outside pressure.
45
  
 
 Ultimately, the second Pearsall Plan permitted voluntary desegregation but allowed a 
district to close its schools if desegregation occurred; white students in those districts would be 
given state tuition aid to attend private schools. The Pearsall Plan allowed North Carolina to 
comply with the Supreme Court’s ruling, while still promoting an anti-integration policy.46  
In an August 1955 radio and television address about the school issue, Hodges said black 
education in North Carolina had been successful due to the help of white citizens. Integration, he 
argued, would cause whites to withdraw their support from schools, resulting in their closure and 
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a corresponding decline in black education.
47
 Speaking directly to black citizens of North 
Carolina, Hodges equated a desire for integration with a lack of racial pride. Without explicitly 
naming the NAACP, he denigrated its work. He requested that black citizens: 
 Not allow any militant and selfish organization to stampede you into refusal 
 to go along with the program I am proposing in the interest of our public schools; take 
 pride in your race by attending your own schools; and make it clear that any among you 
 who refuse to cooperate in this effort to save our public school system are not to be 
 applauded but are to be considered as endangering the education of your children and as 
 denying the integrity of the Negro race by refusing to remain in association with it.
48
  
 
 Hodges told North Carolina’s black citizens that remaining segregated was synonymous 
with black pride. He attempted to cultivate in blacks the same fear that whites had about the 
dilution of the white race: intermingling also would attenuate the Negro race. Furthermore, as 
Chafe noted, Hodges invoked the imagery of miscegenation by claiming the NAACP would have 
the black race “lose itself in another race” by encouraging blacks to sacrifice “their identity in 
complete merger with whites.”49 Hodges concluded his broadcast by warning black citizens that 
efforts to integrate, which he previously referred to as “show-off actions to demonstrate 
equality,” would be strenuously and bitterly resisted by North Carolina’s white citizens.50 
 Chafe referred to the Pearsall Plan as “a subtle and insidious form of racism” but noted 
that at the time, most North Carolina political leaders and white newspapers editors dubbed it a 
“moderate” solution to the school integration dilemma.51 Hodges was disappointed when he was 
unable to obtain support among black groups, such as the statewide black teachers association. 
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According to Chafe, more telling than his disappointment was his surprise that black citizens 
would have an independent view in direct contradiction to a white edict.
52
 In the fall of 1955, 
Hodges spoke to students at historically black North Carolina A&T University as part of its 
Founder’s Day program. His speech did not focus on school desegregation; however, during the 
course of his address, Hodges criticized the NAACP and referred to “Negroes” as “Nigras,” a 
slight he later claimed was indeliberate.
53
 Students began to loudly shuffle their feet in protest, so 
much so that he asked Ferdinand D. Bluford, A&T’s president, if he should continue. Hodges 
finished his speech, but was incensed at what he believed was discourteous behavior. Upon 
receiving a written apology from Bluford, Hodges provided a terse reply and refused to 
acknowledge any other letters “from Negro students at A&T or any other Negroes.”54 Although 
Hodges “was not a venomous white supremacist in the mold of Alabama Governor George 
Wallace,” he was a segregationist.55 Hodges believed that blacks were “ill prepared for 
citizenship” and “should gratefully accept white leadership.”56  
 When schools opened in 1957, a dozen black students were enrolled in previously all-
white schools in Charlotte, Greensboro, and Winston-Salem.
57
 With token integration 
proceeding, Hodges turned his attention to improving North Carolina’s economy. A former 
management executive in the textile industry, Hodges applied his business acumen to running the 
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state. In the early 1950s, North Carolina’s per capita income was among the lowest in the nation. 
To boost that figure, Hodges sought to replace the state’s low-income jobs with those in higher-
paying industries. With a focus on economic development via industrialization, Hodges and 
others in his administration travelled the country touting the benefits of doing business in North 
Carolina.
58
 Between 1956 and 1958, the governor’s efforts brought approximately 300 new 
factories to the state.
59
 In early 1959, Hodges decided to expand his promotion of “the North 
Carolina Story” to business leaders in Western Europe. At the end of the year, he and his staff 
traveled to ten major cities in France, Germany, Britain, Switzerland, the Netherlands and 
Belgium.
60
  
 In addition to his achievements in improving North Carolina’s economy, Hodges was 
lauded for his management of the school desegregation issue, especially when compared with the 
actions of other southern states.
61
 In stark contrast, Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus’s fervid 
resistance to integration caused him to order the National Guard to stop nine black students from 
enrolling in the all-white Central High School in Little Rock on September 4, 1957. The National 
Guard was joined by mobs of white citizens incensed at the integration efforts. The students 
attempted to enter the school every day, and they were subsequently barred by the National 
Guard and harassed by the white protesters. The situation escalated to such a degree that on 
September 24, President Eisenhower superseded Faubus’s actions and sent federal troops to 
Little Rock to enforce a federal desegregation order. The news media also were on site and 
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although only a few reporters were in Little Rock on September 4, four weeks later “there were 
225, including reporters for three London newspapers.”62 According to Gene Roberts and Hank 
Klibanoff, “A week after school opened, 67 percent of the newspapers in the North and 68 
percent of the newspapers in the South were giving the events in Little Rock front-page 
headlines of five or more columns, and virtually all were running two or three related sidebars on 
the front page each day.”63 In addition to domestic coverage, the events in Little Rock became 
international news that drew attention to America’s ongoing racial problems, thereby threatening 
its global image and damaging foreign relations during the Cold War. Arkansas Gazette Editor 
Harry Ashmore contrasted Faubus’s actions with those of Hodges’s. Ashmore wrote, “The North 
Carolina governor simply said that ‘North Carolinians do not like lawlessness’ and made it quite 
clear that anyone who had other ideas would be promptly dealt with.”64 Ashmore noted that 
hecklers in Charlotte had been “taken in hand” by local authorities, and desegregation in North 
Carolina proceeded peacefully.
65
  
 Although North Carolina’s reputation for racial temperance may have “reflected a self-
created mythology and congratulatory image-making,” Hodges’s achievements led Time to dub 
him “the South’s new leader.”66 Time wrote that Hodges was “too busy in pursuit of twentieth 
century economic development to be inhibited by diehard last stands against school 
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integration.”67 Time focused on Hodges’s success in bringing jobs and industry to North 
Carolina, balancing the state budget, and reducing corporate taxes. Other than a scant reference 
to school desegregation, the article does not mention race relations in North Carolina. In early 
1959 when Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy was mentioned as a possible presidential 
candidate, Hodges was considered a potential running mate.
68
 By the time the kissing case 
became an international incident, Hodges had cemented a positive reputation with a bright 
future. 
Monroe 
 It was against the Jim Crow system that Robert Williams directed the initial attention of 
the local NAACP chapter, which he joined when he returned to Monroe in 1955 after a stint in 
the Marines.
69
 Located about 25 miles southeast of Charlotte, Monroe in 1950 had a population 
of 10,140. Thirty percent of Monroe residents were black.
70
 As with many Southern towns, 
Monroe was segregated; the railroad tracks that ran through town separated black and white 
residential communities. Unwritten social codes of behavior dictated that blacks should avoid 
“getting into trouble with white people.”71 By 1956, the Monroe NAACP chapter’s ranks had 
dwindled to six due to renewed harassment by local whites, whose fears of integration had been 
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stirred after the 1954 Brown decision.
72
 The six members elected Williams president, and Dr. 
Albert Perry, a physician who had recently moved to his wife’s hometown of Monroe, was 
elected vice president. To revive the chapter, 31-year-old Williams launched a one-man 
recruiting campaign, going to pool halls and walking the streets in search of farmers, domestics, 
and fellow veterans.
73
 Once the chapter’s ranks had been restored, its members set out to 
integrate the Union County Public Library, after the branch for blacks was destroyed by fire. 
Williams and a fellow black veteran went to the library, and the veteran went in while Williams 
waited in the car. The veteran checked out a book, without incident.
74
 This success spurred 
Monroe NAACP members to tackle the desegregation of other public facilities. 
 Next was the public swimming pool, which had been built with Works Progress 
Administration funds as part of the New Deal.
75
 Jim Crow laws prevented blacks from 
swimming in the public pool. Instead, black children swam in ponds, streams, swimming holes 
and drainage ditches, and as a result of these unsafe alternatives, several black children had 
drowned.
76
 Williams and Perry asked the Union County Recreation Department to build a 
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separate pool for blacks or allow them to use the public pool one or two days a week. They were 
told there were no funds for a separate pool. The request to use the pool one or two days also was 
denied for economic reasons—officials insisted the pool would have to be drained and refilled 
after being used by blacks. Undaunted, Monroe NAACP members organized “stand-in” 
campaigns in which blacks would go to the pool, attempt admission and, upon refusal, stand in 
protest at the entrance.
77
 The authorities would then close the pool, which meant whites, too, 
were unable to swim. By this time, local white citizens were irritated with Williams, as they felt 
he was disrupting the community by fomenting trouble between the races. A group of whites 
circulated a petition demanding that Williams leave Monroe.
78
  
 The swimming pool protests caught the attention of the Monroe chapter of the KKK, 
which launched a campaign of night-riding, cross-burning, and rallies.
79
 The Klan motorcade, led 
by the police chief to “keep order,” would often cruise through Monroe’s black neighborhood, 
“blowing their horns, throwing rocks, and firing pistol shots into the air.”80 A group of black 
ministers asked Monroe town officials to “forbid the Klan from terrorizing their section of 
town.”81 Williams made similar requests to Gov. Hodges, President Eisenhower, and various 
federal officials, all to no avail.
82
 As a result, Williams and a group of veterans in the Monroe 
NAACP decided to take action. Williams wrote to the National Rifle Association (NRA) and 
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received a charter, which allowed his “NRA Rifle Club” members to purchase military-surplus 
weapons, as well as weapons from sporting goods stores and by mail order.
83
 The veterans in 
Williams’s group trained those without weapons experience, and the group developed a 
counterintelligence system to forewarn them of attacks. In the meantime, KKK motorcades 
continued their night rides, often targeting Williams’s house, as well as Dr. Perry’s. Both men, 
along with other blacks in Monroe, received death threats. Perry was targeted because local 
whites believed he was bankrolling the NAACP. They also were resentful of his thriving medical 
practice and his large new house—a violation of the racial caste system.84  
 After the KKK called Perry’s wife and told her their house would be bombed, Williams 
and about 60 men armed themselves and guarded the house in shifts. One evening in October 
1957, Klan members in a motorcade of about 50 vehicles fired upon Perry’s house. Williams and 
his men, hidden in foxholes and behind sandbags, returned fire. In response, the Klan fled. 
Although there were no deaths or injuries, the next day Monroe officials revised the city charter 
and outlawed any type of cavalcade of three or more automobiles without a permit. While not 
specifically referring to the KKK by name, the ordinance forbade anyone participating in a 
motorcade (pursuant to a permit) to “wear a mask or hood which would prevent recognition” by 
the police.
85
  
 Although Williams and the black clergy had previously asked for police and government 
intervention in the Klan’s attacks, no help was offered before the shoot-out at Perry’s. Despite 
the fact that a black community stood up to the Klan, Williams later noted that there was no 
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coverage by the mainstream white press, although a few black newspapers and magazines 
reported on the incident.
86
 In contrast, when a large group of Lumbee Indians stopped a Klan 
attack in a nearby county two weeks after the Monroe shoot-out, the Lumbee victory received 
national media coverage.
87
 In speaking to the press about the altercation between the Klan and 
blacks in Monroe, the town’s police chief, A. A. Mauney, denied there was any shooting.88 The 
Monroe Enquirer reported as such, and included an Associated Press story quoting Mauney’s 
denial. No reporter contacted Williams for comment. He recognized the white-controlled press 
was often complicit in perpetuating the dominant racial conventions, a practice certainly not 
limited to newspapers in Monroe.
89
 Mauney was rumored to be a member of the KKK, and the 
reporting in the Monroe Journal was more reflective of his attitudes than an objective account of 
the incident.
90
  
 Deviating from the NAACP’s position of non-violence, Williams and his allies armed 
themselves and returned fire when fired upon. Williams did not promote aggression, but he did 
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advocate armed self-defense.
91
 His viewpoint was considered radical, despite the fact that “years 
of terrorist actions against law-abiding black citizens by racist whites and the sanctioning of 
those acts by local authorities” helped him arrive at his position.92 That fact that a black man 
would challenge a white man, regardless of the reason, was a violation of the unwritten codes of 
behavior in the South.  
 The day after Williams and others vanquished the Klan at Perry’s house, the physician 
was arrested on “the charge of performing a criminal abortion on a white woman,” an allegation 
he vehemently denied.
93
 He was released on bond; however, his trial occupied the front pages of 
Monroe’s two newspapers for the remainder of the year. In addition to the accusation leveled at 
Perry, whites perpetrated various acts of violence on Monroe’s black citizens, with no legal 
redress. For example, there was an attempted rape of Mary Ruth Reid, a pregnant black woman, 
by Lewis Medlin, a white man; a black female hotel worker was kicked down a flight of stairs by 
a white man; and black neighborhoods were randomly attacked.
94
 At the same time, Williams’s 
insurance company canceled his auto coverage because he was a KKK target. Citing the rocks 
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thrown at his car and home several times by people driving by at night, the insurer said it was 
forced to cancel the comprehensive and collision portions of his policy.
95
 
 One month before the kissing incident, Williams tried unsuccessfully to enroll his 
children at the all-white school, further arousing the ire of local whites. Speaking of life in 
Monroe, Williams’s wife Mabel later recalled, “I don't think that the white society—they didn't 
look on us as human beings. They just did not feel that we were people who had to be 
considered. We were just servants and kind of nuisance people in the community, I guess.”96   
By October 1958, racial tensions in Monroe had long been running high, as evidenced by the 
reaction to a kiss exchanged between young children of different races during the course of a 
game.  
Public Relations in the 1950s  
 This dissertation is a historical study; therefore the public relations material here must be 
analyzed within a 1950s context to avoid presentism. To do so, I review how it was defined in 
the 1950s by public relations pioneer and counselor Edward Bernays and Rex Harlow, an 
accomplished public relations practitioner and educator. As illustration, I include examples of 
public relations practice in the late 1950s. 
 In his 1952 book Public Relations, Bernays wrote that public relations covers three areas 
of activity: information, persuasion, and integration.
97
 He defined public relations as information 
given to the public; persuasion directed at the public to influence their attitudes or actions; and 
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efforts to integrate actions or attitudes of an organization with its publics, and vice versa.
98
 
Bernays outlined the elements of public relations planning as conducting research, setting 
objectives, identifying publics, developing and implementing tactics, and evaluation.
99
 He 
stressed the importance of having clearly defined objectives, and as examples, provided the 
following: intensify already existing favorable attitudes, get the target audience to take a specific 
action, convert disbelievers, or disrupt certain viewpoints.
100
 He also referred to the public 
relations process as the “engineering of consent,” explaining that if the public is convinced of the 
soundness of an idea, it will proceed to act on it.  
 In 1957, Rex Harlow offered a similar definition: “The public relations man must devote 
a large part of his time and efforts to attracting the attention of people, arousing their interest in 
his enterprise, winning their consent to consider his messages, and stimulating them to certain 
types of desired action.
101
 A public relations counselor, Harlow added, “strives to “sell” them on 
his enterprise—on its products, services, policies, personnel, management, program, or future 
plans; or, as the case may be, on such thing as the righteousness of the cause he champions.”102 
In some instances, the goal of a public relations program is to influence attitudes and affect 
public opinion, which Harlow acknowledged could be extremely difficult. Other public relations 
efforts focus solely on spurring the public to take a specific action, such as buying a product or 
writing a letter to an elected official.  
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 From its inception, publicity was important to the NAACP. According to historian Robert 
Jack, “When the NAACP was organized, it was immediately discovered that it must maintain 
means of publicity through which the work would become widespread, thus arousing interest and 
support from those who felt that the organization was fostering a worthy cause.”103 In a history 
of the NAACP, Warren St. James noted the association’s “well-staffed public relations 
department,” which “has utilized all the modern means of communication—the press, telephone, 
telegraph, radio, television, and movies.”104 To influence public opinion, the department 
implemented an “educational propaganda” campaign, in which it sent “important newsworthy 
items on Negro achievements to the leading white newspapers in an attempt to offset the 
stereotyped opinions about Negroes that are found among many whites.”105 The purpose was not 
only to sway attitudes of the white public, but also to “educate Negroes to make more positive 
and militant efforts for the attainment of their civil rights.”106 With this campaign, the public 
relations objectives were attitude change among whites and raising awareness and encouraging 
action among blacks.  
 St. James also provided an example of NAACP-conducted research to support these 
efforts. Specifically, the association researched crime statistics and discovered that felonies were 
not synonymous with any one racial group.
107
 The NAACP incorporated this fact in educational 
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materials, which they sent to “schools, libraries, race-relations committees, civil bodies, and 
many other groups and persons interested in advancing democratic concepts and furthering racial 
understanding.”108 Furthermore, St. James addressed evaluation by noting that “there are no 
reliable measurements of the effectiveness of the Association’s efforts in the area of public 
opinion.”109 However by revisiting the NAACP’s chief objective of eliminating discrimination, 
he identified some successes, such as the admission of blacks to southern universities and a 
decline in race-related violence. His example highlights one of the ways public relations was 
measured at the time (and often still is). Specifically, if an organizational objective is achieved, 
the public relations practitioner assumes public relations must have played some role; therefore, 
the public relations efforts are labeled a success. However this approach does not isolate what 
role public relations played, thereby further illustrating the challenges of public relations 
measurement. 
 The January 1959 public relations report for the NAACP’s annual meeting, prepared by 
Public Relations Director Henry Lee Moon, offers another example of public relations practice in 
the 1950s. Moon reminded board members that the NAACP’s public relations objective was to 
enhance its image in order to gain public acceptance of its programs, methods, and goals.
110
 One 
of its main constituencies was the black public, which Moon acknowledged was not fully 
informed about the NAACP and its activities. With the white public, Moon segmented them into 
three groups: those who were incontrovertible and opposed to everything the NAACP stood for, 
those who were committed to the NAACP’s position, and those whose moral principles 
                                                 
108
 Ibid. 
 
109
 Ibid., 109. 
 
110
 Henry Lee Moon, “Problems and Goals of NAACP Public Relations Activities: Report of the Department of 
Public Relations,” 49th NAACP Annual Meeting, January 5, 1959, Group III, Box A36, NAACP Papers. 
 
27 
 
conflicted with their current actions and viewpoint.
111
 Moon believed that changing attitudes of 
the first group was beyond the NAACP’s public relations efforts. Instead, public relations 
programs should be targeted primarily to the third group, whose members were open to 
alternative viewpoints. Moon reminded board members of the difficulty of this work “because 
our program challenges deeply rooted prejudices.”112 Without mentioning Bernays by name, 
Moon wrote, “The task of meeting these problems involves what one expert has called the 
‘engineering of consent’ in an area of human relations full of emotional booby-traps.”113 Moon 
also defined objectives, segmented audiences, and stressed the importance of evaluation. 
 Furthermore, his public relations counsel illustrated that with some audiences, the 
primary purpose of public relations was to inform and educate, whereas with others, the 
objective was to disrupt existing viewpoints. Among the public relations tactics referenced by 
Moon and Bernays were writing and distributing communication material such as press releases, 
leaflets, bulletins, fact sheets, telegrams, letters, postcards, and brochures; speakers’ bureaus; 
engaging audiences via conventions and events; holding press conferences; and arranging 
interviews in print and broadcast media outlets.  
 To summarize, public relations practice in the 1950s used communication tools to create 
awareness, influence attitudes and/or behavior, and to spur action. Public relations plans included 
objectives, target audiences, strategies, tactics, and occasionally, evaluation. Public relations 
tools included the following: press releases; press conferences; print and broadcast media 
interviews, whose purpose was to secure publicity; speaking engagements; speakers’ bureaus; 
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special events; and a variety of written material, such as pamphlets, flyers, fact sheets, letters, 
telegrams, petitions, and postcards. Notwithstanding changes in technology, the public relations 
tools and elements of a public relations plan used in the 1950s are still being used in today’s 
practice.  
Public Relations and Propaganda 
 Most examinations of public relations history cannot avoid the overlap between the terms 
“public relations” and “propaganda.” Although contemporary use of “propaganda” connotes 
pernicious behavior, Scott Cutlip posited that propaganda is an essential part of the public 
relations function if the word is used neutrally, because practitioners often propagate a cause, 
institution, or individual.
114
 At the time of the kissing case, the terms were often used 
interchangeably, therefore the link between the terms must be addressed to avoid presentism. 
Thus, the last part of this background section considers the interplay between public relations 
and propaganda.  
 Public relations historian Jacquie L’Etang examined the challenges of trying to define 
public relations and propaganda as separate concepts. She found the term “propaganda” was not 
always cloaked in negativity. “Propaganda” began its descent into disrepute after World War I, 
and the decline accelerated after World War II, when propaganda was associated with Nazi 
manipulation. However despite its adverse subtexts, L’Etang argues that as late as the 1950s, 
“public relations practitioners in non-governmental contexts remained comfortable with the 
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term…and many…used the terms interchangeably.”115 Civil rights leader Julian Bond, who 
served as director of public relations for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC) from 1961 to 1966, said the terms “public relations” and “propaganda” were fungible 
because “propaganda” did not always connote negativity. For example, SNCC volunteers may 
have spoken of “distributing our propaganda materials.”116 Today, action phrased that way would 
likely be seen as an insidious practice focused on manipulation of truth. Yet in the mid-twentieth 
century, the expression meant that a public relations practitioner was disseminating public 
relations material, such as press releases, letters, flyers, or brochures. As L’Etang points out, part 
of the problem has been identifying the difference between acceptable and unacceptable forms of 
persuasion, as well as intention, moral position, and behavior. SNCC’s organizational goals, and 
its corresponding public relations goals, did not include using chicanery to achieve them. Asked 
how civil rights organizations used the term “propaganda” in the 1950s and 1960s, Bond replied, 
“We meant it to be something good!”117 
Literature Review 
Theoretical Framework 
 Writing in The Souls of Black Folks, W.E.B. Du Bois in 1908 identified the problem of 
the twentieth century as “the problem of the color line.”118 Twenty-five years later, historian 
Ulrich B. Phillips wrote that Southerners were unified in their fierce determination to keep the 
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region a white man’s country.119Although race-related issues were not limited to the South, 
Philips argued that the preservation of white dominion was a central theme of Southern 
history.
120
 Given its dynamics, the kissing case certainly cannot be analyzed without taking race 
into account. However the construct of race has changed over time; therefore, this proposed 
dissertation must incorporate an understanding of race in the 1950s. To do so, it employs racial 
formation theory as a foundation in its analysis. In addition, because this study is ultimately 
about communication, framing theory will provide a conceptual foundation for the analysis of 
communication material and public opinion. 
Racial Formation Theory 
 The concept of “race” is one that developed over time, and “black” as a racial category 
evolved with the consolidation of racial slavery.
121
 The mutable nature of race is foundational to 
a theoretical approach developed by scholars Howard Winant and Michael Omi. They argue that 
race is not a manifestation of some other category such as biology, ethnicity, nation, or class. 
According to Winant, “Although the concept of race appeals to biologically-based human 
characteristics (phenotypes), selection of these particular human features for purposes of racial 
signification is always and necessarily a social and historical process.”122 Further, “There is no 
biological basis for distinguishing human groups along the lines of race, and the sociohistorical 
categories employed to differentiate among these groups reveal themselves, upon serious 
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examination, to be imprecise if not completely arbitrary.”123 Put another way, “Races do not 
emerge full-blown.”124 Instead, “They are the result of diverse historical practices and are 
continually subject to challenge over their definition and meaning.”125 
 Omi and Winant posit that race is a sociohistorical concept in which “racial categories 
and the meaning of race are given concrete expression by the specific social relations and 
historical context in which they are embedded.”126 They define “racial formation” as “the process 
by which social, economic, and political forces determine the content and importance of racial 
categories, and by which they are in turn shaped by racial meanings.”127 Race is an organizing 
principle of social relationships that operates at both a micro and macro level. At the micro level, 
racial meanings and awareness reflect the formation of individual identity through day-to-day 
practices and interactions.
128
 Concurrently, the macro level of race is a matter of collective 
economic, political, and cultural/ideological social structures. Racial order is organized and 
reinforced between the interplay of these two levels.
129
 Racial discrimination, then, reflects a 
macro-level set of social practices that have consequences at the micro level. 
 Elaborating on their theory, Omi and Winant describe race as “an unstable and 
decentered complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle.”130  
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The transformation of race takes place over time through “political contestation over racial 
meanings.”131 At any given time, there can be many different racial discourses and many 
different interpretations of race.
132
 An example of the changeable nature of race can be seen in 
the various definitions of “Negro” in laws prohibiting black/white intermarriage.133 While some 
states decided that individuals with any black ancestry or “blood” were considered black, other 
states decried that a person was black if he had one-eighth percent black blood.
134
 Virginia at one 
point had one-quarter as its percentage, but later changed it to one-sixteenth before ultimately 
deciding that any amount of “Negro” blood made an individual a “Negro.” Further complicating 
definitions of race were instances in which a mixed-race person might knowingly or 
unintentionally pass for white. Along with the varying determinate of what constituted a black 
person, the fact that an individual might visually be perceived as having white skin, despite 
having a drop of black blood, further reflects the inconsistency of the race construct itself. 
 A key element of racial formation theory is the racial project, which is “simultaneously 
an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics and an effort to organize and 
distribute resources along particular racial lines.”135 A racial project is an attempt at racial 
signification and identity formation, as well as a political initiative focused on organization and 
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redistribution.
136
  Elites, popular movements, state agencies, religions, and intellectuals of all 
types develop racial projects, which interpret and reinterpret the meaning of race.
137
 The modern 
civil rights movement is an example of a racial project. Thus, public relations activities in 
support of African American civil rights were part a racial project. 
 Omi and Winant posit that “race is a significant dimension of hegemony, that it is deeply 
infused with the power, order, and indeed the meaning systems of every society in which it 
operates.”138 They describe the pre-modern civil rights era as one of racial domination, in which 
the racial order was maintained by any means necessary so that whites could retain power. In the 
civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, the established system of racial meanings and 
identities experienced increasing strain and opposition, when individuals and organizations 
contested collective and individual meanings of race.
139
 The civil rights movement challenged 
the racial hegemony that had been established via the racial state, which is comprised of 
“institutions, the policies they carry out, the conditions and rules which support and justify them, 
and the social relations in which they are embedded.”140 The racial state can absorb, slight or 
inhibit a movement. In the 1960s, the racial state began absorbing the changes.
141
 The civil rights 
movement challenged entrenched racial practices and stereotypes and pushed for blacks’ entry 
into the political and economic process. Consequently, racial awareness, racial meanings, and 
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racial subjectivity began transforming, resulting in “the politicization of black identity or the 
rearticulation of black collective subjectivity.”142 This change resulted in another racial project, 
which became known as the black power movement. At the same time, the racial state 
democratized new social structures and created new organizations and political norms.
143
 
 According to scholar Barbara J. Allen, the social construction of race has important 
implications for communication studies because racial formation processes occur through 
communication.
144
 In this dissertation, I explore how race and racism were reflected in the public 
relations materials within the historical and social context of 1958. Furthermore, the social codes 
of behavior dictated by race may provide insights into why the CCRI and Governor Hodges 
chose the public relations strategies they did. As the CCRI pushed to challenge racial injustice 
and disrupt long-standing racial practices, Hodges, as part of the racial state, fought to inhibit this 
action and maintain the status quo. Thus, this dissertation incorporates racial formation theory in 
its analysis of the public relations campaigns and corresponding public opinion. 
Frame Analysis  
 This dissertation uses frame analysis to examine primary-source evidence related to the 
kissing case. According to Robert Entman, “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived 
reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
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recommendation for the item described.”145 Entman asserts that communicators make framing 
judgments, either consciously or unconsciously. Through word choice, placement, inclusion, 
exclusion and emphasis, frames highlight some bits of information about an item that is the 
subject of a communication, making it more noticeable or meaningful.  
 Frames can reflect prevailing attitudes, and they are “organizing principles that are 
socially shared and persistent over time that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the 
social world.”146 Framing also is a process based in and bound by culture, and it reflects how 
forces and groups in society try to shape public discourse about an issue.
147
 Frames define the 
roles social actors play and outline the interrelationship between beliefs, values and actions.
148
 
Within various frames employed, “A particular group may been seen as an essential actor in 
resolving a social problem, while in another the same group may be perceived as peripheral to its 
resolution or even a source of the problem itself.”149 The source of frames can stem from “the 
deliberate attempt of individuals or groups to structure public discourse in a way that privileges 
their goals and means of attaining them.”150 This aspect of framing is particularly relevant to this 
dissertation because I examine frames used by groups to influence opposing sides of an issue. 
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For example, it is expected the CCRI will have employed frames to help free the boys, whereas 
Governor Hodges will have framed communication in a way to justify the boys’ incarceration. 
In addition to the ways that frames work within communication, other scholarship has examined 
their effects. Framing effects occur when changes in the presentation of an issue or an event 
(how it is framed) cause a change in public opinion.
151
  
 According to Hank Johnson, “Whether framing activities are done by the media or by a 
social movement organization, they count only insofar as they penetrate the ‘black box’ of 
mental life to serve as determinants of how a situation is defined, and therefore acted upon.”152 In 
studying framing effects, Fuyuan Shen argued it is “important to differentiate news frames from 
individual frames or schemas.”153 News frames are those carried in the media, whereas 
individual frames are “schemas or knowledge structures that guide individuals’ information 
processing.”154 In acting upon an individual’s knowledge structures, media frames can cause a 
shift in interpretation or attitude. However, because individuals have different schemas on issues, 
effects are not uniform among all members of an audience. Shen found that when news frames 
were consistent with individual frames, audiences were more likely to generate frame-related 
thoughts and display frame-consistent attitudes.
155
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 Similarly, Nicolas Winter posits that individual racial and gender schemas can be 
activated by frames.
156
 Specifically, if an issue is matched to an individual’s racial schema, the 
person will apply their thoughts and feelings about race relations to the issue.
157
 A number of 
studies have had findings similar to those of Shen and Winter, concluding not only that news 
frames become more salient when they support audiences’ existing attitudes, but that frames can 
activate existing racial prejudices and stereotypes.
158
 
 Both Shen’s and Winter’s findings are pertinent to this dissertation because as part of my 
examination of public relations campaigns, I explore audience segmentation, which in some 
instances was done by issue schema. The NAACP, for example, recognized that among its white 
publics, changing the attitudes of those who were in complete opposition to the organization was 
beyond the purview of its public relations efforts. In other words, the issue schemas advanced by 
the NAACP did not match the racial schemas of those the NAACP deemed incontrovertible. As 
NAACP Director Henry Lee Moon wrote, “The higher the regard for the Negro, the more 
acceptable is the NAACP and its program. Conversely, the lower the esteem in which the Negro 
is held and the lower his self-esteem, the more difficult is our task.”159 The NAACP directed its 
public relations efforts towards citizens whose views of African Americans reflected a middle 
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ground, described by Moon as those “who find the teachings of democracy and their religion in 
conflict with the practices they follow.”160 Stated differently, their beliefs about inequality, 
justice, and liberty were in conflict with their actions. Therefore, the NAACP targeted its public 
relations efforts to whites whose racial schemas conflicted with their moral schemas, 
theoretically making them receptive to alternative viewpoints. 
 In addition to explanations of frames as content features that produce media effects, 
scholars have called for work that explores the relationship between frames and political and 
social power.
161
 Specifically, they argue that the interaction between social movements and the 
news media provides a relevant means to evaluate the relationship between framing and power. 
According to the authors, the ability of social movements to challenge existing power structures 
is tied directly to their framing processes and effectiveness in influencing news discourse. 
Marginalized groups use frames to “highlight their concerns, mobilize support, and validate their 
existence as political actors.”162 On the other hand, elites use frames to maintain their power 
position and disrupt the frames of marginalized groups. These conflicting frames often result in 
framing contests, or a “struggle over framing.”163 This call for additional studies of framing and 
power is particularly relevant to this dissertation. The NAACP and CCRI represented a 
marginalized group that challenged the actions of those in power (Hodges and the USIA.) All 
four groups incorporated frames in their public relations material, and the corresponding framing 
contest between the marginalized and the elites reflected a struggle for power.  
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 Framing of social issues also has been explored in terms of responsibility. Jon 
Hanson and Kathleen Hanson explored the ways that elites have framed responsibility for racial 
injustice, and their research is germane to this dissertation. They argue that people generally 
crave justice and will actively work to eliminate injustice. However, with racial injustice, rather 
than stop the discriminatory behavior, groups with power justify their actions by “conceiving of 
the victim as a person who actually deserves to suffer.”164 Stated differently, elites create an 
illusion of justice through assumptions, arguments, or stereotypes about the blameworthiness of 
the victim.
165
 This process entails not only blaming the victim, but excusing the perpetrator. 
Within a broader blame frame, the authors identify three frames: the god frame, the nature frame, 
and the choice frame. Under the god frame, a person’s behavior and place in society have been 
mandated by God, who supposedly created whites as superior and blacks as inferior. The nature 
frame deflects blame by relying on anthropology and biological schema in which blacks are 
presumed to be genetically inferior to whites. In the choice frame, what happens to an individual 
reflects his preferences and choices; outcomes are controlled by those who experience them. An 
individual has a good outcome because he has chosen such an outcome and in turn, those who 
experience poor outcomes chose that result. Correspondingly, an individual’s position in society 
reflects his ability to make good or bad choices and “good people enjoy good outcomes, and bad 
outcomes happen to bad people.”166 In other words, if a minority group experiences hardship, it 
was not the dominant group that inflicted the adversity. Instead, under the choice frame, 
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minorities choose and prefer their experiences. The choice frame excuses racial injustice as being 
situationally determined by market forces or individuals’ choices, and “any other outcome would 
impede or ignore the preferences of people entitled to choose for themselves.”167 With the 
kissing case, responsibility for the boys’ incarceration is an issue reflected in Governor Hodges’s 
public relations campaign. Therefore, I consider these blame frames in my analysis of Hodges’s 
communication strategies and tactics. 
 This dissertation examines the communication of an issue that transpired within cultural 
and societal mores. Given the social structure of frames, framing theory provides a fitting 
theoretical foundation from which to examine the groups’ communication. Furthermore, these 
four groups occupied different social positions, and framing provides a basis by which to review 
their discourse from a dominant versus subaltern social group perspective.  
Framing Analysis and Public Relations 
 Framing analysis is typically applied to news content, yet some scholars have used it to 
examine public relations messages.
168
 For example, in perhaps the only public relations and 
framing study focused on issues pertaining to African Americans, Stephynie Chapman Perkins 
compared the NAACP’s frames and corresponding news frames regarding the 2000 election of 
George W. Bush.
169
 To identify the NAACP’s messages, Perkins examined press releases and 
information on the organization’s website. She found the frames advanced by the NAACP 
focused on the following: advocacy, in which the NAACP positioned itself as the nation’s 
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leading civil rights organization; black voter disenfranchisement; unfair and illegal voting 
practices; unresponsive government; and a divisive Bush administration. According to Perkins, 
the media did not focus on these frames, instead writing about which candidate would prevail 
and by what margin. Although she concluded the mainstream media ignored the NAACP’s 
messages, Perkins does not address the possibility that the media did not read the press releases 
and other information on the NAACP’s website, nor does she consider other explanations the 
NAACP’s frames were ignored. 
For the 2000 election, Chapman noted the NAACP invested in a multi-million dollar 
media blitz to reach its publics. Although she does not identify the purpose of this blitz, she 
noted that minority voter turnout increased significantly in various states. If the purpose was to 
increase minority voter turnout, the public relations frames should have supported this objective. 
Instead, the NAACP used many different frames, apparently without linking them to a specific 
objective, thereby fragmenting its messages. Furthermore, although the NAACP does not 
endorse political candidates, it was concerned about the impact of a conservative administration 
on black civil rights; however, its frames in the 2000 election do not address this issue in relation 
to black voter disenfranchisement.  
 After the election, if an NAACP goal was to communicate election fraud, the 
organization should have identified and segmented the relevant publics, developed related 
messages and frames targeted to those publics, and identified communication channels that 
would best reach those audiences. Overall, the NAACP had too many messages and too many 
frames, none of which appeared to be explicitly linked to communication or organizational 
objectives. The number of frames diluted the power of any one frame, which may have caused 
confusion among reporters. Instead of conveying a clear direction, the multiple frames raised a 
42 
 
number of questions, such as whether the NAACP was focused on getting blacks to vote, on 
black voter disenfranchisement, or on reservations with the Bush administration. The NAACP 
might have been focused on all these issues, but communicating them simultaneously muddled 
the frames, which probably contributed to the reason they were ignored by the media. However, 
Perkins does not address these possibilities in her study. 
 Barbara Barnett also examined frames in public relations documents, specifically 
focusing on news releases generated by the National Organization for Women (NOW) from 
1995 to 2003. Instead of looking at how the press framed the women’s movement, Barnett’s 
qualitative study investigated how the women’s movement framed itself. She analyzed more than 
100 news releases produced by NOW and found three key frames the organization used to 
convey its messages: vigilance, unity, and deviance. In the vigilance frame, NOW presented 
itself as watchful of government institutions and corporations, especially those that falsely 
claimed to have women’s best interests at heart. The unity frame highlighted NOW’s allegiance 
with others committed to fighting discrimination. NOW stressed the common bond among 
women, as well as the experiences they shared with racial minorities. In constructing the 
deviance frame, NOW cast its opponents as dishonest, contemptuous, and irrational. In using 
these three frames, Barnett surmised that a critical component of NOW’s public relations effort 
was to challenge media frames that depicted NOW as dissident and rebellious, while also 
redefining the language used to characterize the women’s movement.170 Barnett noted that 
frames may be corrective, as in NOW’s efforts to counter entrenched stereotypes about women 
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that were reinforced by the mainstream press.
171
 Based on her findings, Barnett concluded that 
public relations practitioners can use framing not only to define debates and correct 
misperceptions, but to challenge journalistic frames “that ignore or dismiss the work of social 
movement organizations.”172 Barnett’s study helps inform this study’s examination of how 
frames may have been used to combat and correct racial stereotypes and other misinformation.  
 Barnett acknowledged that her study did not examine newspaper coverage of NOW; 
therefore, she was unable to determine if NOW’s frames were suffused in the media. Although 
Barnett noted that NOW’s frames reflected its organizational goals, it was beyond the scope of 
her study to determine if the frames helped NOW achieve these goals. An aim of this historical 
study is to examine how public relations frames might have helped an organization achieve its 
goals. 
 Although he did not analyze frames in public relations material, Kirk Hallahan suggested 
how framing may be applicable to public relations practice. The foundation for his proposition is 
that public relations involves the construction of social reality. Specifically, Hallahan surmises 
that public relations counselors define reality for organizations “by shaping organizational 
perspectives about the outside world.”173 At the same time, communication directed outward 
from the organization attempts to define reality related to the organization on behalf of its 
various publics. Although Hallahan says this construction process may be construed as 
manipulation, he argues that defining reality is the essence of communication, and 
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“constructionists would argue that the process is neither inherently good or bad.”174 Hallahan 
highlights the role of framing in the social construction of reality “because it helps shape the 
perspectives through which people see the world.”175 In suggesting how framing can be useful in 
examining the strategic creation of public relations messages and audience responses, Hallahan 
identified seven categories that identify what can be framed: situations, attributes, choices, 
actions, issues, responsibility and news. Hallahan used crisis communication as an example of 
how a public relations practitioner might employ the seven categories in combination.
176
  
Specifically, the public relations counselor would gather facts about the situation and ascertain 
what occurred or did not occur. She would identify issues surrounding the crisis, including 
responsibility. Based on her findings, she would recommend specific actions, ultimately 
consolidating these frames into how the company’s news will be presented to its various publics.  
 Hallahan’s seven models can be particularly beneficial to an analysis of framing used in 
public relations, in that he has provided a typology of tangibles and abstractions that can be 
framed. In this dissertation’s examination of frames in public relations material, including press 
releases, pamphlets, flyers, fact sheets, and letters, three of Hallahan’s categories help guide this 
dissertation’s analysis: framing of actions, framing of issues, and framing of responsibility. 
For communicators, a key concern is how to frame actions necessary to achieve 
compliance with a desired goal.
177
 In its public relations campaign to free the boys, one of the 
CCRI’s strategies was to encourage the public to take an action, specifically to write a letter to 
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the governor asking him to free the boys. As a result of the CCRI’s campaign, Hodges received 
hundreds of letters protesting the boys’ sentence. As part of my analysis, I examine the frames in 
the CCRI’s communication material to illuminate how the committee appealed to the public to 
write to Hodges. 
 Hallahan describes an issue as “a dispute between two or more parties, usually over the 
allocation of resources or the treatment or portrayal of groups in society.”178 Parties involved in 
an issue often incorporate framing in their attempts to explain their position and sway others to 
their viewpoints. With the issue of the boys’ sentencing, I look for common frames in the letters 
Hodges received from the public and explore how those frames may have been used to influence 
Hodges to free the boys.  
 According to Hallahan, most issues and social problems entail questions of cause and 
responsibility. This category is particularly relevant in analyzing Hodges’s public relations 
campaign.
179
 Part of his strategy was to focus on the boys’ delinquency as the primary reason for 
their incarceration, thereby ascribing responsibility to the victim for his circumstances and in 
turn, deflecting blame from the perpetrator. This dissertation analyzes how Hodges framed 
responsibility in his public relations material and in response, how the public framed their letters 
to him. 
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African Americans in Public Relations History  
 In 1994, Scott Cutlip published The Unseen Power: Public Relations, a History, which 
according to some scholars, remains a seminal work.
180
 Although Cutlip surmised “the use of 
communication to influence public opinion and human behavior is as old as civilization,” he 
started his history at the dawn of the twentieth century, when he believed the roots of the public 
relations profession “flowered.”181 His 776-page book focuses on public relations agencies and 
their founders, with profiles of the industry’s “influential pioneers.”182 In the prologue, Cutlip 
noted that critics may lament the book’s absence of black public relations counselors and the 
dearth of women. This omission, he asserted, “is a fact of history, not a choice of mine.”183 On 
the contrary, this omission may be more reflective of a “great man” outlook in which the 
recognized leaders were not just men, but white men. For example, Cutlip makes no mention of 
the NAACP’s Henry Lee Moon, an African American public relations counselor who began his 
career as a press agent for the Tuskegee Institute in 1924, after receiving a bachelor’s and 
master’s degree in journalism from Howard University and Ohio State University, 
respectively.
184
 Among his career accomplishments, Moon served as director of public relations 
for the NAACP from 1948 until his retirement in 1974. Given Cutlip’s focus on public relations 
agency men, Moon may have been omitted because he had no agency experience. On the other 
hand, Moss Kendrix—also neglected in Cutlip’s history—founded an eponymous public 
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relations firm after working at the Department of the Treasury promoting war bonds and later 
serving as director of public relations for the Republic of Liberia’s centennial celebration.185 One 
of his agency’s key clients was the Coca-Cola Corporation, for whom he developed pioneering 
and successful public relations campaigns that targeted the African American market.
186
 
 The reason for mentioning Moon and Kendrix is not to highlight their accomplishments, 
although both men are certainly worthy of further study. Instead, it is to show that either or both 
could have been included in Cutlip’s book. Hence, Cutlip’s claim that blacks and women were 
not part of public relations history reflects his particular way of seeing, not historical fact. As 
further evidence of Cutlip’s restricted view, the 1988 book Blacks and Public Relations: History 
and Bibliography, profiles a number of black public relations pioneers, including Joseph V. 
Baker.
187
 Born in 1908, Baker spent his early career as a government administrator and later was 
the Philadelphia Inquirer’s first black journalist. In 1934, Baker became public relations 
consultant for the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. Over the next 40 years, his eponymous 
public relations firm provided counsel for clients such as RCA, Procter and Gamble, NBC, Scott 
Paper, Hamilton Watch Corporation, Chrysler, and Gillette.
188
 
 In addition to the exclusion of African American public relations counselors, Cutlip 
provides scant mention of any public relations campaigns developed by his 17 white pioneers (15 
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men and two women) on behalf of African Americans. One of Cutlip’s public relations 
forerunners, William H. Baldwin, served on the board of trustees of the historically black Fisk 
University. Cutlip stated that Baldwin used his public relations expertise to direct a fund-raising 
drive for the university, which included promoting the Fisk Jubilee Singers. Cutlip includes that 
Baldwin’s mother co-founded the National Urban League on Urban Conditions Among Negroes, 
which was later shortened to the Urban League. Baldwin worked briefly at the Urban League, 
although from Cutlip’s description it does not appear that he did so in a public relations capacity. 
In addition to Fisk University, Baldwin served on the boards of the Urban League and the 
Southern Education Foundation. Cutlip wrote that, “Advancing African American education and 
improving the lot of the African Americans was a consuming interest of Baldwin as long as he 
lived.”189  Although Cutlip includes descriptions of a public relations campaigns conducted by 
Baldwin, there was no mention of any public relations work focused on African American issues, 
other than the fund-raising campaign for Fisk in the early 1920s. 
 In the section on Edward Bernays, Cutlip describes some of the many campaigns 
developed by Bernays and his wife and business partner Doris Fleischman. However Cutlip 
omits their work in handling publicity for the NAACP’s annual convention in 1920, which was 
the first time the event had been held in the South. In contrast, Bernays devoted a chapter to this 
work in his memoirs, and he gave credit to the instrumental role played by Fleischman.
190
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 Cutlip continued his exploration of public relations history in a subsequent book that 
covered the seventeenth to the twentieth century, in which he described early attempts at using 
communication to influence attitudes and behavior that would today be termed “public 
relations.” Cutlip focused on how public relations played a role in number of events and for well-
known figures in United States history, such as the Revolutionary War, various presidential 
campaigns, and the westward expansion. While Cutlip’s broad-ranging case studies provide an 
interesting overview of early public relations practice, he provided no criteria for inclusion. For 
example, he includes Clara Barton and the American Red Cross, but excludes the women’s 
suffrage movement, which employed a range of media forms to advocate its cause. Although 
Cutlip again excluded the work of African Americans, he noted that much of the anti-slavery 
work of abolitionist and newspaper publisher William Lloyd Garrison could be considered early 
public relations practice.
191
 In addition, Cutlip posits that Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin “stands as one of the powerful propaganda tracts of all time.”192 By doing so, Cutlip 
acknowledged that race-related work played a role in early public relations. However given the 
impact of African American political, economic, and social issues on US history, Cutlip’s brief 
mention of Garrison and Stowe presents a skewed outlook in which African Americans are 
underrepresented.  At the end of his book, he devoted a chapter to the growth of social service 
organizations and the role of public relations in promoting social change. This chapter includes 
no African American issues related to social change, nor does it include the work of any black 
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public relations practitioners. In a list of thirty-four national organizations promoting social 
change, the only one focused on African American issues is the NAACP.
193
 
 For the reader of Cutlip’s two books on public relations history, blacks are largely absent, 
as practitioners and audiences. In a 1997 study, Linda Childers Hon proclaimed “the historical 
record of African Americans’ contribution to public relations remains largely unwritten.”194 
Among the reasons she cites for this marginalization is the business and corporate focus of most 
historical accounts of public relations. She suggested blacks were excluded from most corporate 
and business enterprise, hence their omission from the grand narrative.
195
 This bias has presented 
a distorted, often negative view of public relations as a business tool focused only on serving 
corporate ends. Other scholars also have noted the business-centrism of public relations history, 
arguing that this concentration has come at the expense of other historical frameworks, such as 
political, cultural, religious, or social.
196
  
 Alternatively, a number of scholars have studied the public relations work of activists, 
specifically in the Progressive Era.
197
 As public relations historian Margot Opdycke Lamme 
discovered, some social reform groups had communications plans in place long before the 
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supposed pioneers began practicing public relations.
198
 This broader view of early public 
relations shows it was not solely the purview of white men.  
 A challenge to the white-male-dominant history can be seen in the work of Ida B. Wells’s 
anti-lynching campaign. Frances Ward-Johnson stated that Wells, in her global quest to end 
lynching, “used all the communications tools at her disposal in what today would be considered a 
well-thought-out campaign strategy.”199 A former slave who became a journalist and civil rights 
activist, Wells recognized she needed to increase public awareness of lynching, but before doing 
so, she conducted research, a foundational step in a public relations campaign. As a result of her 
investigation, she challenged the inaccurate view that most black men were lynched for raping 
white women by arguing that, in fact, most of these liaisons were consensual. Wells wrote a 
column that appeared regularly in the top black newspapers, as well as in a few white 
newspapers. In 1889, she also became co-owner of Memphis’s black newspaper, Free Speech. 
After an editorial in which she suggested the term “rape” was often used to cover up consensual 
interracial relations, white leaders in Memphis destroyed her newspaper and printing office. 
Rather than remain in Memphis, she decided to launch a national anti-lynching campaign from 
the North. In addition to editorials, her communication tools included news articles, pamphlets, 
and speaking tours, which she later expanded to Great Britain. Wells was among the first 
activists to communicate to an international audience the brutal treatment inflicted on blacks in 
the American South, a strategy later adopted by other civil rights organizations.
200
 Although 
lynching continued, Ward-Johnson notes that Wells “saw her most important task as placing the 
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facts before the American people, and eventually before the world.”201 Almost 45 years later, 
Myrdal noted that the American people needed to be made aware of the facts of racial injustice, 
writing that “to get publicity is of the highest strategic importance to the Negro people.”202 Wells 
succeeded in raising awareness, which is often a goal of public relations campaigns, and she 
helped clarify misperceptions of lynching. She did so using a number of public relations tools, 
which were later used by other civil rights organizations, such as the NAACP and CCRI. 
 African American women implementing public relations tools on behalf of African-
American causes is also evident in the work of the National Association of Colored Women 
(NACW), formed in part to support Ida B. Wells, who had been vilified by the head of the 
Missouri Press Association because of her anti-lynching crusade. Dulcie Straughan researched 
the origins of the NACW and its public relations tools, including the National Association Notes, 
a newsletter to communicate with current and prospective members.
203
 In her examination of the 
Notes, from the first issue in 1897 until women gained the right to vote in 1920, Straughan found 
the newsletter helped foster unity and pride among black women, while conveying the NACW’s 
focus on advancing the black race, strengthening the black community, and fighting social and 
legal wrongs, such as Jim Crow laws. The newsletter also covered women’s suffrage, 
temperance, and public health issues. The newsletter demonstrates an important communications 
objective: creating audience awareness of an organization’s issues. In this way, it helps inform 
this examination of how the CCRI created awareness of the kissing case. 
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 One of the “earliest” studies of public relations and the civil rights movement was 
conducted by Childers Hon in 1997. She referred to the modern civil rights movement as “one of 
the most spectacular public relations campaigns ever waged.”204 Hon argued that textbooks 
include other social and political movements as examples of public relations in history, but the 
modern civil rights movement has been excluded.
205
 To fill this gap, she conducted research to 
“describe and analyze the public relations elements of the civil rights movement” from 1955 to 
1968.
206
 Specifically, Hon focused on the communication strategies of the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (SCLC). Although her statement of purpose may have been broad given 
that SCLC was but one organization among many that worked on behalf of African American 
civil rights, her scholarship is valuable in that it filled a void.  
 Hon found that SCLC developed “strategic public relations in the form of rhetorical 
communication, situational use of one- and two-way models of public relations, alliance 
building, political advocacy, consumer boycotts, and several grassroots communication 
efforts.”207 As an example of a rhetorical strategy, Hon cites SCLC’s stance of nonviolence. 
Another public relations strategy Hon identifies is building alliances with groups such as black 
churches and other civil rights organizations. These two strategies illustrate a criticism of Hon’s 
study, namely it does not define public relations. Therefore it appears that Hon labeled as public 
relations any action, including consumer boycotts and voter registration. Although she has not 
described what constitutes public relations, Hon broadly defines effective public relations as 
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communication strategies and programs that helped the SCLC achieve its goals.
208
 She claims, 
“Effective public relations clearly was a large element—if not the ultimate component—of 
SCLC’s overall strategy.”209 In other words, SCLC’s strategy was a public relations strategy. 
Hon’s findings are broad in that everything appears to be public relations. Notably, public 
relations historians have called for a greater focus on defining the field itself.
210
 These definitions 
“could lead to much needed elaboration (e.g., how to know that it was PR) and help avoid 
findings that are either too limiting (e.g., PR as media relations) or too broad (e.g., PR as 
everything).”211 This critique extends to Hon’s discussion of evaluation. She concluded that the 
public relations program was effective because SCLC achieved its basic goal of eradicating 
state-supported segregation and discrimination. However without a definition, it is unclear what 
role public relations played in SCLC’s success.  
 Straughan also examined the activities of a civil rights organization, specifically how the 
NAACP used public relations from 1960 to 1965 in its struggle for prominence as other 
organizations began taking a more visible role in the fight for civil rights.
212
 With the 
movement’s influx of young people, along with its increased focus on direct action, protest, and 
grassroots mobilization, a number of civil rights leaders viewed the NAACP’s reliance on legal 
means to affect change as too slow and outdated. Furthermore, audiences took note of protest 
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and direct action, whereas legal and political actions were often behind-the-scenes affairs. After 
conducting research, the NAACP launched a proactive public relations program, developed by 
Executive Secretary Roy Wilkins and Director of Public Relations Henry Lee Moon. According 
to Straughan, Wilkins attributed the NAACP’s reputational problems on poor public relations. In 
defending himself, Moon counseled that any public relations program must reflect the 
organization’s goals and objectives, otherwise it is meaningless or becomes simple press 
agentry.
213
 As a result, the public relations program focused on the NAACP’s strengths, which 
included its legal strategy and vast political network. In addition to illustrating the strategic 
thinking shown by Moon, Straughan’s research is valuable in that it shows the NAACP using 
public relations not only to fight for African American civil rights, but to fight for its reputation. 
At the same time, this study provides an example of an how an organizational leader, faced with 
a rapidly changing environment be it social, political or financial, blamed his organization’s 
problems on public relations rather than on leadership and the inability to anticipate and/or adapt 
to change.
214
 This is a problem contemporary practitioners often face, and Straughan’s study 
shows this challenge has an historical antecedent.  
 Kimberly Williams Moore documented the role of public relations in the early years of 
the NAACP. She examined the strategies of the NAACP and the Anti-Defamation League within 
the context of what she referred to as “the hallmarks of public relations: research, media 
relations, face-to-face communication and publications/literature.”215 Moore found that public 
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relations was instrumental to both organizations’ early successes. With the NAACP, Moore 
noted the organization linked research and publicity, well before Edward Bernays would 
document the need to do so.
216
 In addition, she discovered that many of the tactics the NAACP 
practiced in the early 1900s would later be used by other groups advocating for social change. 
Thus the NAACP was a forerunner among civil rights organizations and moreover, a public 
relations pioneer. 
 Lamenting the exclusion of African Americans in public relations history, Marcia Taylor 
examined civil rights leader Bayard Rustin’s role in the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and 
Freedom through the lens of public relations.
217
 Taylor explored Rustin’s activities as March 
organizer in the context of contemporary public relations theories and practices. She argued that 
Rustin’s work would today be labelled as public relations and therefore, Rustin should be 
included in the history of public relations. However, Taylor did not explore public relations 
practices of the 1960s. Had she done so, her study might have provided additional insights into 
the historical development of public relations. Furthermore, one wonders if involvement in a 
single event makes one a public relations practitioner, even if that event is a watershed moment 
in civil rights history. As the March’s chief architect, Rustin was involved in a number of 
activities, including but certainly not limited to public relations. Rustin had a long career as a 
civil rights activist, but Taylor does not examine his other involvements to determine if they too 
could be labeled public relations. A more valuable contribution to the role of African Americans 
in public relations may be to study the overall public relations planning, strategies and tactics 
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implemented for the March on Washington. The March involved of a number of organizations, 
such as the NAACP, the Urban League, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC), SCLC, and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). Each of the organizations 
jockeyed to communicate its role in the March, often competing for visibility.
218
 Examining the 
public relations work of each of these organizations, including the important contribution of 
Bayard Rustin, may provide a more thorough study of how black civil rights activists 
communicated their organization’s messages, while relaying the March’s overarching call for 
jobs and freedom for black Americans. 
 As an example, although civil rights leader Julian Bond served as director of 
communications for SNCC, public relations historian Vanessa Murphree did not limit her study 
to his work. Rather, she examined in addition the ways that others involved in SNCC’s 
communications used public relations to achieve the organization’s goals.219 In her study, she 
outlined the communication strategies SNCC employed to have its position accurately presented 
in the local and national press at a time when racist viewpoints were often reflected in news 
coverage. Among its public relations tools, SNCC relied on press releases, press conferences, 
newsletters, special events and fundraisers, which Murphree describes as “textbook public 
relations procedures.”220 By analyzing communications in the context of the changing civil rights 
movement, Murphree provides an important case study of the value of public relations in helping 
to foster social change. Murphree explains how SNCC’s public relations tactics shifted with the 
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organization’s change in focus from nonviolent protests and community organizing to political 
activism and finally, to advocating black power.
221
 Her work also adds to the limited scholarship 
on how public relations was used by African Americans to advance the fight for civil rights. 
 Although SNCC had many successes and played a key role in the modern civil rights 
movement, Murphree notes that it is difficult to directly measure the success of SNCC’s 
communication efforts, but “evidence suggests that the impact was significant.”222 She offers that 
SNCC helped set the nation’s agenda via public relations and the press by creating civil rights 
news. Thus, Murphree wrote, “Even without an accurate calculation of printed news releases and 
successful stories pitched, the national media of the day can be reviewed to find extensive 
coverage of SNCC events which were specifically designed to attract the national media and 
consequently the support of the national public.”223 This, along with Murphree’s conclusion that 
it “may be impossible to quantify” the group’s communication accomplishments, implies that the 
quantity of news releases and press clippings is a determinant of public relations success. 
Murphree acknowledged SNCC had no formal evaluation mechanism in place. However, she 
refers to informal success measures, such as integrated lunch counters, passage of civil rights 
legislation, and an increase in the number of registered black voters.
224
 Although Murphree 
posits that “almost every SNCC activity was fueled to some degree by public relations,” it is 
unclear if Murphree is labeling these activities as public relations accomplishments or general 
organizational successes. Her conclusions about evaluation illustrate the challenges of public 
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relations measurement and show the problem is not unique to today’s practice. In this 
dissertation, I address measurement by examining how public relations strategies and tactics 
helped the CCRI achieve its organizational goals.  
Justification 
 Although journalism and mass communication scholars have devoted significant 
attention to the African American press, scholarship on the role of African Americans in public 
relations has been limited. African Americans are largely absent from US public relations 
history, be it as practitioners or in public relations campaigns about African Americans’ civil 
rights. This study helps close that gap by examining a public relations campaign conducted by 
black and white activists on behalf of an issue impacting African Americans. In addition, among 
the few studies of public relations history and African Americans, most have focused on larger 
civil rights organizations, such as the NAACP, SCLC, and SNCC, as well as on prominent 
individuals, such as Martin Luther King Jr. and Bayard Rustin. In contrast, this dissertation looks 
at how public relations was used in grassroots efforts by local activists. According to Aldon 
Morris, community-based civil rights work played a significant role in the origins of civil rights 
movement, but has been overshadowed by the work of larger organizations.
225
 In addition, 
because this study also analyzes public relations outcomes, it adds to the limited scholarship on 
the history of public relations measurement.
226
 Academics and practitioners have long been 
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concerned with the challenges of measuring public relations programs.
227
 As shown in this 
dissertation’s literature review, measurement has been a challenge for the industry. Research and 
discussion have explored different methods for public relations evaluation, which have run the 
gamut from measuring outputs, such as the number of press clippings, to evaluating outcomes, 
such as attitude change, action taken or awareness level.
228
  Although the public relations 
profession today is becoming more focused on assessing outcomes, doing so remains difficult for 
a number of reasons, including the lack of standardized evaluative measures, budgetary and time 
constraints, the historical practice of measuring outputs, and practitioners’ unfamiliarity with 
appropriate measures. 
229
 Despite an ongoing focus on equating public relations success with 
news stories, the public relations industry today has called for a move away from relying on 
news stories as a determinant of effective public relations.
230
 News stories that result from public 
relations efforts are not outcomes; they are outputs. Therefore, while this research reviews some 
news stories in order to present the events of the kissing case, it is less concerned with the 
content and quantity of news stories and instead will focus on the opinions and actions (the 
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outcomes) impacted as a result of reading those news articles and being exposed to other public 
relations tactics (the outputs.)  
 This study helps fill another gap identified in the review of the literature: rather than 
applying framing analysis to newspaper articles, it analyzes frames in public relations materials 
and related public opinion. Also, this dissertation examines Governor Hodges’s reaction to 
public opinion, thereby providing historical context and insights into what today might be called 
reputation management and crisis communication. 
 Additionally, this dissertation adds to the nascent scholarship on the development of 
public relations in the United States.
231
 Some public relations historians have posited that extant 
literature in that subfield has been dominated by a business frame, which results in a flawed and 
incomplete understanding of public relations.
232
 Specifically, an emphasis on corporate public 
relations creates a perception that it was a tool of big business used primarily to manipulate.
233
 
Given this focus, scholars have called for more research into other types of activities, such as 
reform movements, which are “conducted by the people rather that at the people.”234 Karen 
Miller posited, “Research that has utilized other historical lenses has proven insightful.”235 In its 
exploration of a civil rights issue, this dissertation looks at the work of activists in promoting 
social change. Furthermore, by examining how public relations was used by an advocacy group, 
this research can help broaden the view of public relations history. 
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 Finally, although this study does not focus solely on Robert Williams, due to his pivotal 
leadership role in the kissing case it will provide additional insight to his pioneering work as a 
champion of civil rights. Although he has been studied by scholars such as Ronald Stephens and 
Timothy Tyson, his contributions have been largely overlooked in most accounts of the long 
civil rights movement. He advocated black power well before it became a movement, and he 
railed against a society in which blacks were denied full rights as US citizens. His efforts in this 
regard have been minimized or ignored. Moreover, mass communication scholarship about 
Williams has focused on his newsletter and radio work. In contrast, this study offers a different 
perspective by exploring Williams’s work in public relations. 
Research Questions 
 This dissertation focuses on identifying and analyzing the public relations campaigns of 
the CCRI and Governor Hodges, as well as the public relations tactics of the NAACP and USIA 
during the events of the kissing case. Aside from background on the racial environment, this 
study covers the following time period: October 28, 1958, the day the boys were arrested, to 
February 13, 1959, when they were freed. Using racial formation theory and framing theory as 
its foundation, this proposed dissertation asks the following questions: 
 Based on the 1950s-era practice of public relations described earlier in this dissertation, 
how was public relations used by CCRI, the NAACP, Governor Hodges, and the USIA in 
relation to the 1958/1959 kissing case? What strategies and tactics did the four groups 
employ? 
 
 What frames did the four groups use in their public relations material in relation to the 
case? What frames were in the letters the public sent to Hodges, and how did the frames 
relate to those in the four groups’ public relations material? 
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 How was race, as it was constructed and codified via Jim Crow practices in 1958/1959, 
reflected in the four groups’ public relations material and the opinions expressed in the 
letters? 
 
 What do the study’s findings tell us about the practice of public relations historically and 
what can contemporary practitioners learn from the strategies and tactics used by these 
groups? 
Method 
 To answer the research questions, this dissertation employs two methods: the historical 
method and frame analysis, supplemented by two interviews conducted by the author. According 
to Louis Gottschalk, the historical method is “the process of critically examining and analyzing 
the records and survivals of the past.”236 Stressing the importance of these records, William 
David Sloan posits “most of historical methodology deals with sources.”237 In addition, Sloan 
and Michael Stamm aver that “historians must bring thoroughness and tirelessness to the effort 
of collecting and analyzing source material.”238 Put another way, “It is with the sources that any 
account of the historian’s work must begin.”239 Therefore, I have paid particular attention to 
identifying relevant manuscript collections and obtaining documents from those collections 
about the kissing case and its public relations components, as well as on primary source material 
that provides context. I also consulted secondary sources for background on the racial, political 
and social context of 1958. 
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 With each manuscript collection, I examined and reviewed documents to identify those 
relevant to my research. To determine what constitutes a public relations document, I relied on 
the 1950s definitions of public relations outlined earlier in this proposed dissertation. Tosh posits 
that the historical method requires “a secure grasp of context, and in many instances, a high 
degree of technical knowledge.”240 Given the similarity between public relations practice of the 
1950s and today, my knowledge and background in public relations—which has given me 
significant technical knowledge—also informed my examination and evaluation.241  
 The archival material I reviewed includes letters, notes, press releases, reports, plans, 
government records, legal documents, petitions, pamphlets, speeches, flyers, news media stories, 
fact sheets, photographs, and postcards. Notwithstanding the news stories, I refer to these 
documents as public relations outputs—the material produced or the tactics to help achieve the 
public relations objective. These differ from the public relations outcome. Outcomes are the 
changes in awareness, attitude, opinion, knowledge and/or behavior as a result of the public 
relations program. With the kissing case, the outcomes were to create awareness of the boys’ 
dilemma, mobilize public opinion to their cause, and spur the public to write letters to Governor 
Hodges demanding the boys’ freedom. This mass pressure would then result in the ultimate 
outcome: the boys’ freedom. To ascertain public opinion, I reviewed the letters members of the 
public wrote and sent to Hodges in which they expressed their opinions about the kissing case 
and asked Hodges to free the boys. According to Taeku Lee, constituency mail “is a positive, 
proactive conception of public opinion that is especially well-suited for examining activated 
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mass opinion.
242
 Furthermore, “The content of the letters themselves offers an abundance of 
textual and contextual information about the correspondents’ opinions and how they choose to 
express them.”243 Lee added, “Correspondents hold free rein not only over issue definition and 
issue position, but also over how to structure that position—what language to use, which frames 
to conjure, what other issues to link to, and the like.”244  
 In addition, I conducted a telephone interview with Joyce Egginton, the reporter from the 
London News Chronicle who in 1958, broke the story internationally. I conducted an email 
interview with civil rights leader and former SNCC public relations director Julian Bond to 
obtain his perspective on public relations practice of the early 1960s, as well as his recollections 
of the kissing case. These interviews, however, are supplementary to the manuscript collection 
documents, since according to historian John Tosh, the “vividness of personal recall can give an 
exhilarating sense of touching the ‘real’ past,” but are filtered through subsequent experience.245  
 To identify and examine frames in the public relations outputs and outcomes, I employ 
qualitative framing analysis. According to Stephen Reese, “The qualitative turn of much framing 
analysis helps resist the reductionistic urge to sort media texts and discourse into containers and 
count their size or frequency.”246 Reese also posits that “the most important frame may not be the 
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most frequent.”247 I read each of the documents, allowing for what sociologist Stuart Hall 
referred to as “a long preliminary soak, a submission by the analyst to the mass of his 
material.”248 As I continued to read, I took notes to ascertain recurring themes. According to 
Hall, a researcher learns to hear the same underlying appeals, the same notes, being sounded 
again and again in different passages and contexts.
249
 Furthermore, Hall adds that this analysis 
allows the researcher to see areas of emphasis in text by noting position, placement, treatment, 
tone, and stylistic intensification. I identified and analyzed these notes and areas of emphasis as 
frames.  
 Entman explained that frames can be detected by probing for particular words and visual 
images that consistently appear in a narrative and convey thematically consistent meanings 
across media and time.
250
 Similar to Hall’s description, Entman explained, “By providing, 
repeating, and thereby reinforcing words and visual images that reference some ideas but not 
others, frames work to make some ideas more salient in the text, others less so—and others 
entirely invisible. But through repetition, placement, and reinforcing associations with each 
other, the words and images that comprise the frame render one basic interpretation more readily 
discernible, comprehensible, and memorable than others.”251  
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Limitations 
 The opinions examined in this study were those expressed by individuals and groups in 
letters, postcards, and petitions sent to Governor Hodges. No doubt, there were countless citizens 
who did not express their opinions to Hodges about the kissing case. Therefore, the opinions in 
the letters are not generalizable to the entire population. Also, given the qualitative nature of this 
analysis and the fact that this study analyzes one event that occurred over a four-month period, 
the conclusions drawn about public relations practice are not generalizable to all public relations 
practices on behalf of African American causes during the civil rights movement. 
Chapter Outline 
 The kissing case began on October 28, 1958 and was resolved on February 13, 1959. This 
dissertation presents the events of the kissing case chronologically; however; many of these 
events overlapped. The activities of the CCRI and NAACP, who worked to free the boys, will be 
examined in the second chapter. Chapter three will focus on Gov. Hodges’s and the USIA’s 
public relations activities. Hodges sought to justify the boys’ sentencing, thereby protecting his 
reputation and that of North Carolina. Similarly, the USIA targeted its efforts on protecting the 
international reputation of the United States in the midst of the Cold War. Chapter four examines 
the outcome of the kissing case, while chapter five explores the public relations campaigns in 
relation to this dissertation’s theoretical foundation, as well as key learnings for contemporary 
practitioners. 
Chapter 1 
 The first chapter provides an introduction and overview of the topic, background on race 
relations in the South in general, with information on North Carolina generally and Monroe,  
specifically. This chapter defines public relations of the 1950s and addresses the interplay 
between public relations and propaganda. In addition, this chapter includes the literature review, 
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comprised of the theoretical foundation and previous research on public relations and framing, 
and public relations and African American civil rights. The first chapter also includes the 
justification, research questions, and method. 
Chapter 2 
 The second chapter focuses on the public relations work of the CCRI and NAACP. This 
chapter provides additional details on the kissing case as they unfolded, the legal machinations, 
initial news coverage, and the formation of the CCRI on December 19, 1958, to include detail on 
the CCRI’s goals and its public relations strategies and initial tactics. Chapter two also details the 
beginning of the international news coverage in mid-December, the involvement of the NAACP 
in late December and the continued public relations work of the CCRI. 
Chapter 3 
 Chapter three focuses on the public relations efforts of Gov. Hodges and the USIA. In 
January, publicity about the kissing case reached a crescendo, with a significant international 
outcry. As a result, Hodges launched his own public relations campaign, and the USIA 
implemented some public relations tactics. In addition, members of the public expressed their 
views about the case in hundreds of letters and thousands of signatures on petitions. This chapter 
will focus on those activities and events.  
Chapter 4 
 This chapter presents the outcome of the kissing case, and summarizes and analyzes the 
public relations activities implemented by the CCRI, the NAACP, Gov. Hodges, and the USIA 
on behalf of the kissing case. This chapter also provides further exploration of the NAACP’s 
involvement in the kissing case. 
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Chapter 5 
 Chapter five discusses the public relations campaigns, including the frames in the public 
relations material, in relation to racial formation theory, as well as in the context of the role of 
public relations in society. In addition, this chapter presents lessons that contemporary public 
relations practitioners can learn from the public relations campaigns implemented on behalf of 
the kissing case. Chapter five also suggests opportunities for further study. 
Epilogue 
 This chapter provides a brief summary of what later transpired in the lives of the key 
players involved in the kissing case. 
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All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
1
 
 
CHAPTER 2:  THE NAACP and the CCRI 
 Robert Williams had been advocating on behalf of Monroe’s African Americans since his 
return from the Marines in 1955. In demanding that the city’s blacks be afforded the rights to 
which they were entitled by the US Constitution, Williams attempted to integrate the pool, the 
library, and the elementary school. As a result, Monroe’s white citizens viewed Williams as an 
agitator, whereas blacks saw him as a champion.
2
 Therefore, it was not surprising that Williams 
became involved when the boys were jailed, leading to the formation of the CCRI.  
 This chapter examines what transpired after the boys were jailed, and describes how and 
why the CCRI was formed and the NAACP’s role in that process. In addition, through a critical 
examination and analysis of historical documents, this chapter identifies and explores the public 
relations strategies and tactics the CCRI and NAACP implemented on the boys’ behalf. Using a 
qualitative framing analysis, this chapter also identifies and analyzes the frames used in the 
CCRI’s and NAACP’s public relations material.  
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The News Spreads 
 After the reason for the boys’ incarceration spread through Monroe, mobs of angry white 
citizens gathered outside the jail. On October 31, 1958, a group of police officers decided to play 
what they claimed was a Halloween joke by dressing in white sheets and entering the boys’ cell. 
The frightened boys believed the KKK had broken into the jail.
3
 Elsewhere, incensed Monroe 
residents fired shots into the Thompson home and burned a cross on their lawn.
4
 The boys’ 
mothers, Evelyn Thompson and Jennie Simpson, were fired from their jobs as domestics. Evelyn 
Thompson received an eviction notice from her landlord. 
 Robert Williams become aware of the incident on November 3 when Monroe Mayor Fred 
Wilson asked for assistance in getting the mothers to authorize the boys’ hearing.5 Williams 
visited with Thompson and Simpson, who had been told their sons were being held for their 
safety and no charges would be filed against them.
6
 The next morning, local authorities 
summoned the mothers to the courthouse for the hearing, which was to be held that afternoon. 
The mothers asked Williams to accompany them.
7
 Upon arriving, they discovered that Union 
County Juvenile Court Judge Hampton Price had already met with the girl and her parents. Price 
claimed it was best not to mix the races; therefore, he held “separate but equal hearings.”8 The 
boys were not offered legal counsel, and police barred Williams from the courtroom. The 
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mothers later claimed that during the proceedings, Price referred to their sons as “niggers.”9 
Instead of hearing the boys’ version of events, Price summoned them to the courthouse to 
announce their punishment, which was determined based on Sissy Sutton’s claim that James 
Thompson kissed her. Price sentenced James and Fuzzy to indeterminate terms in the Morrison 
Training School for Negroes, a reformatory in Hoffman, North Carolina, approximately 70 miles 
east of Monroe.
10
 With good behavior, they could hope to be released before age 21.
11
 
 Williams and the other local NAACP officers agreed the association should intervene. To 
garner support beyond the Monroe chapter, Williams called Kelly Alexander, head of the North 
Carolina State Conference.
12
 Alexander declined involvement, as did national NAACP Executive 
Secretary Roy Wilkins. Williams surmised they did not want to get involved in a sex case, 
particularly one involving miscegenation.
13
 By this time, Conrad Lynn, a New York-based 
African American civil rights lawyer, heard of the boys’ situation and offered his services as 
legal counsel.
14
 Lynn had been a member of the Communist Party in the 1920s and 1930s, but 
was expelled in 1937 over disagreements about support for striking Trinidadian oil workers in 
their protest against their British overseers.
15
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 Lynn contacted George Weissman, a writer, publisher, and founding member of the 
Socialist Workers Party (SWP), and told him the events in Monroe might make a good magazine 
story. They flew to Monroe, and Lynn met with Judge Price. When Lynn asked why both boys 
were sentenced when only James was involved in the kissing incident, Price responded that what 
Fuzzy had witnessed planted certain ideas in his mind, and it would take years to rehabilitate 
him.
16
 Lynn argued that the boys should have been provided legal counsel; Price advised Lynn to 
stop interfering in local affairs and return to New York.
17
 Instead, Lynn visited the boys’ mothers 
and later recalled they were nervous and frightened.
18
 Confronted by Monroe’s white power 
structure, the women were out of their depth. The women were housekeepers who earned about 
fifteen dollars per week. Mrs. Thompson, whose husband had abandoned the family years 
earlier, had five other children.
19
 Mrs. Simpson was a widow with three other children who lived 
at home and five adult children who lived elsewhere.
20
 Jennie Simpson had a sixth grade 
education; Evelyn Thompson’s schooling stopped at the fifth grade.21 The mothers were 
unfamiliar with the legal system and relied on Williams for guidance. 
 Lynn decided to prepare a writ of habeas corpus, a summons forcing the state to produce 
the boys in court.
22
 In the meantime, Weissman interviewed Sissy Sutton’s parents and others in 
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Monroe for an article to appear in the Nation.
23
 Although Lynn and Weissman had to return to 
New York, Lynn asked Williams to search for a North Carolina judge who would be willing to 
hear the writ. While Lynn continued to explore additional legal options, New York Post reporter 
Ted Poston heard about the case.
24
 Poston was the first African American journalist to spend his 
career at a mainstream newspaper.
25
 By the 1950s, Poston was “held in esteem by most 
journalists in New York” and had become well known among civil rights supporters for his 
reporting.
26
 Poston interviewed Williams by phone to gather additional information, and the first 
news article about the kissing incident appeared on November 10.
27
 As a result, African 
American newspapers began reporting on the boys’ situation, and Poston continued to update 
Post readers.
28
  
 Two mainstream Charlotte, North Carolina, newspapers also covered the case, one on 
November 11 and the other on November 14.
29
 Williams was buoyed by the initial press 
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coverage, as he had previously contacted the Associated Press (AP) and United Press 
International (UPI), to no avail.
30
 Monroe’s newspapers were initially silent on the issue, with 
the Monroe Enquirer later reporting that it was not local media practice to publicize juvenile 
court cases.
31
  
 To draw additional attention to the events in Monroe, Williams sent a telegram to 
President Eisenhower on November 13. Williams’s message highlighted the disparity in justice 
for blacks and whites in the Union County courts. He asked that the “Department of Justice 
introduce the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution to this social jungle called Dixie.”32  
 On November 20, the Monroe press broke its silence with an article in the Monroe 
Inquirer that was less about the kissing case and more about outside attention received as a 
result. The article began by referencing the boys’ “records of petty thievery and truancy” and 
later referred to the New York Post as a tabloid whose article was “exaggerated and distorted and 
typical of the fulminations of one or more persons whose apparent aim is to inflame and 
engender racial discord in a peaceful community.”33 Less than a week later, a New York Post 
editorial wryly noted that due to its November 10 story about the case, which resulted in AP and 
UPI coverage, “Monroe finally got the news about Monroe.”34 In other words, without the New 
York Post story, Monroe’s papers would have remained silent about the incident. 
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 Around the same time, Williams received a response to his White House telegram from 
E. Frederic Morrow, President Eisenhower’s Administrative Officer for Special Projects. 
Morrow was the first African American to hold an executive position in the White House.
35
 
Morrow wrote that the boys’ sentencing violated no federal laws, and that while the President 
deplored such instances, it was not the purview of the White House to intervene in such 
matters.
36
 Citing state laws, Morrow encouraged Williams to seek remedy in the North Carolina 
courts. Morrow sent the same response to concerned citizens who wrote to President Eisenhower 
about the boys.
37
 The CCRI later distributed a press release containing the text of Morrow’s 
letter to Williams.
38
 Although the media list for the press release is not included in the historical 
documents, based on media coverage and Morrow’s later comments, it appears the release was 
sent to the black press.
39
 The Los Angeles Tribune took particular issue with Morrow, writing 
that he was a pawn used by the White House to deal with Negro problems.
40
 Morrow felt his 
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response was portrayed unfairly, and he wrote letters to the black press and the NAACP 
defending his position.
41
 
The Formation of the CCRI 
 On December 6, Louis E. Austin, African American publisher of the Carolina Times, a 
daily newspaper for African American North Carolinians, published an editorial lamenting the 
travesty of justice in the South. Specifically writing about the Dr. Perry abortion accusation, 
Austin argued that Perry’s dilemma had been elevated to a struggle “between southern prejudice, 
backed by KKK influence and progressive Negro leadership.”42 Austin called for the “NAACP 
or some other organization to organize a committee for Dr. Perry’s defense.”43 Although 
Austin’s editorial played an important role in the formation of the CCRI, the SWP claimed full 
credit. 
  Minutes of the December 16, 1958, executive meeting of the SWP include a report on 
the organization of a Committee to Combat Racial Injustice.
44
 Another report by the SWP to its 
North Carolina members notes that after the boys’ story hit the New York press, the SWP sent 
two members of its Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) to Monroe to speak to Robert Williams and 
Harry Golden, a white, Charlotte-based writer, publisher, and civil rights advocate.
45
 The report 
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explains that “upon their return, the YSA comrades gave us information they had gathered which 
indicated the possibility of launching a movement far beyond the scope of the original 
perspective.”46 The SWP claims it developed the idea of forming a committee and at the same 
time, saw Austin’s Carolina Times editorial and asked him to join the committee.47 According to 
historian Patrick Jones, this version of events appears to be wishful thinking.
48
 The SWP had 
been looking for an opportunity to broadly demonstrate its commitment to African American 
civil rights and may have therefore embellished its role in the formation of the committee.
49
 
 Furthermore, the SWP’s version of events minimizes the integral role of local leaders and 
“fails to recognize the power held by Robert Williams” among Monroe’s black community.50 
Even though he was a SWP member, George Weissman does not credit the SWP with formation 
of the CCRI. Weissman noted that the Carolina Times editorial “in large measure inspired the 
setting up of this committee.”51 Weissman added that he, Williams and Lynn decided to meet 
with Austin after reading the editorial.  
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 We met with him in his office in Durham last Thursday and decided then to form a 
 Committee to Combat Racial Injustice. Its aim will be to help mobilize aid for legal and 
 other assistance in cases in the South where the NAACP or other organizations are unable 
 to help. This is precisely the situation now in Monroe and in many other areas. Indeed, I 
 wish there had been such a committee in existence two years ago to have helped in the 
 Tallahassee bus protest.
52
 
 
 At the December 10 meeting in Austin’s office, the group decided that Williams would 
be CCRI chairman, with Weissman as secretary and Lynn as general counsel. Austin and Perry 
were also CCRI founding members.
53
 A few days later, Weissman began calling civil rights 
supporters to ask them to play a leadership role in the CCRI. One of the first he contacted was 
Reverend Charles Kenzie Steele, who went by the initials C. K. and was co-founder of the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and a friend of Martin Luther King Jr. In 
1956, Steele organized a bus boycott in Tallahassee at the same time King was leading the 
Montgomery bus boycott.
54
 Steele agreed to join the committee’s leadership, as did Carl Braden, 
a white, Louisville, Kentucky-based leftist, civil rights activist, and journalist.
55
 Braden and his 
wife Anne were field organizers for the Southern Conference Education Foundation (SCEF), a 
pro-integration organization. They were often targeted by the local white community for their 
support of African Americans.
56
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 Unfortunately for the CCRI, Edgar Daniel Nixon, known as E. D. Nixon, declined to 
participate, despite numerous requests. Nixon was an African American, Alabama-based civil 
rights activist who organized the Montgomery branch of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
Porters, co-founded the Montgomery Improvement Association, and helped lead the successful 
1955 Montgomery bus boycott. By the time the CCRI contacted him, Nixon was disillusioned 
with aspects of the civil rights movement, as he believed Martin Luther King Jr. had been given 
undue credit for the Montgomery bus boycott when local activists had been organizing the 
protest for years.
57
  
 With Nixon’s refusal, the CCRI’s first letterhead listed Robert Williams as chairman, 
followed by L. E. Austin, Carl Braden, Dr. Albert Perry, and Rev. C. K. Steele. Weissman was 
listed as secretary and Conrad Lynn as general counsel. Weissman and Braden, both long-time 
NAACP members, were white; Steele, Williams, Perry and Austin were black. The CCRI was an 
interracial organization, and its leaders recognized that it needed both black and white 
supporters, as the fight for racial equality ultimately impacted all Americans.
58
 In addition, 
although Williams and Perry were disillusioned with the NAACP, Weissman and Braden 
recognized that the CCRI should assist and complement the NAACP instead of competing with 
it.
59
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 On December 11, the Monroe Enquirer reported that Weissman and Lynn were back in 
town “investigating and checking recent happenings.”60 On December 14, Joyce Egginton, a 
New York-based reporter for the London News Chronicle, arrived in Monroe. Egginton had read 
Ted Poston’s articles in the New York Post. She was intrigued by the fact that two young boys 
could be jailed for a child’s game and asked her editors if she could travel to Monroe to write a 
story for the Chronicle.
61
 Before doing so, she telephoned Dr. Perry to get background on the 
incident. On December 15, the Monroe Enquirer reported that the “latest reporter in town 
checking on incidents is Joyce Egginton of the London News Chronicle. It’s the first time, we 
think that a European newspaper has sent a reporter to Monroe.”62 Egginton spoke to Monroe 
Mayor Fred Wilson, who informed her that the situation had been handled, and therefore wasn’t 
newsworthy.
63
 However she continued her reporting, interviewing next Sissy Sutton’s parents. 
Sissy’s mother told Egginton that she would have killed Hanover herself given the chance.64 
 Egginton wanted to interview the boys, so Williams and Perry drove her to the Morrison 
Training School, a two-hour car ride from Monroe. The boys’ mothers, who had not seen their 
sons since the November 4 sentencing and had no means to get to the reformatory, joined the 
trip. Williams, who had smuggled in a camera, took photos of the boys and their mothers, which 
he gave to Egginton. For the first time since their arrest, the boys were able to tell their side of 
the story. James Thompson said he and Fuzzy were walking home when some white boys asked 
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them to play. There were three white girls with them and together, the children went into an open 
culvert. A kissing game ensued and the white boys kissed the white girls. One of the girls then 
asked Hanover for a kiss. However Hanover said he “did want to kiss her because I knew it was 
wrong. I knew I should never kiss a white girl.”65 When Egginton asked Hanover why he was in 
the reformatory, he responded that he did not know but thought it was for “stealing and doing 
things.” Hanover said he had stolen a ham last summer because he was hungry. When Egginton 
asked Fuzzy why he was in the reformatory, he too said he did not know, but guessed it was 
because he played hooky from school. Earlier, Egginton had asked J. Hampton Price if it was 
“wrong to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of a seven-year-old girl.”66 Price responded, 
“I had to believe someone, and I preferred to believe her because the boys had previous records 
of petty larceny. Anyway, we had to put them away for their own protection. Feeling among the 
white residents was running very high.”67  
  Egginton’s article, accompanied by Williams’s photos of the boys, appeared on the front 
page of the December 18 London News Chronicle. In addition to describing the boys’ ordeal, 
Egginton reported that Monroe’s white residents supported the sentencing, believing it was 
tempered with mercy.
68
 At the end of her story, Egginton recounted that Monroe’s mayor said he 
didn’t know what the fuss was about, as “Monroe is no different from scores of other towns in 
the South.”69 Egginton concluded, “and that is the truth and the tragedy of the whole affair.”70 
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 After the story appeared, other overseas newspapers reported on the boys’ situation, and 
the kissing case was soon catapulted onto an international stage. Egginton’s story played an 
important role in the kissing case, as it gave people in other countries a glimpse into the United 
States’ race relations problems. Shocked by the events that had transpired in Monroe, many were 
compelled to write to North Carolina authorities.
71
 These letters and the opinions expressed in 
them would later shape Gov. Hodges’s public relations efforts. 
 The same day Egginton’s story ran, Harry Golden sent a letter to North Carolina NAACP 
President Kelly Alexander, informing him that Conrad Lynn had asked for assistance in finding a 
judge to review the writ of habeas corpus. Although the purpose of the letter was to obtain input 
from Alexander before assisting Lynn, Golden also used the opportunity to comment on Robert 
Williams, writing that “Negro leadership in Monroe has been very bad.”72 Golden and Alexander 
were long-standing friends, and neither man liked Williams.
73
 They thought he was too militant 
and brash and believed he was motivated by self-interest. Williams had little respect for Golden 
or Alexander, as they were aligned with the national NAACP’s approach to civil rights, which 
Williams found stagnant and ineffective. 
 With increasing media coverage about the boys, the NAACP’s absence in the kissing 
case was becoming apparent. In addition, the association was receiving letters from citizens 
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asking what it was doing to help the boys.
74
 Of all the issues being tackled by the North Carolina 
NAACP, the kissing case was now the most prominent. As head of the NAACP’s North Carolina 
operations, Kelly Alexander was under pressure to demonstrate some oversight of the situation.  
 After Egginton’s article ran, Alexander asked Williams to attend a NAACP state-level 
meeting on December 20. In relaying Alexander’s outreach, Williams wrote to Weissman that 
“Kelly stated that they are interested in us here in Monroe to the extent that the whole state 
conference is coming to our rescue.”75 He added, “He has heard about the Committee and some 
of the local people are giving him hell. He sounded more than a Tom than ever. He also said that 
we do not want these people from New York coming here to upset the community.” Feeling the 
need to defend himself to Roy Wilkins, Kelly Alexander attributed the NAACP’s late 
involvement in the case to personality conflicts with Williams, as well as differences of opinion 
regarding legal strategy.
76
 Alexander believed Williams intentionally “circumvented the State 
Conference, and sought newspaper publicity rather than endeavored to straighten out the matter 
through proper channels.”77 However, it was the newspaper publicity that generated awareness of 
the case, and this awareness forced the NAACP to become involved. Williams initially pursued 
the NAACP’s proper channels, but was rebuffed. He therefore decided to handle the case in his 
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own way, which included spreading the news beyond Monroe to rouse public opinion and action. 
At the end of December, Williams and Lynn were invited to a meeting with Roy Wilkins at 
NAACP headquarters in New York to discuss how to proceed. The three agreed that Lynn would 
continue as legal counsel, working with NAACP General Counsel Robert Carter. In addition, the 
NAACP agreed it would assume responsibility for the boys’ case, including relocating the 
families to a new community and providing financial assistance.
78
 
The NAACP and Kissing Case Public Relations 
  On December 31, 1958, the NAACP’s national office issued its first press release about 
the case, announcing it “has thrown its full weight into the drive to rescue two young Negro boys 
of Monroe, N.C., sentenced to the state reformatory because one of them has been kissed by a 
little white girl.”79 Referring to the national office, the press release described the association’s 
“enlarged role in the defense of the children” and explained the NAACP had been involved 
through its state chapter, which had made a “preliminary inquiry into the case.”80 The statement 
was inaccurate, not only because Kelly Alexander had declined involvement of the state chapter, 
but because the inquiry into the case, made by the Monroe chapter, was not preliminary. The 
Monroe chapter planned for full involvement and, believing the state and national NAACP to be 
ineffective, partnered with others to form the CCRI. The press release, which does not mention 
the CCRI, affirms the NAACP’s local involvement by including Williams’s and Lynn’s NAACP 
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affiliations: Williams with the Monroe chapter and Lynn in Rockland County, New York.
81
 
However Williams’s and Lynn’s involvement with the kissing case was through the CCRI, and 
in fact, both men had expressed disappointment in the NAACP’s state conference and national 
office.
82
  
 The black press covered the involvement of the NAACP’s national office and in some 
instances, printed the press release verbatim.
83
 However, an editorial in the New York 
Amsterdam News focused on the national office’s delay in entering the case, using the NAACP’s 
“full weight” language. The editor wrote that the NAACP “has finally decided to throw its 
weight behind the fight to free two little Negro boys who are being held in jail in North Carolina 
because one of them was kissed by a little white girl,” and “it is a pleasure to note that the 
NAACP is throwing its weight into their fight for freedom.”84 The editorial also lambasted Kelly 
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Alexander, writing of his refusal to “throw the full weight of his office behind Mr. Williams and 
the two boys.”85  
 In its ongoing attempts to free the boys via legal means, the NAACP, through Conrad 
Lynn’s efforts, finally managed to obtain a hearing for its writ of habeas corpus petition.86 The 
hearing was held on January 12. NAACP Director of Branches Gloster Current, Frank Reeves, a 
NAACP attorney from Washington, DC, and Kenneth Lee, the NAACP’s general counsel in 
North Carolina, represented the national office, as General Counsel Robert Carter was unable to 
attend. Kelly Alexander and NAACP Field Representative Charles MacLean also attended.
87
  
 On the stand, North Carolina Attorney General Malcom Seawell questioned Williams 
extensively about what transpired from the time he was first informed about the boys’ 
incarceration to their sentencing.
88
 Seawell then turned his attention to the CCRI, interrogating 
Williams about its purpose, its finances, and its membership. Seawell peppered Williams with 
questions about Carl Braden and his sedition conviction and prison sentence. Seawell also asked 
why Williams had recently traveled to New York. Williams responded, “I went to New York to 
solicit funds to bring justice to this social jungle called Dixie.”89  
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 After additional testimony from Williams, Lynn questioned J. Hampton Price. As Lynn 
approached the witness box, he noted that Seawell and Price exchanged a wink.
90
 Lynn 
challenged the disparity in North Carolina law that allowed white offenders to be treated as 
juveniles until age 20, whereas black juveniles were subject to adult criminal terms starting at 
age 16. Ultimately, the hearing focused more on disparaging the CCRI and its members than on 
the children.
91
 After all testimonies were complete, North Carolina Superior Court Judge Walter 
Johnston upheld the boys’ sentencing and denied the writ.92 Later summarizing the proceedings, 
Conrad Lynn thought Williams was an outstanding witness, while national NAACP officials 
thought he was too militant.
93
 Braden suspected Seawell’s intent was to “split whites and 
Negroes working together.”94  
 On January 15, the NAACP issued a press release announcing it planned to appeal the 
ruling.
95
 The release quoted Robert Carter, despite the fact that Lynn had prepared the writ and 
Carter had not attended the hearing. The press release also detailed the NAACP’s efforts to 
relocate the families and provide financial assistance. Similar language was used in a memo the 
NAACP sent to update its branch and youth council presidents on the kissing case. However, the 
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memo did not address the NAACP’s delay in supporting the kissing case. Instead, it contained 
the same “full weight” language as the December 31 press release.96 The memo concluded that 
the NAACP “has worked in its traditional method of seeking to combat injustice. We have 
retained counsel and are assisting the families in being relocated and adjusting in a new 
community.”97 The NAACP asked it branches to assist by sending funds to support the legal case 
and the families.  
 On January 16, Williams wrote to Weissman that North Carolina NAACP officials were 
“still dragging their feet” and “are not going to do anything worthwhile.”98 Williams reported 
that the boys’ mothers believed that the NAACP officials were condescending, and “have no 
understanding of these people, have no sympathy for them.”99 Weissman’s assessment was that 
the NAACP’s involvement consisted solely of relocating the boys’ families and assuming legal 
expenses.
100
 Although one of the NAACP’s strengths was its expertise in legal redress, the bulk 
of the kissing case legal work was handled by Conrad Lynn, who was more closely aligned with 
the CCRI rather than the NAACP. Almost a month after the December 31 meeting in Roy 
Wilkins’s office, Lynn and NAACP General Counsel Carter still had not met, and Weissman 
reported that “Carter couldn’t be reached.”101  
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 The NAACP did not focus on generating additional awareness of the kissing case and as 
a result, it issued only two press releases. The first press release announced it had entered the 
case, and the second provided an update on legal matters and financial support for the boys’ 
families. The dearth of public relations support was not because the NAACP devalued public 
relations. On the contrary, Henry Lee Moon had often advised NAACP leadership that providing 
audiences with information about the NAACP and its goals was an essential part of its overall 
public relations program.
102
 Specifically, one of the purposes of the NAACP’s public relations 
department was to “inform the public of the activities and objectives of the NAACP.”103 
Additionally, Roy Wilkins had previously upbraided Moon over instances in which the NAACP 
did not receive press coverage, and Wilkins believed it should have.
104
  
 Most likely, the NAACP did not devote public relations resources to the kissing case 
because the association believed the best means to secure the boys’ release was by improving 
their families’ living conditions. Kelly Alexander criticized Williams for seeking newspaper 
publicity rather than endeavoring “to straighten out the matter through proper channels.”105 
Furthermore, the NAACP was involved in school integration and a number of other issues. In 
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comparison, it determined the kissing case was not a priority.
106
 In the public relations 
department’s January and February monthly reports, there are no mentions of any public 
relations activities on behalf of the kissing case.
107
 The two press releases the NAACP 
distributed about the kissing case were not included. The kissing case was just one of many 
instances of racial injustice, and it was one the NAACP lent its support to reluctantly and only 
because public pressure dictated it do so. Otherwise, the NAACP would not likely have thrown 
any of its weight into the case. Indeed, a representative from the NAACP’s southeast regional 
office visited the boys’ mothers in Monroe and noted that “under other circumstances this was a 
case in which the Association would have had no part,” as “this was a case for trained social 
workers in the welfare department or in some kind of social welfare organization.
108
 In other 
words, the boys’ situation was not a local or national civil rights problem that required the 
expertise and strength of the NAACP. The boys’ problem did not require legal redress or 
government lobbying, the NAACP’s strong suit. Instead, it seemed the NAACP believed it was a 
socioeconomic problem that could be dealt with by local agencies. 
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The Frame in the NAACP’s Public Relations Material 
 Although the NAACP’s public relations material was limited to two press releases and a 
memo, the press releases played an important role in expanding the visibility of the kissing case, 
specifically among black audiences. The NAACP was a prominent and trusted organization 
among African Americans. Henry Lee Moon quoted a 1957 Catholic Digest survey that found 
among African Americans, 94 percent of those in the North and 93 percent who reside in the 
South believe in the NAACP.
109
  
 Whereas some African Americans may have questioned a mailing received from the 
CCRI, the NAACP’s involvement provided them with the assurance that the case deserved their 
support. Additionally, reading a story in the black press about the NAACP’s role would quell 
any concerns about the validity of the campaign to free the boys. L. E. Austin’s January 10 
Carolina Times editorial noted as much. 
 Entry of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People into the 
 Monroe “kissing” case will certainly meet the approval of Negro leaders in North 
 Carolina, as well as other states. Although earlier efforts to rescue the two young boys 
 were being put forth by a special committee organized outside the state for that purpose, 
 it was handicapped by the fact the organizers were generally unknown here in North 
 Carolina. The respect and confidence which the NAACP enjoys among Negro citizens of 
 this state will make it much easier to raise funds to defend the boys.
110
 
 The sole frame in the NAACP’s three public relations documents reflects this trust, and it 
highlights the association’s strength and size. The key phrase associated with this trust frame is 
“thrown its full weight in.” This language is noteworthy, as the NAACP did not merely 
announce it was supporting the efforts to free the boys. The words “thrown its full weight” 
convey the size and might of the organization. With the full weight of the NAACP behind 
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Hanover and Fuzzy, African Americans were assured that everything was being done to gain the 
boys’ freedom. In addition, the focus on the full strength of the NAACP might have been 
intended to offset some of the criticism it received for not immediately entering the case. The 
press release notes that the NAACP had been previously involved through its local, Monroe 
chapter, and the case now had the full support of the national office. The “thrown its full weight” 
phrase, which conveys the NAACP as a formidable organization, is also used numerous times in 
the NAACP’s memo to its branch and youth council presidents about the kissing case.111  
 Although the NAACP’s second press release—stating its intent to appeal the denial of the 
writ—does not specifically use the word “weight,” the size and strength of the organization is 
again reflected in the language used in the press release. The NAACP stated it had taken full 
responsibility for the case. It relocated the families from Monroe to Charlotte “in homes secured 
for them by Kelly Alexander, president of the NAACP in North Carolina,” and it secured 
employment for the boys’ mothers and supplied the families with money, new furniture, and 
clothing.
112
 “We hope to do a job of complete family rehabilitation so that the state will have no 
excuse for not returning Hanover and Fuzzy to their families,” said Alexander.113 In other words, 
African Americans could trust that the NAACP was taking the necessary actions to help free the 
boys. The NAACP’s particular kind of support reflected its view of the case as a socioeconomic 
problem rather than as an incident emblematic of ongoing racial intimidation and suppression. 
Furthermore, after North Carolina authorities became aware of the NAACP’s plans for legal 
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action to free the boys, the state’s Board of Correction and Training announced the possibility of 
the boys’ release should their home environments improve.114Although North Carolina 
authorities may have made this statement to mitigate possible legal action, the NAACP directed 
its efforts to free the boys toward improving families’ living conditions. 
The CCRI’s Public Relations Campaign 
 Although the NAACP did not believe public relations was instrumental to freeing the 
boys, the CCRI did. CCRI leaders all believed that generating awareness of the case and rallying 
the public would help secure the boys’ freedom.115 Many had used public relations on previous 
efforts to obtain social justice, and they recognized its value. To gain publicity for his protests in 
Monroe, Williams often contacted national wire services, as well as local television and radio 
stations.
116
 Recalling his New York speaking engagements about the kissing case, Lynn wrote, “I 
worked to obtain as much publicity as possible in the hope that popular pressure would force the 
authorities to relent.”117 Braden advised, “We of course want to keep this case before the public 
until those boys are freed. Trouble with these things is that people forget so quickly.”118  
 George Weissman, who would play an instrumental role in the public relations activities, 
brought an important combination of resources to the efforts to free the boys: time, knowledge, 
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and connections.
119
 Weissman noted his previous experience “in the line of work, having run the 
defense committee for James Kutcher, the legless veteran fired from his government job during 
the witch hunt.”120 Kutcher, who lost both legs in World War II, was fired from his Veterans 
Administration job in 1948 when his employer discovered he was a member of the Socialist 
Workers Party. To educate the public about Kutcher’s case and arouse public opinion in his 
favor, the SWP formed the Kutcher Civil Rights Committee. Weissman recalled, “the case was 
fought to a complete victory—he was given back his pension, his job, his housing project 
apartment.”121 Possibly due to the success of this campaign and Weissman’s involvement, many 
of the public relations strategies and tactics used by the Kutcher Civil Rights Committee were 
later used by the CCRI.
122
  
 With civil rights battles, Weissman surmised that he knew “what can be done at the 
grassroots level—at union local meetings, etc., in getting resolutions passed, donations granted, 
etc., if the work is organized. I also think the educational effect of such activity on the northern 
workers and general public very worthwhile.”123 Weissman pledged up to six months’ free labor 
on the kissing case. His network of activists and labor advocates, along with his previous 
leadership on social justice campaigns, would prove valuable in the efforts to free the boys.
124
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Public Relations Objectives, Strategies, and Tactics Defined  
 In his 1952 book Public Relations, Edward Bernays provides a blueprint for a public 
relations plan, including objectives, strategies, public or audience, and activities or tactics.
125
 The 
historical documents do not indicate the CCRI prepared such a document—a written public 
relations plan in which it delineated public relations objectives, audiences, strategies, and tactics. 
However, each of the elements of the CCRI’s campaign to free the boys can be defined as either 
a public relations objective, strategy, or tactic.  
 A week before the CCRI was formed, Conrad Lynn wrote to Williams that he had spoken 
to influential friends in New York who want to help and “they emphasized that only a great 
protest of people throughout the country can save Perry, you and the children and get justice for 
the woman who was raped. This is our objective at this time and we feel the less the NAACP 
knows about it, the better.”126Although the CCRI did not use the term “public relations 
objective,” it did state that its efforts on behalf of the kissing case were conducted to arouse 
public opinion, create mass pressure, and secure the boys’ freedom.127 Specifically, the CCRI 
wrote that it “launched a campaign to bring the pressure of world opinion to bear on the 
authorities in North Carolina to return to boys to their mothers.”128 These actions can be 
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considered public relations objectives, the specific statements of what is to be accomplished. 
Public relations objectives should be stated in terms of desired outcomes, which for the CCRI 
was the boys’ release. The CCRI would need to create and maintain awareness of the boys’ 
dilemma, and they would do so by informing and educating their audiences about the kissing 
case, and then issuing a call to action focused on the “mass pressure” part of the objective. 
 To achieve its objectives, the CCRI implemented a number of strategies. Public relations 
strategies are broad-based actions that describe how the objectives will be achieved. Stated 
differently, strategies outline the approach that will be taken to fulfill the objectives. Public 
relations tactics are the specific, detailed actions or tasks that will help in the achievement of the 
objective. An example of a communication strategy is to use face-to-face communication to 
reach a particular target audience.
129
 A tactic in support of this objective would be to secure 
speaking engagements at specific venues attended by members of the target audience. Face-to-
face communication is the strategy; speaking engagements is the tactic. Another example of a 
strategy is to use the news media to relay messages to a target audience. Tactics could be writing 
and distributing press releases, holding press conferences, or calling reporters. Tactics are 
considered the outputs of a public relations campaign. With the examples above, speaking 
engagements, press releases, press conferences, and calls to reporters are outputs. These outputs 
may result in desired media coverage. However when evaluating a public relations campaign at 
its completion, counting the number of speaking engagements, press releases, and news stories, 
or assessing their quality, does not determine the success of a campaign. A campaign is 
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successful if the objective or outcome has been achieved. In short, production of outputs does not 
signify success; the achievement of outcomes does. 
The CCRI’s Public Relations Strategies and Tactics 
Engaging Opinion Leaders 
 One of the CCRI public relations strategies was to enlist the support of opinion leaders 
who were already committed to racial justice. There are two benefits to using this strategy. The 
first relates to the objective of the CCRI’s campaign. It was not to disrupt the deep-seated 
attitudes of those who believed African Americans were inferior to whites. Instead, it was to free 
the boys by galvanizing the public to pressure Gov. Hodges to do so. For this to occur, the CCRI 
would need to identify those already receptive to its principles. When seeking supporters, 
Weissman sought “people who stand for a militant fight for civil rights.”130 Those already 
supportive of African American civil rights would not need to first be convinced of the merits of 
the cause. Instead, they could be immediately mobilized to take action. 
 By engaging opinion leaders, the CCRI could easily cascade its messages to broad 
audiences, which is another benefit to this strategy. The CCRI would educate opinion leaders, 
who would then inform their constituents.
131
 Additionally, opinion leaders can influence their 
constituents, thereby creating receptivity and adding credibility to a message. This endorsement 
was beneficial to the CCRI, which as a new organization, had no name recognition. The CCRI 
sought opinion leaders from the following groups: labor unions, civil liberties organizations, 
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churches, student organizations, and universities. It also targeted prominent individuals 
committed to civil rights.
132
  
 Through his active involvement in the SWP, Weissman had a strong network of labor 
advocates, most of whom were located in Cleveland, Detroit, and New York.
133
 The CCRI 
believed the labor struggle was aligned with the civil rights struggle, and it wanted to obtain the 
support of trade unions, particularly those in the North.
134
 Immediately after the CCRI was 
formed, Weissman began calling and writing letters to educate them about the kissing case and 
obtain their assistance. He wrote, “the CCRI is appealing to trade unions and fraternal 
organizations to join in protesting this racist outrage.”135 Weissman also asked for names of other 
labor advocates he might contact, and he wrote letters to those individuals as well. As an 
example, Detroit-based SWP member Berta Green provided Weissman with “names and address 
of trade unionists and prominent Detroiters to contact for membership on the committee,” and 
she organized and headed a local committee to support the efforts of the CCRI national 
committee.
136
  
 Weissman began his outreach in mid-December and by January 21, wrote that he was 
“half-way through the work—letters inviting notables to join the committee.”137 His many phone 
calls and letters to labor had the desired cumulative effects, as unionists cascaded the message to 
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their members and provided financial support. For example in a letter to Robert Williams, the 
president of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE) wrote that the 
kissing case “and other pressures being brought to bear upon the Negro people of Monroe, North 
Carolina have come to our attention.”138 The UE made a financial contribution and pledged to 
“assist and participate in the efforts of your committee to bring justice and elemental and basic 
civil rights to the Negro community in Monroe.”139  
 The Amalgamated Meat Cutters (AMC) union adopted a formal resolution to support the 
CCRI and its work to free the boys.
140
 Auda Romine, secretary of the Cleveland arm of the 
AMC, organized a local committee to support the CCRI and sent letters to labor and non-labor 
advocates asking for assistance.”141 The text of both letters was the same with one exception. 
The correspondence to labor included a paragraph that noted a parallel between “the organized 
union movement in the North and the fight for Negro rights in the South.”142 Romine added that 
there are no unions in Union County because employers are using race to divide workers. By 
avoiding unionization, Union County industry can pay substandard wages, “thus threatening the 
wage structure in the unionized plants of the North.”143 Both letters noted that Union County 
blacks’ efforts to gain civil rights subjected them to intimidation, violence, and economic 
reprisal, and the CCRI’s purpose was to help blacks in the South obtain their democratic rights. 
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The letter to labor included the following sentence: “It is hoped that labor will play a leading part 
in this effort.”144 
 However, the CCRI’s engagement of opinion leaders was not limited to those in unions. 
As a result of the committee’s work, churches passed resolutions in support of the kissing case, 
and local citizens formed groups to free the boys. The Metropolitan Community Methodist 
Church in New York adopted a resolution urging Hodges to free the boys.
145
 The Baptist 
Ministers Conference of Greater New York and Vicinity, comprised of 242 churches and a 
congregation of 250,000, adopted a similar resolution and formed a committee to aid the quest 
for the boys’ freedom.146 Other examples include the Nassau Committee to Secure Justice for 
Jimmy & David, a group of 50 residents of Long Island; the Mothers Alliance of Buffalo, an 
interracial group in New York; and the City Terrace Community Club of Los Angeles, where 
100 members voted to protest the boys’ sentencing.147  
Engaging Youth  
 Engaging youth was another public relations strategy the CCRI implemented. The CCRI 
believed that young people of both races who were committed to social justice would rally to the 
boys’ cause. Members of the SWP’s Young Socialists Alliance formed a Youth Committee to 
Free Hanover Thompson and Fuzzy Simpson, which aimed its efforts at high school and college 
students, as well as faculty and staff. Headed by James Lambrecht, the CCRI Youth Committee 
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(YC) mirrored the work of the CCRI national committee. While Weissman was educating and 
soliciting support among labor, religious, academic, and social justice leaders, Lambrecht was 
calling and writing letters to youth groups at high schools and colleges. Working in tandem with 
the CCRI, the YC also targeted black and white advocates. In a form letter Lambrecht sent to 
colleges, he wrote of “a whole generation of Negro youth looking for a way to fight Southern 
reaction,” adding that this “is the major fight of our (Caucasian) generation too—Southern 
reaction bulwarks reaction everywhere, in all forms.”148 Lambert appeared to be saying that 
southern resistance served as an impetus for northerners to take action to counter this opposition. 
He asked students to pass resolutions, write letters to Gov. Hodges, and distribute petitions.  
 By early February, less than a month since it began its efforts, the YC had assistance 
from the following college NAACP chapters: Queens College, Columbia University, City 
College of New York, as well as the Bronx NAACP Youth Council, and the Newark NAACP 
Youth Council. In addition, Lambrecht garnered support from the Forest Hills High School 
Discussion Club, Students for Democratic Action, and from students groups at Croton-Harmon 
High School and the following colleges or universities: Antioch, Brooklyn, Fordham, Oberlin, 
and Wellesley.
149
 As a result of the YC’s work, articles about the kissing case began appearing in 
college newspapers.
150
 The YC also planned a “picket line demonstration” on February 20 at the 
headquarters of the United Nations.
151
 Prior to the demonstration, Lambrecht held a planning 
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meeting of all New York youth organizations that had pledged support to the kissing case, which 
was attended by students from the organizations and schools listed above.
152
 
Call to Action  
 Another public relations strategy the CCRI employed was to include a call to action in its 
communication materials. Specifically, the CCRI asked supporters to send a letter of protest to 
Gov. Hodges demanding the immediate release of the boys.
153
 One of the ways it did so was with 
a postcard mailing. One of the postcards was addressed to the CCRI’s New York headquarters, 
which used Conrad Lynn’s New York office as its official mailing address. The other side of the 
post card read: “Dear Robert F. Williams: You may add my name to the National Committee of 
the Committee to Combat Racial Injustice,” with a line for the date and the supporter’s 
address.
154
 
 We appeal to you to do the following: 
 Send a letter or resolution of protest to governor [sic] Hodges, Raleigh, North Carolina, 
 demanding the immediate release of Hanover Thompson and Fuzzy Simpson. 
 Send a contribution to the Committee to Combat Racial Injustice to help us in mobilizing 
 world opinion against racial injustice in these United States.
155
  
 
 The CCRI mailed a second postcard, likewise addressed to its New York headquarters, 
that allowed supporters to check a box to send a donation and/or request additional information. 
A third postcard could be sent directly to Hodges. In addition to space for the sender’s name, 
address and signature, the text read: 
 Honorable Sir: 
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 You are respectfully urged to exercise your executive powers in the case of Negro 
 juveniles James Thompson (10) and David Simpson (8) who have been denied rights to a 
 fair trial and given indeterminate sentences which may keep them imprisoned until they 
 are 21 years old. This is a gross violation of civil rights which reflects badly on your State 
 and our Nation.
156
 
 
 In addition to postcards, the CCRI’s petition drive was another tactic that supported the 
call-to-action strategy. The CCRI proclaimed the petition drive “should function as the axis for 
the whole campaign.”157 The petitions served two purposes: they created awareness of the boys’ 
dilemma and they directly engaged supporters in protesting. Through its petitions, the CCRI 
collected thousands of signatures, which were then sent to Gov. Hodges. Additionally, many 
groups sent their signed petitions directly to Hodges. In updating Weissman, Cleveland-based 
CCRI organizer and local AMC union secretary Auda Romine noted, “The petitions are out in 
our plants,” and “this weekend I expect to get them back from the churches. The petition 
campaign is going well.”158 
 Lambrecht urged students to actively participate in the petition campaign, as it would 
help develop a “public outcry in the North.”159 One student informed Lambrecht that he had 
“petitions circulating in six Detroit high schools with about 300 signatures from already-
collected petitions, including signatures from teachers.”160 The CCRI received a letter from 
students from Croton-Harmon High School in Croton, New York, who wrote that they read of 
the committee’s efforts on behalf of the boys. The students added, “We are extremely anxious to 
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help you correct this highly unjust situation and would like to know if you have petitions 
available to gain sympathy for this cause. If so, please send them to us immeadiately [sic], and if 
not, let us know and we will draw up our own.”161 These students later sent 200 signatures to the 
CCRI and requested additional petitions.
162
 Another student from the same school later requested 
additional petitions and information, writing “I have friends in Chicago, Boston, Baltimore etc. 
who are sadly uninformed but who, I’m sure, will be willing to contribute their efforts.”163  
 The YC continued to actively promote the petition campaign, and schools responded. A 
student from Columbia University requested enough petitions for 50 signatures.
164
 A student 
from Elizabeth Irwin High School in New York asked for a dozen petitions.
165
 In addition, the 
Wisconsin Socialist Club wrote that it had received several petitions, which are “now all but 
over-flowing [sic] with signatures” and the group requested 100 additional petitions because “a 
large publicity and petition-signing campaign is about to be staged on the University of 
Wisconsin campus.”166 
 Additional tactics to support the strategies described here were the written documents the 
CCRI prepared to inform and update current and potential advocates about the kissing case. 
Among the documents was a form letter, addressed to “Dear Friend,” and sent to those 
predisposed towards support of the CCRI’s efforts. The one-page letter provided an update on 
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the boys’ case and the reason for the formation of the CCRI, including support for Dr. Perry. The 
letter ends with the call to action: Send letters of protest to Governor Hodges and send a 
contribution to “help us defray the expense of launching a protest movement that will stay the 
hand of the white supremacists and win a victory for the civil rights fight in this country.”167  
 In the letters Weissman and Lambrecht sent, they often enclosed fact sheets, reprints, or 
flyers. A two-page synopsis summarized the events in Monroe, including Williams’s efforts to 
desegregate the library, pool, and school, as well as information on the KKK’s reprisal and 
Perry’s abortion accusation.168 The synopsis ends with a description of the kissing case and 
contrasts it with the case of Lewis Medlin, the white man in Monroe who beat and attempted to 
rape Mary Ruth Reid, a pregnant black woman. Medlin was charged with simple assault and 
released on bail. A similar document, which the CCRI titled “Fact Sheet on Cases in Monroe, 
NC,” recapped the kissing case, the Lewis Medlin trial, and Perry’s case.169 
 The CCRI also distributed reprints of articles and news stories. It sent George 
Weissman’s Nation article, editorials from the Carolina Times, Egginton’s London News 
Chronicle article, and an article from the Harvard Law Record about southern courts’ disparate 
treatment of blacks and whites.
170
 For instances in which the CCRI was unable to obtain actual 
reprints, it would re-type the text of newspaper articles on its letterhead, with the heading “exact 
copy of article that appeared in…” For example, the CCRI disseminated the text of a Carolina 
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Times editorial that lauds the NAACP for finally supporting the kissing case. Although the 
editorial does not mention the CCRI by name, it references a special committee that had been 
working to free the boys. The editor commends Williams and Lynn for setting aside their 
differences and partnering with the NAACP to present a united front to secure the boys’ 
release.
171
  
Face-to-Face Communications 
 An additional strategy the CCRI used to educate its audiences about the kissing case was 
face-to-face communications. In early January, the CCRI began seeking opportunities for 
Williams to speak to groups in the North about the events in Union County. The committee 
initially asked to speak to the unions that were part of Weissman’s initial outreach, which led to 
additional speaking opportunities. For example, in a letter confirming Williams’s January 13 talk 
to the members of the Cleveland AFL-CIO, union president Sam Pollock suggested “possibly 
while you are in the Cleveland area, arrangements might be made by friends for you to meet and 
speak with other labor groups on the injustices which are being visited on the Negro People.”172  
Williams’s speaking tour eventually included not only unions, but churches, colleges, and youth 
organizations. If he was unavailable to speak, Conrad Lynn or Dr. Perry substituted for him.
173
 
 Despite Williams’s conflicts with the NAACP’s national office, the CCRI sought 
speaking opportunities at local NAACP branches in Northern cities. For example, Williams 
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spoke to a group in New Rochelle, New York, arranged by the local NAACP and the Ministerial 
Alliance, a local religious organization.
174
 
 The Youth Committee also sought speaking engagements at high schools and colleges. 
James Lambrecht and a colleague addressed the Columbia University chapter of the NAACP, 
and they spoke at a meeting of the Baptist Ministers Conference of Greater New York and 
Vicinity during which it passed a resolution to aid the kissing case.
175
 Other members of the YC 
spoke to various youth groups in the New York area.
176
 On February 1, the YC held a reception 
in New York at which Williams and Perry spoke.
177
 Lambrecht wrote to his contacts inviting 
them to the reception, and he developed a flyer to promote the event. The flyer identified 
Williams and Perry as leaders in the fight for civil rights, but “they are under personal attack 
from the KKK,” and they need help. The flyer ended with a call to action, reminding supporters 
that only a nationwide protest would free the boys. More than 100 people attended the reception, 
most of them high school and college students.
178
  
 Williams embarked on a speaking tour the week of February 9 in Cleveland and the 
following week in Chicago, where he spoke to students at Roosevelt College, labor and religious 
organizations, and local NAACP chapters. In Chicago, Williams spoke at the Negro History 
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Week festival organized by the Afro-American Heritage Association. Alongside featured 
entertainer Sammy Davis, Williams was listed at the event’s principal speaker.179 The purpose of 
the speaking tour was to “inform the public of the case and to raise funds for the children’s 
defense.”180 Capitalizing on his time in Cleveland, local CCRI member Auda Romine organized 
a press conference with Williams and distributed press releases about his speaking 
engagements.
181
 As a result, he appeared on a Cleveland radio show and while in Chicago, met 
with reporters from Jet magazine, who had previously reported on events in Monroe.
182
 
Williams’s visit and the kissing case were covered in the local black press, as well as 
Cleveland’s mainstream white newspaper.183 While Williams was in Cleveland and Chicago, 
Conrad Lynn addressed various groups in New York, noting that he had speaking engagements 
on February 2, 12, and 22.
184
  
 After the speaking tour, Romine reported that “Williams made a tremendous impression 
on many people here. While we did not have as many speaking engagements as we had expected, 
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we feel that his visit was very much a success publicity wise.”185 Romine shared some of the 
feedback she received: 
 We’ve been waiting for an organization that will fight—this is it. A member of the 
 Unitarian Society said, “I had been thinking of resigning from the Unitarian Society, but 
 since they have had a speaker like Williams—I think they are on the right track and I’ll 
 stay around.” Another of our union members who came here from Georgia about two 
 years ago said, “This is a new ‘noise’ from the South and I feel sort of proud to say I’m 
 from the South.”  
 
 Although she was pleased with Williams’s’ speaking tour, Romine had one setback 
involving the local NAACP. At a February 10 luncheon meeting with Williams, local NAACP 
officers withdrew their support of the CCRI, “saying they would have to get in touch with the 
national NAACP to find out what their policy is.”186 Romine informed Weissman that the 
officers of the chapter had faced numerous leadership problems over the years, and it was 
“completely tied to the national office and does nothing independently as some branches may 
do.”187 
 As a result of its enlistment of opinion leaders, the CCRI amassed a number of prominent 
supporters, including author Norman Mailer, syndicated cartoonist Jules Feiffer, Alabama-based 
civil rights activist Virginia Durr, SCLC co-founder Rev. Fred Shuttlesworth, sociologist and 
author E. Franklin Frazier, National Guardian founder James Aronson, Bishop Frank M. Reid of 
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the African Methodist Episcopal church, Dr. Willard Uphaus of the Interfaith World Fellowship, 
and Dr. Horace Kallen, professor of the New School in New York.
188
 
 Despite support from a broad range of leaders, Anne Braden lamented that there were no 
women being recruited to serve on the CCRI. “I am at a loss to know how you think you’re 
going to win any of these struggles without the women,” she wrote to Weissman.” In fact, all my 
experience in the integration movement has led me to the firm conviction that the most 
convinced and dedicated people are women; this applies to both Negro and white women.”189 
Anne Braden was not suggesting she serve on the committee, as she felt “one Braden on a 
committee is enough.”190 However, she did suggest that there were probably women of both 
races who would be glad to lend their support. Weissman later responded to Anne Braden that 
civil rights leader Ella Baker had been approached about being a CCRI founding member, but 
she wanted to wait to see how the CCRI progressed. Weissman also noted that Auda Romine 
was a CCRI member and played an active role in securing labor support in Detroit and 
Cleveland.
191
 
 Although there was a dearth of women recruited by the CCRI, international women’s 
organizations, many with socialist and labor ties, learned of the kissing case, be it through the 
cascade to opinion leaders, the international news coverage, or both. For example, the Women’s 
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International Democratic Federation (WIDF) wrote a letter to the CCRI and enclosed the text of 
a telegram it had sent to Hodges demanding the boys’ release. Boasting 200 million members on 
every continent, the WIDF indicated it would print an article on the kissing case in its magazine, 
which was distributed to approximately 90 countries.
192
 In addition, the WIDF wrote, “We know 
that women everywhere will want to do all they can to help free the children and to join our 
friends in the U.S.A. who are working for an end to the practices of racial discrimination and 
segregation which is the root cause of so much suffering and hardship to the Negro people in 
your country.” The WIDF sent a notice to its members outlining the facts of the kissing case and 
condemned it as a racist, outrageous violation of human rights. It called upon all women to 
protest and demand the children be returned to their parents.
193
 The WIDF’s actions provide an 
example of the effectiveness of the CCRI’s strategies. The WIDF heeded the call to action by 
writing to Hodges. As an opinion-leader group, it informed its members about the kissing case 
and urged them to protest the boys’ sentencing. One of its affiliates, the Union of Australian 
Women, heard of the case via the WIDF. The affiliate then informed its members about the boys, 
and it took action by sending a telegram to Hodges demanding the boys’ freedom.194 
 While the CCRI was gathering supporters and executing its call-to-action strategy, 
Williams sent a telegram to the UPI on January 17, announcing that he planned to resign from 
the NAACP in the near future so that he could devote himself full time to the CCRI.
195
 Both 
Weissman and Braden encouraged Williams to remain with the NAACP as well as the CCRI, 
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which he ultimately did. Williams’s telegram was not carried by the UPI. In a letter to Braden, 
Weissman wrote, “Nothing has been printed up here on it and if we are lucky the UPI will for 
once be doing us a favor by not printing our releases.”196 On the same day, Williams again 
telegrammed President Eisenhower, informing him that the North Carolina Superior Court had 
upheld the boys’ sentencing. As he did in his November telegram, he ended by asking President 
Eisenhower, “When may Negroes expect your Justice Department to introduce the 14th 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to ungodly social jungle called Dixie?”197 
News Media Strategy 
 In addition to engaging opinion leaders to expand the reach of its messages, the CCRI 
used the news media to inform audiences about the kissing case. With this strategy, the CCRI 
held press conferences, wrote and called reporters, and distributed press releases with updates 
about the case. In contrast to the NAACP, the CCRI was proactive with its media relations. 
 On December 19, nine days after the CCRI was formed during the meeting in L. E. 
Austin’s office, the CCRI issued its first two press releases. One press release described the legal 
steps taken and planned by Conrad Lynn on behalf of the boys and Mrs. Reid, the pregnant 
Monroe woman beaten by the white man, as well as Lynn’s efforts to overturn Mrs. Thompson’s 
eviction.
198
 The second press release contained the full text of E. Frederic Morrow’s response to 
Williams’s first telegram to President Eisenhower.”199 The CCRI also wanted to hold a press 
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conference, but delayed it due to a New York newspaper deliverymen’s strike.200 By the end of 
the month, the strike had ended, and the CCRI held its first press conference. 
 On December 29, the CCRI distributed a media alert announcing the press conference, 
which was held December 31, 1958 at 11 a.m. at the CCRI offices.
201
 Seven reporters attended, 
including Ted Poston and Joyce Egginton.
202
 The other reporters were from the New York Times, 
the Associated Press, and three socialist newspapers. Williams and Lynn addressed reporters 
and, afterwards, the CCRI distributed two press releases with their remarks.
203
 Williams’s 
comments focused on the racism behind the kissing case and against blacks in Union County. 
While Lynn concentrated on the legal aspects of the case, he said the mothers were being 
persecuted and recommended the families be relocated, as the mothers feared for their safety 
should they return to Monroe. 
 On January 2, the CCRI issued a press release announcing that the committee and 
NAACP would cooperate on the kissing case, with Lynn continuing to handle legal matters.
204
 
Unlike the NAACP’s “full weight” press release, the CCRI revealed that it had been handling the 
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case all along. Less than a week later, the CCRI distributed a press release with the news that 
Conrad Lynn applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the boys’ case.205  
 As the CCRI sought media coverage, Weissman, Braden, and Williams acknowledged 
that they could not rely on the mainstream press for coverage of the kissing case. Although there 
are no media lists among the documents used in this study, CCRI media coverage indicates the 
committee sent its press releases to the black press, which actively covered the kissing case. 
Noting his efforts to obtain publicity for the SCEF, Braden provided the following advice: 
 We make it a practice never to leave it to the wire services to transmit anything. We keep 
 a list of 325 labor, liberal, Negro, and religious publications and send them releases that 
 they might use—utterly ignoring the wire services and the commercial press. Of course 
 we also send the releases to the commercial papers and the wire services for their 
 information, on the off-chance that someday they may use a paragraph or two. Also, so 
 we can point out later that they were given due notice of our position.
206
 
 Per Braden’s advice, the mainstream press was most likely included on the CCRI’s media 
distribution list, but as expected, it gave the kissing case scant coverage. Time wrote two short 
articles about the case, and the New York Times provided minimal exposure and possibly only 
because the New York Post was covering it extensively.
207
 Weissman wrote, “Unfortunately it is 
true that the newspapers in the U.S., with the exception of the N.Y. Post and the Negro weeklies, 
have not given the case very much attention. Indeed, it is abroad that the newspapers are paying 
most attention to it.”208 
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 With the CCRI’s labor cascade extending to other countries and Joyce Egginton’s 
London News Chronicle article serving as a catalyst for international news coverage, the kissing 
case had attracted world attention. Supporters heeded the CCRI’s call to action, and hundreds of 
letters and thousands of signatures were sent to Gov. Hodges from across the United States, 
Albania, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, 
and the United Kingdom.
209
 In Holland, a Catholic youth group in Rotterdam headed by 
Stephanus Saris organized a petition drive and letter-writing campaign on the boys’ behalf. Saris 
had previously spearheaded a campaign to aid Hungarian refugee children. The group dubbed its 
efforts to help Hanover and Fuzzy “Operation Snowball” because its efforts would grow “larger 
and larger when rolling.”210 Saris first heard of the kissing case in a Dutch newspaper, which he 
later contacted to win publicity for Operation Snowball. Other newspapers in Rotterdam also 
invited Dutch citizens to sign a petition. Within one day, 4,000 signatures had been collected. 
Saris’s group also asked that Dutch citizens write letters to President Eisenhower and within a 
week, Operation Snowball had collected 12,000 letters. Students from 10 high schools took the 
letters to the US embassy and asked that the letters be forwarded to Mamie Eisenhower.
211
 A 
Dutch high school named for Franklin Roosevelt collected and sent hundreds of signatures from 
students, teachers, and staff to Eleanor Roosevelt, who forwarded them to the NAACP’s Roy 
Wilkins with a note that read, “Dear Mr. Wilkins, I thought you might be interested in seeing the 
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enclosed and perhaps you could put it to good use.”212 Wilkins forwarded the petitions to 
Hodges, with a brief cover letter explaining that they had originally been sent to Mrs. Roosevelt 
and “we thought you might wish to have this information.”213 
 This international attention was problematic to the United States, as it was another 
example of the contradiction between the country’s treatment of its black citizens and its 
expectation of how other countries should treat their citizens. As an example, after World War II, 
in which a segregated armed forces and US allies defeated Nazism and fascism, these same 
segregated soldiers were called upon to occupy, reeducate, and democratize the defeated 
countries. In seeing this segregation, foreigners also saw the incongruity behind the United States 
as an advocate of democracy. In Germany, for example, “much of the occupation coverage 
exposed the racism and violence that white enlisted men and officers inflicted on black soldiers 
in front of the very Germans they were sent to democratize.”214 Gov. Hodges did not want his 
state to be the focus of negative international attention, and his public relations efforts centered 
on attempting to change public opinion so that North Carolina and the United States were viewed 
favorably. 
Frames in the CCRI’s Public Relations Material 
Shock/Outrage 
 All the CCRI’s public relations material included one or two sentences describing the 
facts of the kissing case. There were no adjectives or other words to illuminate the description. 
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Instead, the reader was informed in a straightforward fashion that the CCRI was undertaking the 
defense of “David ‘Fuzzy’ Simpson and James Hanover Thompson, the eight and nine-year-old 
Negro boys of Monroe, North Carolina, committed for indefinite terms to reform school after 
one of them had allegedly been kissed by a seven-year-old white girl.”215 The CCRI provided the 
reader with the names of the boys; their ages, race and domicile; the age and race of the girl; the 
action that transpired; and the boys’ punishment. Another example of how the facts were 
presented is as follows: “The case of James Hanover Thompson and David ‘Fuzzy’ Simpson, the 
eight and nine-year-old Negro boys of Monroe, N.C., sent to reform school after the older one 
had been kissed by a seven-year-old white girl.”216 The CCRI believed the incident and the 
punishment—that an eight and nine-year-old boy could be charged with assault and molestation 
and sentenced to a reformatory for at least the next 12 years for a kissing game—would result in 
shock and moral outrage. This frame is reflected not only by what was included, but by what was 
omitted: CCRI opinion. Committee leaders believe the unvarnished details were adequate to 
provoke outrage. “The facts of the case produce a moral shock: you don’t need too much 
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sociological explanation.”217 In a letter to a supporter, James Lambrecht wrote, “There’s a certain 
moral shock produced just by the facts of the case.”218  
Racism 
 However, the CCRI did not let all of the facts of the case speak for themselves. It 
believed there was a reason that two young boys were sentenced to a reformatory for a kissing 
game involving a young girl: racism. Racism was the most prominent frame in the CCRI’s public 
relations material, and the committee often used the word “racist” to describe the motivation 
behind the boys’ punishment.  
 Robert Williams wrote of the “attempt by the officials of North Carolina to whitewash 
the racist reason for the imprisonment of these two boys.”219 In a letter to a supporter, Lambrecht 
noted, “The Monroe racists have been using the case to destroy the morale of the Negro 
community there.”220 Comparing the Lewis Medlin trial with the kissing case, the CCRI noted 
that one jurist remarked the defendant “was drunk and just out to have a good time,” and the 
judge released Medlin.
221
 On the other hand, the children were “accused of an act which 
anywhere else in the world would be considered trifling,” and thus the verdict in this case was 
indicative of “racist dual standard of justice.” 222   
                                                 
217
 James Lambrecht to Ed (last name excluded from salutation), February 9, 1959, CCRI papers, box 1, folder 2. 
See also George Weissman to Harold Goldstein, January 29, 1959, CCRI papers, box 1, folder 2. 
 
218
 James Lambrecht to Larry (no surname), January 12, 1959, CCRI papers, box 1, folder 2. 
 
219
 Robert Williams to Blaine Madison, January 3, 1959, CCRI papers, box 1, folder 2.  
 
220
 James Lambrecht to Betty Lou Burleigh, February 7, 1959, CCRI papers, box 1, folder 3. 
 
221
 “Committee Takes Steps to Free Children in Carolina Kissing Case,” press release, CCRI papers, box 2, folder 7. 
 
222
 Press release “Committee Takes Steps to Free Children in Carolina Kissing Case,” December 19, 1958, CCRI 
papers, box 2, folder 7. See also Tom Kerry, “For NC Members Only—To Be Transmitted Verbally: Committee to 
Combat Racial Injustice,” December 19, 1958, SWP records, Reel 9. 
 
120 
 
 In the CCRI’s one-page flyer announcing the February 20 demonstration at the United 
Nations, the term “racial injustice” is used three times, and the kissing case is referred to as “an 
outrageous and barbarous act of racial injustice.”223 One CCRI press release included a photo of 
the boys with the caption: “Victims of racial injustice.”224 The CCRI also used the words 
“racism” or “racist” as an adjective. For example, on the CCRI’s petition, which was one of its 
primary public relations tactics, sending the boys to a reformatory was described as “under any 
circumstances barbarous but in this instance is an act of racist cruelty.”225  
 Other language associated with the racism frame does not use the word “racist,” but the 
charge of racism is implicit. For example, Robert Williams posed the following query at the 
December 31 press conference: “Simply ask yourself the question: Would this have happened if 
the two boys had been white instead of Negro?”226 The CCRI included the same question on its 
petition.
227
 On one of its flyers, the CCRI asked if the United Nations would “bow to the 
abominations of white supremacy.”228 
 In some instances, the CCRI linked racism to terrorism. One document describes the 
“terror against the Negro community” and ask allies to “join us in protesting this racist 
outrage”229 The flyer to announce the February 1 YC reception at which Williams and Perry 
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spoke described “terroristic acts against the Negroes.”230 The flyer also includes details of the 
kissing case and refers to it and KKK reprisals in Monroe as “terror in the South.”231   
The CCRI also linked racism with the quest for civil rights. The CCRI described its campaign as 
a protest movement that will “stay the hand of the white supremacists and win a victory for the 
civil rights fight in this country.”232 It also explained that “the Negro community in Union 
County, NC, has been subject to a ferocious campaign of intimidation, violence, and economic 
reprisal because of their determination to win their civil rights.”233 Due to the racist environment 
in Monroe, the CCRI declared blacks have waged a “courageous fight for equal rights and 
dignity”234 
 The CCRI’s use of the racism frame was particularly effective, given that its primary 
audience was northerners. Had the CCRI directed a racism frame at a southern audience, its use 
would have been ineffective, as southerners did not necessarily see their attitudes and behavior 
as racist. Instead, some southerners may have believed their superiority and blacks’ inferiority 
was not only a reflection of biology, but a religious mandate.
235
 The CCRI believed northerners 
would be more sympathetic and therefore it focused on “trying to build a movement in the North 
to aid Southern Negroes.”236 Yet, as Gunnar Myrdal found in his research, there is “an 
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astonishing ignorance about the Negro on the part of the white public in the North.”237 He added, 
“A great many Northerners, perhaps the majority, get shocked and shaken in their conscience 
when they learn the facts.”238 Although the CCRI targeted those who were already receptive to 
its viewpoints, that audience may have been unaware of the depth of racism that blacks endured. 
The CCRI wanted to ensure its audiences were fully aware of the racism that permeated the 
South, hence the prominence of the racism frame.  
 In addition, highlighting racism to an obdurate audience that did not find the actions 
racist would have resulted in the audience justifying its actions rather than finding them 
wrong.
239
 As the London News Chronicle’s Joyce Egginton reported, the authorities and most 
citizens in Monroe did not experience shock or outrage. She wrote, “There is not one white 
person here who does not support Mrs. Sutton’s attitude or who does not believe that [Judge] 
Price’s justice has been tempered with mercy.”240 Societal conventions prescribed rules of 
behavior, and the boys violated sacrosanct tenets regarding conduct between blacks and whites. 
Regardless of the facts of the case, most white citizens in Monroe thought the boys had 
committed a serious crime, and that there was no racism involved in their sentencing.  
 In examining the overall public relations program for the NAACP, Henry Lee Moon 
described the attitudes of the white public, separating them into three groups:  
 An irredeemably hostile minority opposed to everything for which we stand and rejecting 
 the Judeo-Christian concept of the brotherhood of man as well as the democratic creed of 
 quality under law; another minority composed of persons who, out of religious faith or 
 democratic conviction, are basically committed to our position. And then there is the 
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 third group, probably the vast majority, embracing millions of citizens who find the 
 teachings of democracy and of their religion in conflict with the practices they follow. 
 The first of these three groups is beyond our reach. The second is already in accord with 
 our principles. It is the support of the uncommitted third group that is essential to the 
 ultimate triumph of our cause. Our public relations program must be geared to winning 
 this vital support.
241
  
 
 Unlike the NAACP, the CCRI did not direct its efforts toward an uncommitted group. 
Instead, it identified those predisposed to racial justice—the second group described by Moon—
and reinforced that commitment. Within this group, it identified and engaged opinion leaders and 
youth and used them to cascade the message to a broader audience. It informed them of the facts 
of the kissing case, which resulted in shock and outrage, as Myrdal had observed was a 
possibility.
242
 The CCRI then illuminated the racism behind the punishment, and asked these 
supporters to contact Hodges and demand he free the boys.  
 In just six weeks, word of the kissing case had spread around the world, spurred by news 
coverage and the CCRI’s public relations campaign. During this time, the CCRI amassed the 
support of numerous labor advocates in the United States and internationally. In addition, the 
CCRI engaged religious leaders, civil rights advocates, academics, students, and other opinion 
leaders. Although the NAACP’s public relations support was minimal, its endorsement conferred 
legitimacy on the campaign and generated additional publicity.  
 Members of the public learned of the case from a number of sources: opinion leaders, the 
news media, a CCRI postcard, a letter, a petition, a speech, or word of mouth. One woman in San 
Francisco wrote that she heard about the boys’ dilemma on the radio.243 Another woman in 
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Detroit wrote that she read of the kissing case in the Nation, and she offered the support of the 
local chapter of the National Lawyers Guild, of which her husband was president.
244
 Others 
merely wrote that the case had come to their attention, while some remarked they had been asked 
to sign a petition, and several attached a CCRI postcard they had received or a newspaper 
article.
245
 
 On February 10, two months after the CCRI was formed, Weissman summarized the 
committee’s public relations work to date. He wrote that the CCRI has “engaged in considerable 
publicity work on the kissing case, including two press conferences, issuing numerous press 
releases, which have appeared in American and foreign newspapers, it has called for people to 
write letters to Governor Hodges urging release of the boys and it has circulated petitions to the 
same, and it has arranged speaking engagements for Mr. Williams, Dr. Perry, and Conrad 
Lynn.”246 Of Weissman’s efforts, Braden wrote, “You are doing an excellent job, and I am sure 
you will so long as we hew to the line of combating racial injustice and keeping out the political 
arguments with the NAACP as well as with the Left.”247 
 Within a very short time frame, the North Carolina governor was inundated with 
thousands of signatures on petitions and hundreds of letters and postcards from around the world. 
The public’s reaction, combined with the international news coverage, reflected poorly on 
Hodges, North Carolina, and the United States. In response, Hodges launched his own public 
relations campaign. As a result, the CCRI employed additional public relations tactics to counter 
many of Hodges’s claims, as well as those of the USIA, which stepped in to manage some of the 
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international outcry. The CCRI had not yet achieved its outcome and thus it could not claim 
success. Its public relations campaign would continue. 
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We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
 endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
 Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.
1
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: GOVERNOR HODGES, THE USIA, AND THE CCRI 
 As a result of the CCRI’s public relations efforts and the publicity about the kissing case, 
Gov. Hodges received hundreds of letters and petitions with thousands of signatures from those 
who protested the boys’ sentencing. This direct outreach by the public condemning North 
Carolina’s actions caused Hodges to launch a reactive public relations campaign. Evidence 
suggests that the letters Hodges received, along with the news coverage of the kissing case, 
shaped his public relations strategies and tactics. Although Hodges did not have a written public 
relations plan that described strategies and tactics, they can be determined from the historical 
documents. This chapter addresses those public relations strategies and tactics and analyzes the 
frames in his public relations material. In addition, this chapter examines how the USIA 
addressed the international outcry, as well as how the CCRI responded to Hodges’s and the 
USIA’s public relations efforts.  
A Deluge of Letters: The Public Voices Its Opinion 
 Although letters trickled in to Hodges’s office in November and early December, the 
spate of letters began arriving in mid-December. Each week, Hodges received a new onslaught 
of letters, telegrams, postcards, and petitions, from Americans and from protesters throughout the 
world. By mid-January, at which time the boys had been at the reformatory for more than two 
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months, Hodges acknowledged that he had received approximately 200 letters.
2
 The 
correspondence to Hodges coincides with the CCRI’s public relations campaign, specifically its 
letter writing and postcard campaign, in which it urged supporters to write to Hodges demanding 
he free the boys. In addition, the London News Chronicle story about the kissing case appeared 
in mid-December, prompting other overseas newspapers to write about the kissing case.
3
 Many 
letter writers corresponded in their native language, prompting Hodges to ask William Friday, 
president of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, if one of the university’s language 
professors would translate the letters.
4
 Friday assigned Professor of Romance Languages J.C. 
Lyons, who later concluded, “It is my impression that these letters came from sentimental, 
emotional but sincere people who are completely unaware that their kindly feelings are being 
exploited for an evil purpose by an unscrupulous propaganda machine. Whatever steps can be 
taken to set them straight as to the real facts are certainly worthwhile moves.”5 
 Hodges was discomfited by the letters. In response to one of a few missives he received 
from supporters, he referred to the volume of letters he received as “intemperate.”6 In that same 
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correspondence, he wrote that “a great deal of misinformation has been widely publicized on this 
matter and I have received a large number of very critical letters from various parts of the 
country.”7 In a letter to Chattanooga Free Press editor Lee Anderson, Hodges complained, 
“More and more evidence is being accumulated to show that this is pure propaganda, as we are 
still getting letters resulting from the story being re-broadcast in various parts of the country. In 
other words, it won’t die down—they are using it for their purposes, and it is creating ill will and 
misunderstanding here and abroad.”8 Hodges considered the CCRI’s version of the kissing 
case—that two black boys were remanded to a reformatory for kissing a white girl—propaganda 
because it did not present the actual facts of the situation. According to Hodges, the correct 
version of the story was that two juveniles with sordid home environments and history of 
delinquency were remanded to a reformatory not only for their recent transgression, but for their 
previous offenses.  
 Hodges was concerned not only by the quantity of letters; their content also was 
troubling. Because the letters were sent largely due to the CCRI’s public relations campaign, the 
overwhelming majority of them protested North Carolina’s actions in the kissing case. Of the 
approximately 400 letters and postcards Hodges received, along with thousands of signatures on 
petitions, about five letters were from US residents who supported the actions of North Carolina 
authorities. There was no particular geographic distribution of the letters. In the United States, 
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they came from Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, 
Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. From outside the United States, Hodges received correspondence 
from Albania, Australia, Belgium, Canada, England, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, and Switzerland.
9
 Hodges’s administrative aide Robert Giles noted that Hodges was 
“greatly distressed that there has been such complete misinformation widely publicized on this 
case.”10  
 Had Hodges received more letters from those who agreed with the boys’ sentencing, he 
might have been less concerned. However, protesters heeded the CCRI’s call-to-action strategy, 
and they wrote to Hodges expressing their opinions about the kissing case. As a result, Hodges 
complained about the “terrible letters, and the effect of pure propaganda and how it has hurt 
North Carolina.”11 Therefore, it was the volume, geographic scope, and content of the letters, 
along with the publicity about the kissing case, that molded Hodges’s public relations efforts. His 
public relations strategies and tactics were developed reactively and in direct response to the 
public outcry. The public expressed its opinion in letters; therefore; it is necessary to examine the 
letters and their frames before reviewing the public relations activities Hodges developed in 
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response. One of the research questions this dissertation asks is: what frames were in the letters 
the public sent to Hodges, and how did the frames relate to the four groups’ public relations 
material? Given that many of the letters were sent as a result of the CCRI’s public relations 
activities, the frames in the letters also will be analyzed in terms of how they relate to the frames 
in the CCRI’s public relations materials. 
The Letters and Their Frames 
 Using qualitative framing analysis, I read each of the letters multiple times and took notes 
to ascertain recurring themes. Stuart Hall posits that researchers employing qualitative framing 
analysis look for areas of emphasis in text and learn to hear the same underlying appeals, the 
same notes, being sounded again and again in different passages and contexts.
12
 These areas of 
emphasis are identified as frames. Entman explained that frames can be detected by probing for 
particular words and visual images that consistently appear in a narrative and convey 
thematically consistent meanings across media and time.
13
 To identify areas of emphasis in text, 
I examined sentences, word choice, position, and tone, probing for points that were reinforced 
and repeated. I noted words and phrases that appeared consistently, thereby reinforcing, 
referencing, and giving salience to some ideas.  
Shock and Outrage 
 A key frame in the CCRI’s public relations material was shock; the CCRI hoped its 
supporters would be outraged by the kissing case. It employed this frame by what it omitted in its 
written materials rather than what it included. Instead of telling the public how to feel about the 
fact that two boys were sentenced to a reformatory for 12 years for a kissing game, the CCRI 
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provided the unadorned facts of the case. This approach worked, and most of the letters sent to 
Hodges expressed indignation over the situation. Although the CCRI did not use the words 
“shock,” and “outrage” in its public relations material, the public did so in its letters.  
 Members of a community club in Los Angles wrote, “At a meeting of our organization 
attended by 100 citizens, we voted to protest the outrageous sentence of the two little Negro 
boys.
14
 One letter writer referred to the boys’ sentencing as “unbelievable and anti-human,” 
while another penned, “To say I am shocked is to put it mildly in reference to what has happened 
to the two Negro Boys Thompson and Simpson.”15 Writing that they represented millions of 
women on all continents, the Women’s International Democratic Federation expressed shock and 
joined “outraged world public opinion demanding unconditional release” of the boys.16 From 
Los Angeles, a woman began her letter by informing Hodges, “I was shocked and outraged to 
learn of the indeterminate sentences given the two small boys, Hanover Thompson and Fuzzy 
Simpson, in your state.”17A woman from Vermont was “very pained and shocked that this could 
happen in America.”18 An eleven-year-old girl from London wrote, “All the members of this 
family would like you to know that we are absolutely disgusted with the report on the case of the 
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two small negro boys who were sentenced to a reformatory school for kissing a white girl in your 
State.”19  
Disbelief 
 After expressing their outrage, the letters writers elaborated on the specific reasons for 
their anger. The public was astonished that the boys’ action was considered a crime, and that it 
resulted in a harsh punishment. “It seems incredible that such a severe punishment should be 
given for such a minor offense,” wrote a California resident.20 Similarly, a Texan exclaimed, 
“How utterly absurd for such a sentence to be given on the basis of little children’s harmless 
play!”21 Public opinion focused on the belief that the children had engaged in innocent play, not 
molestation. “It would seem that boys of pre-pubertal age are really ‘getting the works’ on such a 
charge, and I hope you will use your high office to send the little children home,” wrote Charles 
Schwartz of Los Angeles, California.
22
  
 Letter writers were perplexed by the notion that child’s play could rise to the level of 
criminal behavior. “It is the feeling of this group that those boys are only children and that the 
treatment and punishment are all out of proportion to the deed committed. We feel that they are 
in no sense of the word criminals.”23 A writer from Salerno, Italy, asked, “The motive, one of the 
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most stupid. They were only playing with a little white girl, and what harm is there for children 
to play together?”24  
 The Congress of Canadian Women expressed the following opinion: 
 We understand the crime consisted in demanding a kiss from a small white girl, eight 
 years of age, as a price for releasing her from a ditch. As a rule, this sort of childish 
 teasing is punished either by the children’s parents or the school principal. Never in the 
 annals of human history have infants been committed to state reformatory institutions for 
 this sort of mischievous prank.
25
 
 
 The letter writers believed the boys had been unjustly charged, as children’s games 
should not warrant criminal sentences. 
Racism 
 The most prominent frame in the CCRI’s public relations material focused on racism, 
specifically that the boys’ treatment and sentencing was motivated by racial prejudice. The CCRI 
wanted to draw attention to the racism in the South, and it presented the kissing case as an act of 
racial injustice, impressing upon the public that it was one of many such acts perpetrated on 
blacks in the region. CCRI public relations material used liberally the words “racism” or some 
version of “racial injustice.” This racism frame was also prevalent in the letters from the public. 
In speculating on the reasons for the boys’ sentencing and punishment, most letter writers 
believed it was racially motivated. Addressing Hodges, one man penned, “The reason for this 
travesty of justice is well known to you, and any civilized conscience will condemn the people of 
North Carolina for permitting this vicious racial bigotry.”26 A woman from California began, 
“The Committee to Combat Racial Injustice informs us of the incredible arrest and holding of 
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two small boys for the “crime” of kissing two white girls.”27 She continued, “As you are no 
doubt aware, these arrests have attracted worldwide attention, and, as you must further be aware, 
we, the whites are a distinct minority, internationally speaking. So that in the court of world 
opinion, the feelings of people like Judge J. Hampton Price, are regarded as backward and 
bigoted, to put it kindly.”28 
 A letter writer from England asked Hodges, “If these were two small white boys, would 
they have been sent to a reform school for kissing a girl?”29 Another person from England, who 
wrote that she was “one of many thousands horrified by this inhumanity,” sent a cartoon from 
her local newspaper. It showed a drawing of two children, one black and one white, touching 
hands, with mistletoe above their heads. The caption read: “Peace on Earth and Goodwill to 
Children Everywhere—Even in North Carolina.”30 
 One North Carolinian shared with Hodges what he had read about the boys’ hearing:  
 The juvenile court judge used the word “nigger” twice, a small thing, perhaps, but 
 something which might indicate the possibility of prejudice. The unpleasant publicity is 
 certainly, as you have noticed, very damaging to our State, but even more distressing is 
 the thought that these young boys may have been the victims of racial tensions, a 
 possibility which, in my mind, is not excluded.
31
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 A letter writer from Colorado remarked, “We fully realize that all states, including the 
northern ones, are not free from racial discrimination, but it was most difficult to believe that the 
imprisonment of such young children could happen anywhere in our country.”32 
 A man from Italy noted, “We are very happy that in these days we are not American 
citizens so that we will not be forced to teach our five children to look with distaste on the color 
of skin of their playmates.”33 Another letter writer from Italy wrote, “The absurd sentence, which 
is one of the most cruel manifestations of racism, is an insult to all children, makes them lose 
their confidence in men and pushes them along the road to hatred of races and peoples.”34 The 
writers did not merely point out the prejudice behind the case; they vehemently expressed their 
anger about it.  
 A Canadian wrote,  
 This is so unbelievable an act of viciousness meted out to mere children because they 
 are black that it stinks to high heaven. The Hitlerites thought they were a super race, [sic] 
 you white southerners seem to be contaminated with the same form of insanity. No 
 wonder the world has come to hate you superior Americans.”35 
 A woman from Cambridge, Massachusetts, shared the following opinion with Hodges: 
 Their real crime? Being Negroes, while their little playmate was white. You know, and I 
 know, and the whole world knows that had these small boys been white the incident 
 would have been a joke. For  the guilt of having black skins in North Carolina these 8 and 
 9 year old children are branded as criminals and subjected to the terror of being torn from 
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 their parents and locked up in an institution of punishment, with their whole future lives 
 poisoned and jeopardized.
36
 
 
 In addition to highlighting the racism behind the boys’ treatment, the letter writers also 
believed such action was typical of the South. A woman from Texas wrote, “It is all too obvious 
that this shameful ruling on the part of Judge Price is but a part of the pattern of racial pride and 
prejudice that still has all too strong a grip on some areas of the South.”37 
 In their correspondence to Hodges, most letter writers did not identify their race and 
those few who did were white. A woman from Massachusetts wrote, “Lest you think that only 
Negroes are shocked at this case, I am white though sometimes I am given reason to be ashamed 
of it.”38 If Hodges thought most of the letter writers were black, he may have dismissed their 
protests. Although the historical documents do not indicate if Hodges considered the race of the 
letter writers, he developed a public relations campaign in response to the letters, which suggests 
he most likely recognized that the letters were probably being sent from black and white 
Americans. The fact that the letters were sent from various parts of the United States may also 
have indicated that blacks and whites protested North Carolina’s actions in the kissing case. 
Reputation 
 Another key frame in the letters and one that caused great consternation to Hodges was 
concern related to the reputation of North Carolina and the United States. The public clearly 
believed that North Carolina had brought embarrassment to itself and to the country. For a 
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politician who had been working tirelessly to improve economic conditions in his state, the 
negative public sentiment and stinging, direct comments were troubling, especially since they 
came from both Northerners and Southerners.
39
 A man from New York wrote, “If North Carolina 
is to regain national respect it must assure constitutional rights for all citizens.”40  Hodges 
received the following opinion from an Alabama woman. 
 If the little boys had been white not matter how bad the reputation of their families, no 
 matter how bad their stealing had been had been, this would not have been regarded as an 
 offense against the State of North Carolina. To have made it an offense against the State 
 of North Carolina and to have punished the little boys for it, makes a laughingstock of us 
 all here in the South. You and the State of North Carolina have shamed us and I am afraid 
 this is a mark of shame that will not easily be erased.
41
 
 
 Going beyond North Carolina’s reputation, the public believed the kissing case was an 
opprobrium that made a mockery of the United States’ standing as a worldwide arbiter of 
freedom. Communism, in which citizens were not afforded personal and political liberties, posed 
a threat to this freedom and hence, to world peace.
42
 Therefore, after the defeat of Nazism in 
World War II, US foreign policy focused on containing Communism. During the Cold War, the 
United States “sought to draw into stark terms the differences between American democracy and 
Soviet terror.”43 However, the hypocrisy perpetuated by America’s espousal of freedom and its 
contradictory treatment of its black citizens was noted by its enemies, and the Soviet Union was 
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quick to report on racial incidents in the United States.
44
 Newspapers throughout the world 
carried stories about discrimination against non-white foreign dignitaries who visited the United 
States, as well as against American blacks.
45
 At a time when the focus of US foreign policy was 
to promote democracy and contain communism, the international press attention on America’s 
racial problems was troublesome to US political leaders.
46
  
 To help mold its image, the US government, through the USIA, presented its racial issues 
as an example of peaceful social transformation through democracy.
47
 The USIA used the 1954 
Brown v. Board of Education decision, in which the Supreme Court declared state laws allowing 
segregated schools unconstitutional, as an example of such a change and communicated it 
extensively overseas, to positive feedback.
48
 The Brown decision, at least temporarily, had 
quieted foreign critics.
49
 This gain was to be short-lived, however; the Little Rock school 
integration crisis dominated national and international headlines in September 1957. The Soviet 
Union and other US enemies, as well as its allies, reported extensively on Little Rock, to 
negative reactions.
50
 Not only had the crisis impacted international opinion, US officials believed 
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it adversely impacted diplomatic efforts. US Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot 
Lodge suspected that the United States lost several votes “on the Chinese communist item 
because of Little Rock.”51 
 A little more than a year later, the kissing case again reminded the public of the 
inconsistency between the values that the United States government promoted in official 
communication and in its actions. As the letters poured in, Hodges was concerned that North 
Carolina was receiving such negative attention. One letter writer linked Hodges with Gov. Orval 
Faubus, which had to be especially upsetting to Hodges given that school desegregation in North 
Carolina had proceeded without incident, unlike the crisis Faubus caused in Arkansas.
52
 “It is 
high time that men like yourself and Governor Faubus of Arkansas recognize the tremendous 
harm done the United States in the eyes of the world and especially the uncommitted, colored 
races, by such exhibitions of injustice as practiced in your state.”53 
 Hodges received the following from a professor of sociology at Western Reserve 
University: “The state of North Carolina has, through this arbitrary act, shocked the civilized 
world and tremendously increased the difficulties of our diplomatic agents abroad. At this 
juncture of human events we cannot afford to announce to the world that we have one standard 
of justice for whites and another for the Negroes.”54 A man from Oregon sent a letter to President 
Eisenhower, with a copy to Hodges, asking, “Is this possible in America? We have spent billions 
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to promote democracy and cannot protect two little colored children!”55 A woman in Brooklyn 
admonished Hodges, “Everywhere in our country or abroad where this becomes known, your 
state and your administration will be considered to be run by idiots or viciously prejudiced 
grown-ups.”56 
 Twelve members of the 280
th
 Army Security Agency stationed in West Berlin wrote  
 
Hodges that publicity over the case undermined efforts to cultivate allies abroad. 
 
 Are you aware that the billions of dollars and time and efforts of thousands of Americans 
 abroad are wasted when those we are trying to make our allies in the worldwide battle 
 against atheistic communism read about such instances of our ‘democracy in action’? We 
 are left completely without defense when we are asked to account for our treatment of 
 Negroes.
57
  
 
 Public sentiment was that North Carolina’s actions had negatively impacted the 
reputation of the state, and that of the entire United States. Compounding this problem was the 
fact that the letters were coming from citizens around the globe. A woman from Switzerland 
referred to the boys’ treatment as “shameful for the United States,” while a man from Italy wrote 
that it was “an insult to humanity and a disgrace to the United States of America.”58 An English 
woman cautioned, “We will never have peace in this world when you Americans make such a 
mockery of standing for peace and freedom for all,” while another British citizen wrote, 
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 We are ashamed that so called free Americans can consign two children to banishment 
 just because they are colored. Well might Russia laugh when America talks of its Statue 
 of Liberty and goes through the hypocritical  performance of saluting its flag of liberty.
 59
 
 
 With the negative attention directed toward North Carolina, Hodges needed to take action 
to help manage the state’s reputation. 
Hodges Reacts 
 After the public learned of the kissing case, be it via the news media or a CCRI letter, 
postcard, or petition, members of the public wrote to Hodges to express their opinions in 
language that was clear and direct. Although the historical documents do not specify when 
Hodges first became aware of the kissing case, one of the first letters he received was on 
November 17 from an electronics consultant in Chicago, who referenced an item about the case 
in his local paper.
60
 In a November 19 memo to the governor, his administrative aide Robert 
Giles noted that Hodges had recently seen newspaper stories about the case.
61
 To gain a better 
understanding of the situation, Giles contacted Blaine Madison, commissioner of the North 
Carolina Board of Correction and Training. Madison responded that Union County Juvenile 
Court Judge J. Hampton Price had informed him the boys were on probation; they molested the 
girl and therefore had been committed to the reformatory for their own safety. Although Hodges 
received only a few letters in November and the publicity about the case had not yet reached its 
apex, he nevertheless was compelled to address it in one of his weekly press conferences. In 
preparation, Giles requested a statement from Judge Price. 
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 Price’s account first reaffirmed that North Carolina’s juvenile courts did not as a rule 
publish the names and crimes of juvenile offenders. However due to the widespread publicity 
generated by “disinterested parties who do not know the facts” and “slanted the facts in order to 
gain sympathy for the juveniles and gain publicity for themselves, and create strife in their home 
community,” Price reversed North Carolina’s policy and released the boys’ names.62 In a letter to 
a women from Illinois who had written to Hodges protesting the boys’ sentencing, Giles was 
later more specific about why the boys’ records were made public, explaining that “the detailed 
information on these juvenile cases is not ordinarily made public, but since a studied effort was 
evidently made by some irresponsible Negro people in this particular case to exploit the matter, 
an exception has been made.”63 In his statement, Price outlined the boys’ offenses: They had on 
separate occasions stolen a lawn mower, a ham, and a bicycle. They roamed the streets and as a 
result, “many complaints were coming in from various parts of the city.”64 Price laid blame with 
their working mothers, noting they could not control their sons. He wrote, “They are not at home 
in the daytime [sic], they keep no proper supervision over their children.”65 
 During a press conference, Hodges echoed the points in Price’s statement, with particular 
emphasis on the boys’ records and their families’ living conditions.66 In response to news stories 
that the boys were denied counsel, Hodges countered by saying the mothers did not request 
counsel. Hodges’s comments were carried by the mainstream white press and the black press, 
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which prompted Robert Williams to write to Hodges to refute some of Price’s statements.67 
Williams wrote, “My dear Governor, while parroting the words of one Mr. J. Hampton Price, 
you stated that the two little Negro boys involved in the Carolina kissing incident did not request 
counsel. No, Mr. Hodges, they did not, because their parents were informed there were no 
charges against them.”68 
 In addition, Williams deflected blame leveled at Jennie Simpson and Evelyn Thompson 
and directed it instead at social policy.  
 Yes, Mr. Hodges I agree that children should not be left to roam the streets fatherless 
 while their poor mothers shift for the bare necessities of life. Have you stopped to ask 
 yourself what the local Welfare Department should have done Governor? Sure the boys 
 had a juvenile record but is that any excuse to deny them equal protection under the law? 
 We are not trying to white wash their records Governor, we ask only that they not be 
 swallowed up as victims of the maelstrom of white supremacy. We merely  
 ask that you seek the truth by events of fact rather than through prejudice  
 and hearsay.
69
  
  
 Mrs. Simpson was a widow and Mrs. Thompson’s husband had deserted the family. On 
the fifteen dollars a week they earned as domestics, Simpson was responsible for four children 
who lived at home, whereas Thompson had six children at home. In 1959, 18.9 percent of non-
white families in Monroe had incomes under $1,000 per year, versus 7.4 percent for white 
families.
70
 Despite their economic circumstances, the mothers had been denied welfare. Williams 
believed welfare decisions in Monroe were determined by race, and given that there were a 
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number of economically needy families in Monroe, a white family in Monroe would receive 
welfare before a black family would.
71
 
 Giles forwarded a copy of Williams’s letter to Price, asking “whether or not you think the 
Governor should make some reply to it.”72 Price responded that Williams craved publicity and a 
reply would only fuel his efforts to seek attention. 
Reverend Canon Collins 
 Hodges was disturbed by all of the letters he received in response to the kissing case, but 
correspondence he received from the Rev. Canon John Collins of St. Paul’s Cathedral in London 
caused him particular consternation. Collins wrote, 
 Urge you quash the sentence passed upon the two Negro boys Fuzzy Simpson and 
 Hanover Thompson and let them return to their homes. Millions the world over will be 
 deeply shocked by what has happened. Such inhumanity and such injustice surely belie 
 profession of belief in liberal and Christian values and in the charter of human rights and 
 make a mockery of the claims of the west to stand for freedom and justice for all 
 regardless of creed, race or color.
73
 
 
 Collins had also sent his telegram to the press.
74
 Hodges replied, “Ordinarily I do not 
undertake to correspond with individuals through the medium of the newspapers. I do so in this 
instance because of the prominence of your position and on the assumption that you may have an 
interest in considering a few facts in this case which I will endeavor to relate to you.”75 Hodges 
then proceeded to make his arguments and correct Collins’s characterization of the incident. He 
attached a report from Juvenile Court Judge Hampton Price, noting that he had “absolutely no 
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reason to doubt the integrity of this official.”76 He then explained that the boys were neither 
sentenced to life imprisonment, nor were they convicted of a crime. “Under North Carolina law, 
a juvenile is not convicted of a criminal offense but the Court is authorized to commit the 
juvenile to a training school. This applies in all cases, regardless of race.” Hodges’s next point 
centered on the boys’ home environment, claiming it “leaves a lot to be desired” and 
“unbelievable as it may seem to you, the circumstances and surroundings at the Morrison 
Training School to which these young boys were committed are usually far superior and more 
conducive to good conduct than the homes from which those committed come.”77 In addition, 
Hodges added that the head and staff of the training school are “Negro and are well qualified by 
experience and education for their positions.” After inviting Collins to North Carolina to see for 
himself “what is actually going on in our State relating to juvenile offenses and racial relations in 
general,” Hodges recounted newspapers stories he read of race-related riots in Notting Hill, 
London.
78
 He claimed those riots were more violent than anything that occurred in North 
Carolina, adding that he would not be so presumptuous to hold London officials responsible, nor 
would he judge all of England based on newspaper stories of the riots.
79
 
 In response to an editorial supporting Hodges in the Danville, Virginia Bee that described 
Canon Collins as meddlesome, Hodges wrote, “I do not know which of my friends there wrote 
the editorial in your Friday, December 26, issue entitled ‘Meddlesome Canons.’ I would like to 
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say it is a good one.”80 Hodges enclosed a copy of a letter he had recently sent to Collins and 
planned to release at a January 8 press conference. 
 In his January 22 response to Hodges, Collins agreed that he was interested in publicity 
because he believed that acts of racial discrimination, regardless of where they occurred, should 
be publicized worldwide.
81
 He then reiterated his reasons for protesting: the fact that a black boy 
kissing a white girl resulted in court proceedings against the boy, and his belief that if the boys 
had been white and in a similar circumstance, they would not have been charged and sentenced. 
In concluding, Collins wrote that he suspected the events transpired as they did due to racial 
discrimination. 
 After receiving Collins’s second letter, Hodges penned another two-page response, which 
he began with the following sentence: “I have your letter of January 22, and in all candor, I must 
say that your zeal for publicity seems still to outstrip your desire for factual information.”82 
Hodges then urged Collins to re-read Judge Price’s report. Next, he argued that regardless of 
location, be it London or North Carolina, if “a man forced a woman to be confined in a given 
place until she consented, against her will, to kiss him, that would clearly constitute assault and 
battery.”83 In making this point, Hodges disregarded that the kiss in this case was exchanged 
between children, not adults. However, equating a child’s kiss with that of an adult may be less 
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an act of forgetfulness than a reflection of southern racial norms. In the South, a nine-year-old 
black boy supposedly forcing a seven-year-old white girl to kiss him is a fissure in the region’s 
most inviolable law regarding race relations. An act of miscegenation, particularly when it 
involves a black male and white female, had to be punished, regardless of the age of the 
offender. 
 Further, in his response to Collins, Hodges did not clarify that in the South, when a man 
confines a woman and forces her to kiss him against her will, such behavior is always considered 
assault and battery when the man is black and the woman is white. On the other hand, when the 
man is white and the woman is black, that behavior may be excused for any number of reasons, 
such as merely engaging in drunken fun by the man, as in Lewis Medlin’s case.84  
 Without mentioning its name, Hodges referred to “the Negro organization which has 
been exploiting this case,” presumably indicating the NAACP or CCRI.85 By this time, Hodges 
was clearly irritated with Canon Collins. In an exchange with the State’s Bill Sharpe, both men 
refer to Collins derisively as “reverunt” Collins.86 
Hodges’s Public Relations Strategies, Tactics, and Frames 
 As was the case with the CCRI, Hodges did not have a written public relations plan for 
the kissing case in which he articulated strategies and tactics. However, Hodges knew the value 
of public relations.
87
 As news of the kissing case spread and letters began to suggest the negative 
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impact of the case on his reputation and the state’s, he launched a reactive public relations 
program. Hodges’s strategies, tactics, and the frames in his public relations material were 
intertwined, and he employed them simultaneously. This section examines his strategies, tactics, 
and frames, as well as how the CCRI responded to Hodges’s public relations efforts. 
Engage Protesters and Correct Misperceptions 
 One of Hodges’s strategies was to engage directly with protesters. Protesters expressed 
their dissent via letters, and Hodges used the same medium to engage with them. His tactic was 
to respond individually to each letter he received, and he noted that he had “taken particular 
pains to write each one of them, especially abroad.”88 This strategy and tactic are linked with 
Hodges’s next strategy, which was to correct what he considered were misrepresentations about 
the case. Hodges believed that if the public had the correct information, they would find the 
state’s handling of the case reasonable. Based on his tactics, he believed the best way to 
communicate the correct facts about the case was by relaying them directly to those who voiced 
a dissenting opinion. With this personal appeal, Hodges hoped to change their opinions.  
 In implementing the tactics supporting this strategy, Hodges identified what he thought 
were the key falsehoods about the case, and he developed an argument with what he claimed was 
the correct information. First, Hodges sought to correct reports that the boys had been sentenced 
for life or sent to prison. For example in one response, he wrote, 
 This is a school for young juvenile delinquents. It is not a prison. It so happens that the 
 Superintendent of the School is a Negro and is well  qualified by experience and 
 education for the position. Under the laws of this State, a juvenile is committed to a 
 training school by the Court, and it is up to the school officials as to how long he will 
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 remain. It is the accepted policy of the institutions involved to release the children to their 
 families as soon as it appears the family is able and willing to give some care and 
 guidance to the child. These same laws apply to all such cases whether white or Negro 
 children are involved.
89
 
 
 Hodges or Giles penned a different response to each letter they received, depending on 
the issues raised by the sender. In another response, they addressed the same issue of the boys’ 
incarceration, albeit with different language.  
 These boys have never been “sentenced to prison.” They were not even convicted of a 
 “crime.” They were brought into juvenile Court and upon proper findings that they were 
 delinquent were then committed to the Morrison Training School at Hoffman, North 
 Carolina. The Morrison Training School is a school and not a prison.
90
 
 
 That fact that the Morrison Training School was not a prison was true, but juveniles 
committed to it were unable to leave of their own accord. At the time of the kissing case, if 
juvenile delinquents were sentenced and sent to a facility for rehabilitation, that facility was 
referred to as a reformatory. Hodges approached the issue of a prison versus a reformatory as one 
of word choice—a miscalculation, since the public was incensed that the boys were sentenced at 
all, and that they were sentenced to a facility they were not free to leave for at least 12 years. 
Hodges ignored this concern by attempting to present the facility to which the boys had been sent 
as being preferential to a prison. However, as London News Chronicle reporter Joyce Egginton 
had discovered, Morrison Training School was little more than “an old-fashioned building with 
few comforts.”91 
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 If Hodges was irritated by the letters, his aide Robert Giles, who responded to some of 
the letters on the Governor’s behalf, was equally so. Much of the correspondence from Giles is 
brusque and makes no attempt to hide his irascibility. He seems particularly vexed that anyone 
would take the time to write to the Governor to protest the boys’ sentencing. To the author of one 
letter who expressed shock at the kissing case, Giles wrote, “You state that you are ‘shocked’ at 
what has happened to these two young boys.”92 He enclosed two reports prepared by Price and 
Madison, respectively, and implored the letter’s author to read them. “The Governor has been 
‘shocked’ that there has been such widespread misinformation publicized on this matter. It 
appears that such has been done by people who are interested in publicity as such, with probably 
little real personal interest in the boys themselves and apparently no interest whatever in the 
actual truth of these matters.”93 
 An exasperated Giles wrote to another correspondent, “Although the tone of your letter 
does not hold out much hope that you are particularly interested in considering the basic facts of 
the case involving the two young Negro boys, I would nevertheless like to make an attempt to 
give them to you.”94 Giles blamed the media for the misrepresentation. “The plain fact of the 
situation is these young boys have not been grossly mistreated as reported by the papers, nor 
were they snatched away from the loving arms of good mothers who were giving them good 
homes.”95 This letter writer, who hailed from Amsterdam, had enclosed two dollars and asked 
that the money be given to the boys. Giles replied, “The two $1.00 bills which you enclosed with 
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your letter are returned herewith, with the suggestion, if you desire, that you make any money 
contribution directly to the families involved rather than to State officials.”96 Giles often 
concluded his replies by urging the letter writer to come to North Carolina to see how the state 
was handling race relations.  
 You are welcome to visit North Carolina and the Morrison Training School at any time to 
 see for yourself what this State is endeavoring to do to help these young people. If you 
 could see at firsthand what is actually being done relating to juvenile offenses, you may 
 not agree with everything but I believe you would have a greatly different concept of this 
 particular State. We are hardly as barbaric an uncivilized as we have been painted in 
 some lurid newspaper accounts recently.
97
 
 
 Although Giles and Hodges often refer to newspapers as the source of disinformation, 
they do not cite specific papers. With the exception of local black newspapers such as the 
Carolina Times, stories about the kissing case in the North Carolina press supported the state’s 
actions, as did articles in other southern newspapers.
98
 Hodges and Giles were most likely 
referring to Ted Poston’s stories in the New York Post, which were supportive of the boys.99 The 
New York Times was the only metropolitan daily that covered the kissing case regularly, albeit 
not extensively, and its coverage was neutral.
100
 In addition, Hodges began receiving 
correspondence from England after the London News Chronicle article ran.
101
 Many of the 
English letter writers referenced the article, which was supportive of the boys; some enclosed a 
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copy of the article with their correspondence to Hodges. Therefore, Hodges and Giles probably 
included that story in their account of newspaper propaganda. 
Enlist Expert Opinion 
 Another strategy Hodges employed was to enlist expert opinion. To verify his points and 
present what he thought were the correct facts of the case, Hodges called upon North Carolina 
authorities who oversaw departments involved in the kissing case. In addition to using Price’s 
statement in his November press conference, Hodges incorporated elements of it in his 
correspondence with the public. He often included the following paragraph to introduce the 
judge’s declaration: 
 Much to my distress a great deal of patently false information and half-truths have been 
 widely publicized in connection with this case. I am taking the liberty of sending you a 
 report on this matter from the Judge of the Juvenile Court involved, and also a recent 
 statement of facts concerning the family situation of both these young boys issued by the 
 Commissioner of our training schools.
102
 
 
 In one of the earliest letters he received, Hodges was asked by a man from Chicago if the 
boys had been denied counsel and a chance to confront their accuser and whether the boys would 
have received the same treatment had they been white.
103
 In his reply, Giles did not address 
either issue, which resulted in a second letter from the Chicagoan, in which he thanked Giles for 
the information but noted that his questions had not been answered. Giles’s second letter 
included J. Hampton Price’s report. He noted, “The Governor requested this report last week 
because of the widespread misinformation about this case.”104 Giles explained that as stated in 
the official report, the mothers did not request counsel and if they had, the court would have 
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appointed them representation.
105
 Giles claimed he was unable to address whether or not the 
boys were able to confront their accuser because the official report did not indicate if the 
witnesses were present at the hearing. 
 In addition to Judge Price’s statement explaining the boys’ sentencing, Hodges asked 
North Carolina Board of Correction and Training Commissioner Blaine Madison to prepare a 
statement in response to the CCRI’s and NAACP’s legal actions to free the boys. Madison’s 
four-page statement first addressed the alleged misperception that the boys had been sent to 
prison.  
 Contrary to erroneous newspaper accounts carried in many out-of-state papers these boys 
 were not convicted of a criminal offense and “sentenced to prison for life” or sentenced 
 to prison for an “indeterminate period, etc.” Rather, they were made wards of the State 
 and were committed to the Training School on the occasion for such time as is 
 determined by school officials would be in the best interests of the children. It is 
 significant that both of these children were already on probation with the juvenile court 
 for previous delinquency.
106
 
  
 One of the ways to achieve receptivity to a message is to ensure it is being delivered from 
a credible, trustworthy source. As the governor of North Carolina, Hodges could be perceived as 
credible. In addition, he obtained statements from two authorities who oversaw two departments 
involved in the boys’ sentencing: the North Carolina Department of Correction and Training and 
the Union County Juvenile Court. Protesters received information from three credible sources 
and could therefore be assured of the accuracy of the information and the authority and expertise 
behind the decisions made. However in this instance, it is possible protesters could view Hodges 
and his experts differently. While protesters may not doubt their credibility and expertise, they 
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may doubt their objectivity. In other words, while they may be seen as reliable sources, they are 
also viewed as biased ones. Hodges and his two experts represent North Carolina, so predictably 
they would defend the state’s actions. The fact that the protesters may have viewed them as 
biased was reinforced when Hodges removed culpability from North Carolina authorities and 
assigned it to Hanover and Fuzzy. 
The Blame Frame 
 The points Madison made reflect the most prominent frame used in Hodges’s public 
relations material: the blame frame, in which Hodges blamed the boys and their mothers for their 
circumstances. This frame served two purposes: it attempted to dampen any sympathy the public 
may have about the boys, and it shifted blame from North Carolina authorities to the boys and 
their families.  
 As Hanson and Hanson posited, racists often blame the victim to rationalize racial 
injustice. In this instance, Hodges and other North Carolina authorities blamed the mothers by 
presenting calumnies about their characters and criticizing their home environments. In his 
statement, Madison added, “While the training school is never an acceptable substitute for a 
good home, it is definitely better for the children than a poor home, with irresponsible, and often 
immoral parents.”107 Madison wrote that Hanover Thompson’s mother “claims her husband 
deserted her and one child in 1941 and since then she has, admittedly, lived with a succession of 
men. Birth records show that 10 children have been born to Evelyn Nicholson Thompson. She 
has a poor reputation in the community.”108 In describing David “Fuzzy” Simpson’s home, 
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Madison claimed that Fuzzy’s family members were in constant trouble, and that some of his 
siblings had criminal records.
109
  
 The blame frame was also directed at the boys. They were described as juvenile 
delinquents whose recent actions in the kissing case were an extension of their previous 
behavior. They had been on probation for theft and were thus responsible for their current 
conditions. Madison added that the boys were unsupervised and frequently roamed the streets. 
The mothers did not encourage the children to attend school and failed to provide adequate care 
and guidance.  
 It is obvious, therefore, that on the basis of their home situation before coming to the 
 Morrison Training School, there are serious questions as to what sort of home conditions 
 James Hanover Thompson and David Simpson can expect when released to their 
 families. The Training School will continue to receive reports on these matters, and will 
 hope that their family conditions will improve to the extent that release can be granted as 
 soon as possible.
110
  
 Madison’s statement appears to be based on a referral report for each boy to the Morrison 
Training School; the referral agency is listed as the Union County Juvenile Court. The 
documents, prepared by a caseworker for the Union County Department of Public Welfare, 
include background information on the boys and their families, including the names and ages of 
each member of the household, siblings, relatives, family income, a description of their home 
environments, and the boys’ school records.  James Thompson’s mother is described as having 
“a poor reputation, particularly among her own race—a reputation for using her children and 
young girls as prostitutes.”111 However later in the document, the family is said to “appear 
happy, well-fed and nicely dressed on the numerous occasions when they have been observed 
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parading on the streets, especially on Sundays.”112 Mrs. Thompson is pronounced as loving and 
“proud of her children, but her pattern of living and her immorality have been their only 
examples for living.”113 The report does not specify how and when the caseworker obtained this 
information. When interviewed years later, Robert Williams refuted the allegation of 
prostitution.
114
 
 The report on the Simpson family terms their home as “sub-standard” and their 
neighborhood as a “trouble spot,” with frequent “bootlegging, prostitution, and fighting.”115 The 
report also questions Fuzzy’s legitimacy, noting that he was born “exactly nine months to the day 
from the death” of his father Rufe Simpson, who died of tuberculosis.116  
 Once the Governor received Madison’s statement, Giles began including it, along with 
the previously-prepared statement by Judge Price, in his replies to letters the governor received 
about the case. He added a cover letter that noted the person had recently written to Hodges and 
had received a reply “with such information as was available at that time. “For your further 
information, the Governor has asked me to send you the enclosed recent statement by the 
Commissioner of the North Carolina Board of Correction and Training.”117 
 Hodges and his team developed messaging they believed would convince protesters that 
North Carolina authorities had made sound decisions regarding the boys. Foundational to this 
messaging was that North Carolina was right, therefore the boys were wrong. Rather than 
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recognizing the families’ penury and being sympathetic to their plight, Hodges used it to pillory 
them. Each of the facts he presented about the boys and their mothers was couched in terms of 
blame and responsibility and victim and non-victim.  The boys and their mothers were 
responsible for their circumstances, and North Carolina authorities were the actual victims in the 
kissing case, as they had been unfairly subjected to a propaganda campaign. Hodges was so 
assured of these viewpoints and he believed protesters could be swayed, too. 
The CCRI Responds 
 In reply to Blaine Madison’s statement, the CCRI prepared a rejoinder, sent over Robert 
Williams’s signature. The CCRI focused on the racial issue, which was absent from Hodges’s 
material, arguing that North Carolina officials attempted to “whitewash the racist reason for the 
imprisonment of these two boys and to obscure and distort the facts.”118 The CCRI’s four-page 
rebuttal letter also questioned the charges against the boys, asking if they were sentenced for 
their lack of a proper home atmosphere. Furthermore, the letter explained that the boys, like most 
black children in North Carolina, lived in poverty. Both mothers had been denied welfare, and 
their salaries as domestics did little to attenuate the families’ impecuniosity. “It is not the fault of 
the parents but of the system of discrimination which keeps Negroes from fair employment 
opportunities and forces widowed mothers out of the home to work long hours for $15 a 
week.”119 The letter admonished Madison for claiming the boys were committed because they 
are delinquents with long criminal records and poor home environments, when they were “sent 
to reform school because of their color.”120  
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 In addition to replying directly to Madison, the CCRI developed and distributed a press 
release that included the full text of Williams’s reply.121 In its response, the CCRI used a racism 
frame, thereby attempting to replace Hodges’s blame frame with a racism frame. This approach 
also pointed out that racism was the reason Hodges used the blame frame. Of the CCRI’s rebuttal 
letter, Braden commented that it was the “best reply to the hash dished up by the North Carolina 
Board of Correction and Training.” He added, “You might send it to those who are disturbed by 
this typically racist propaganda. I don’t have to point out to you that this is a classic example of 
the Southern pattern—depress, suppress, and oppress the Negro and then give him hell and 
knock him around for being such a depressed, suppressed, and oppressed victim of suppression 
and oppression.”122 
 A few days after Giles began sending Madison’s statement, Hodges received a 
confidential letter from North Carolina Attorney General Malcolm Seawell. Hodges had asked if  
Seawell had any advice for further handling the kissing case on the state level. Seawell first 
updated Hodges on the eviction proceedings against Mrs. Thompson, which Conrad Lynn had 
been able to halt temporarily because the eviction papers had been improperly drawn.
123
 Seawell 
then surmised that the juvenile court heard the boys’ case, found them delinquent, and sent them 
to a training school. Seawell also noted that these actions were all taken “in a legal way” and that 
the governor had little recourse in the matter.
124
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 As governor, you do not have the power to commute or to pardon either or both of the 
 boys, since they had not been convicted of a crime but have been detained because they 
 have been declared delinquent and in need of the protection of the court. The record in 
 the case convinces me that no successful effort can be made to release either of the boys 
 from correctional detention.
125
 
 Seawell added that he had information to be released to the press “if things are stirred up 
by the NAACP or others.” Seawell was referring to information he had obtained on the CCRI’s 
founding members. He described Conrad Lynn has having “no ability as an attorney,” and he 
branded Carl Braden a communist. Seawell then provided detail about Dr. Perry’s abortion 
conviction and the Braden's sedition charges. To gather additional information on the CCRI 
leaders, Seawell planned to have the State Bureau of Investigation examine their backgrounds. 
As part of his preliminary inquiry, Seawell discovered Braden had previously been in North 
Carolina soliciting funds for the SCEF. Seawell assured Hodges that he would place Braden 
under surveillance should he return to the state. 
 Hodges was obviously disturbed by the negative attention. Recognizing the potential for 
additional adverse publicity, he urged Union County authorities to consider delaying the eviction 
proceedings that Thompson’s landlord had begun after learning of the kissing incident. One letter 
writer from England commented on the eviction proceedings: “As a fair-minded Englishman I 
consider that your recent treatment of the small Negro boy who was sent to a reformatory for 
kissing a white girl was a despicable and inhuman act; and that the follow up action in 
endeavoring to evict his mother (Mrs. Evelyn Thompson) from her humble home indicates a sad 
decline in your assessment of human values.”126 Seeking advice from Seawell, Hodges wrote: 
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 If it is true as has been reported that the white landlord has refused to accept rent and is 
 trying to evict the Thompson woman, I think that is rather unfortunate. Regardless of the 
 legal rights of the landlord to refuse to continue to rent to this person, it does have the 
 effect at this time of simply stirring up the matter and adding fuel to the propaganda 
 which has been greatly exploited in this whole case. If you do talk with Mr. Price, it 
 might be possible for you to suggest this consideration to him.
127
 
 
 After receiving Hodges’s letter, Seawell phoned J. Hampton Price regarding the eviction 
notice.
128
 Price spoke to the landlord and discovered Mrs. Thompson was already planning to 
move from the premises but if she did not, the landlord agreed to consult with Price before taking 
any actions. Hodges believed further eviction proceedings against Mrs. Thompson would 
exacerbate the negative publicity. To avoid further press coverage on the matter, Hodges took 
action, albeit indirectly, by suggesting that eviction proceeding be delayed. 
The Blame Frame and the Saviors 
 In addition to blaming the victims for creating their own circumstances and thereby  
relieving the perpetrator of responsibility, Hodges’s blame frame also presented North Carolina 
authorities as saviors. They believed the boys’ circumstances in the reformatory were better than 
those in their homes, therefore they had “rescued” James and Fuzzy from abhorrent living 
conditions. North Carolina authorities cast themselves as acting in the boys’ best interests, which 
was yet another reason the state was not to be reproached for its actions in the kissing case. 
Urging a letter writer to read Price’s and Madison’s reports, Giles asked, “Will you please read 
carefully both of these statements, and give particular consideration to the home situation which 
both of these young boys had, and which was undoubtedly directly responsible for their 
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delinquency.”129 Additional examples of how Hodges incorporated these aspects of the blame 
frame in his replies are below: 
 Incredible as it may seem to you, there is every indication that Hanover Thompson and 
 David Simpson have a far better “home” at this time at the Morrison Training School 
 than they ever had or ever will have with their own families.
130
 
 
 But the plain fact of the situation is these young boys have not been grossly mistreated as 
 reported by the papers, nor were they snatched away from the loving arms of good 
 mothers who were giving them good homes.
131
 
 
 The blame frame was also used by the North Carolina news media. In an article in the 
Union Mail, the reporter believed that Monroe was the victim in the kissing case, as the city has 
been subjected to unwanted and undeserved publicity that damaged its reputation, especially 
given that “racial relations in this county have always been of the best.”132 The boys’ situation 
was a natural consequence of their behavior, since “incorrigibles have to be punished.”133 The 
reporter wrote that white boys in North Carolina were also sent to reform schools, which was 
proof that racism was not a factor in Hanover’s and Fuzzy’s sentencing. “Now is the time for us 
to let the world know—if the world is interested—that Union County feels no antipathy toward 
the Negro race. We have always thought of them as being an important part of our community 
life.”134 This article illustrates that those who harbored racist attitudes were often unaware that 
they did so. For example, blacks in Monroe would probably have disagreed with this reporter’s 
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assertion about how Monroe whites felt about blacks.
135
 Furthermore, her view of blacks being 
“an important part of our community” sounds as if they were tolerated guests versus citizens 
with equal rights. There were numerous instances of racial injustice in Monroe, hence the need 
for a Committee to Combat Racial Injustice. Despite mistreatment of its black citizens, whites in 
Monroe thought its race relations were good, possibly because they did not view these 
occurrences as acts of racial injustice.
136
 Instead, they represented the racialized social structures 
of the South in which whites commanded dominion. 
News Media Strategy 
 For his public relations campaign, Hodges received guidance from a network of advisors, 
including publishers and advertising executives. Bill Sharpe, publisher of the State and a former 
publicist, suggested Hodges exploit the socialist connections of some of the CCRI leaders. “I 
know you have already done something to counteract this bad publicity, but by hitting directly at 
the Communist connection we might convince some people of the insincerity of these 
protests.”137 This red-baiting, in which individuals or groups were accused of communism, was 
often used by opponents of black civil rights to thwart the movement.
138
 Taking Sharpe’s 
recommendation, Hodges combined it with another public relations strategy: he used the press as 
another channel to reach his audiences, with a focus on using a communism frame in those 
stories. Although coverage of the kissing case in the North Carolina press was favorable to 
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Hodges with the exception of North Carolina’s two black newspapers, he enlisted the support of 
Chester S. Davis, a reporter for the Winston-Salem Journal-Sentinel, to ensure Shape’s 
suggestion was fully manifested in a news story.
139
 Davis penned two news articles that appeared 
in the same issue of the paper, one with the headline “Communist Front Shouts Kissing Case to 
the World” and the other headlined “Press in North Gives Distorted Versions.”140 In the former 
article, Davis adopted the communism frame to discredit the CCRI and its founding members. 
He reported that Conrad Lynn was identified with a number of organizations believed to be 
communist fronts. Davis labeled Carl Braden as “a dedicated Communist” and reported his 
sedition conviction. He referred to L. E. Austin and C. K. Steele as leaders in the fight for Negro 
equal rights. Davis described Dr. Perry by writing of his ongoing abortion trial for allegedly 
performing an abortion on a white woman. Regarding Williams, Davis claimed that other black 
leaders dubbed Williams as overly aggressive, extreme, and “inclined to think of himself as a 
martyr.”141 In explaining how the news of the kissing case was first reported, Davis described 
Ted Poston’s New York Post article as a “sob-sister sort of report that emphasized the kissing 
incident and overlooked the record of previous delinquency and the home background of the 
boys.”142 
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 In addition, Davis incorrectly reported that the CCRI had, “on the strength of its skillful 
blending of truth, half-truth and deliberate lies,” raised “substantial amounts of money” for the 
boys, with no accounting for the funds.
143
 Davis argued the money was used to “finance a 
propaganda campaign designed to discredit North Carolina in the eyes of the world.”144 Yet the 
CCRI’s campaign was not focused on fundraising; it was centered on generating awareness of 
the boys’ dilemma and urging the public to contact Hodges demanding that he release the boys.  
 Furthermore, to report the story Davis did not contact the CCRI’s leaders, nor had he 
spoken to the boys, their mothers, or the superintendent of the Morrison Training School. 
Davis’s articles, which were news stories and not opinion pieces, were biased towards Hodges’s 
position, and he focused on attacking the CCRI, it leaders, and its financial integrity. It appears 
Davis relied on a single source—Hodges, whom he portrayed as an unfairly persecuted 
champion of a beleaguered state.  
 Gov. Luther Hodges, deluged by mail berating him for tolerating this imprisonment of 
 two children because of a prank, has patiently tried to answer the charges made against 
 North Carolina on a letter-by-letter basis. But, judging by his file—which continues to 
 grow without letup and which took five hours of this reporter’s time just to leaf 
 through—his patience gains little reward. He is in the position of a man trying to combat 
 a propaganda story which the world press somehow wants to believe.
145
 
 
 Incorporating the blame frame, Davis bemoaned his assertion that North Carolina’s 
reputation for “liberal race relations” and for “simple human decency” had been smeared by a 
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propaganda attack. He surmised that blame would ultimately rest with the NAACP because it 
allowed two of its officers to be used by a communist front organization. 
 In Davis’s accompanying article, “Press in North Gives Distorted Versions,” he attacked 
the “Communist and race press” for consistently reporting the kissing case “as if it involved 
nothing more than a nine-year-old Negro boy extracting a kiss from a seven-year-old white 
girl.”146 As a result of that coverage, readers around the world had mistakenly “concluded that 
racial tensions in North Carolina have reached the point where stealing a simple kiss from a 
white girl is enough to put two Negro youngsters into jail for life imprisonment.” Davis wrote 
that such a reaction as “incredible when you take the time to consider the actual facts of the 
case.”147 In the remainder of the article, he provides background information on the kissing 
incident, the hearing, and each instance of the boys’ previous delinquencies. Furthermore, he 
vilified the mothers and the home environments they created. Relying on the referral reports 
prepared by the Union County Department of Welfare, Davis described the families’ 
neighborhood as “a trouble spot for fighting, bootlegging, and prostitution.”148 To validate this 
claim, Davis quoted the NAACP’s Kelly Alexander, who apparently referred to the 
neighborhood as “a Negro ghetto of the worst possible sort.”149 Yet there is no indication in the 
historical documents that Davis interviewed Alexander or that Alexander previously made this 
statement.  
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 In addition to the communism frame, Davis used the blame frame liberally throughout 
both articles. The mothers were to blame for the boys’ poor living conditions, and the boys were 
to blame because they had a history of bad behavior. Repeating information in the Union County 
Welfare Department report, Davis wrote that Thompson had more children than she could 
adequately care for. He also cited the report’s claim that Thompson used her daughters in 
prostitution, and he reported that some of Fuzzy’s siblings were also juvenile delinquents. The 
welfare reports were prepared after the boys were jailed and right before their hearings, 
therefore; it is unclear if these were mendacious claims about the mothers that were developed to 
support North Carolina’s actions.150 Additionally, Davis wrote that Hanover’s and Fuzzy’s 
scholastic performance was characterized by truancy and poor grades.  
Again, it appears Davis made no attempt to verify the information he reported, beyond 
relying on material Hodges gave him. There is no information in the historical documents to 
indicate he went to Monroe, nor that he interviewed or attempted to interview the boys, their 
mothers, or the CCRI members. Towards the end of the article, Davis raised the question as to 
whether the same outcome would have occurred had the boys been white, possibly because that 
same question had been posed by many of those who wrote to Hodges. Davis surmised that the 
answer to that question was debatable, as “the argument is one of technique, not the propriety of 
the end result.”151 Davis may have been referring to how the boys were held and sentenced: 
jailed incommunicado for six days and denied an opportunity to confront their accuser or consult 
legal counsel. But in any case, Davis circumvented the question. Hodges never answered the 
question in his correspondence. How could he, without disclosing that the boys’ treatment was 
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related to race? In a similar incident that occurred in a North Carolina town about 50 miles 
northwest of Monroe, two white men in their late twenties assaulted a fifteen-year-old white 
delinquent girl while she was in jail.
152
 A local court convicted the men of contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor, but the judge overturned the conviction. “If this court holds that a boy 
can’t kiss a pretty girl, I don’t know what will happen to this country,” the judge said.153 
 Davis found it surprising that protesters believed that racial tensions in North Carolina 
had escalated to the point where two black boys could be charged with assault and molestation 
for engaging in a kiss with a white girl. However, it was less a problem of racial tensions and 
more an issue of racial structures that contributed to the boys’ sentencing. Hanover and Fuzzy 
had not been charged for any of their other offenses, but this particular act, because it involved 
miscegenation, resulted in at least 10 years in a reformatory. As a supporter of the Southern 
racial norms, Davis was unable to see a viewpoint other than his own. To him, race and 
miscegenation were not factors in the boys’ sentencing. Since Hodges appeared to be Davis’s 
primary source, the information in his reporting mirrors the points in Hodges’s letters to the 
public. The difference is that news articles may provide a third-party endorsement, meaning that 
information conveyed through a media filter may be perceived by consumers as more fact-based 
and credible and less-biased than information provided in a paid advertisement or other 
information prepared and distributed by a self-interested party.
154
 However in this instance,  
Davis was not an objective, self-interested party, and the public was unaware of his relationship 
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with Hodges. Therefore, Hodges’s public relations material provided source credibility in two 
ways: some documents were penned from the governor, who afforded credibility due to his 
position, and Davis’s articles offered third-party credibility from a news source.155 
 Although Davis’s article noted that overcrowding was the only reason the boys had not 
been sent to the reformatory months before for their earlier offenses, this conclusion is incorrect. 
For their earlier offenses, Judge Price did not charge them; he merely placed them on probation 
and did not sentence them. The boys were jailed on October 28 for the kissing game, and on 
October 30 Hampton Price wrote to North Carolina Board of Correction and Training 
Commissioner Blaine Madison, “I realize that you are crowded, but please make room for these 
boys, it will be deeply appreciated.”156 Price added that he had no choice but to keep them in jail 
because of physical threats of violence and “this is a case of emergency, and the worst I have had 
during my long tenure of public office.”157 At the time of the kissing incident, the Morrison 
Training School had no room for the boys because of overcrowding. After they were sentenced 
on November 4, they were sent to the reformatory, despite its overcrowding. Had the boys stolen 
another ham on October 28 instead of playing a kissing game with a white girl, they might have 
been placed on probation again. However, the kiss with a white girl was deemed a severe-enough 
act that it warranted a charge, a sentence, and a term in a reform school. 
 In all likelihood, Davis had determined his story’s tone and content long before he set to 
writing it. He would present the CCRI as a communist organization, denigrate its members, 
expose its apparent lies, and shift blame from North Carolina to the boys and their mothers. In 
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doing so, Hodges would have a supposedly objective third party—a reporter—support and verify 
the points made by Judge Price and Blaine Madison. However, rather than objective reporting, 
the article was a public relations tactic used by Hodges to present his position. 
 Hodges was extremely pleased with Davis’s news articles. In a letter to Winston-Salem 
Journal-Sentinel Executive Editor Reed Sarratt, Hodges described the articles as “the most 
complete and accurate newspaper account of this case that anyone has had, and I am personally 
grateful to Chester for the careful attention he gave to it.”158 Sarratt responded, “I’m so glad 
you’ve been able to make good use of Chester’s pieces. I felt that he did an excellent job and 
hoped that it would be a significant contribution to better public understanding of the true 
facts.”159  
 The Journal-Sentinel provided Hodges with reprints of the articles, which he included in 
his replies to correspondence he received. Hodges also sent Davis’s articles to all major 
newspapers in the United States and England.
160
 He later developed a cover letter for the reprint 
in which he surmised, “A considered effort has been made to make this case a cause celebre. 
Although the pattern was slow in developing, this has become increasingly apparent during the 
past several weeks.” Hodges was disingenuous about the origin of Davis’s coverage, claiming 
that Davis was prompted to explore the case after reading about the boys’ situation in the Nation. 
Hodges included Davis’s bona fides, noting he was a Harvard University Law School graduate, a 
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former FBI special agent and “one of North Carolina’s most distinguished newspaperman, and is 
unusually qualified to make an independent study and report on this story of subject.”161 
 Those who corresponded with the governor now received hefty documentation in return: 
a cover letter from Hodges, a copy of Madison’s and Price’s statements, and a reprint of the two 
Winston- Salem Journal-Sentinel articles. The messaging was consistent throughout the material 
and highlighted two key points: the boys were juvenile delinquents with many previous offenses 
and sordid home environments; and, the state acted appropriately and in the boys’ best interests 
in sentencing them. Although Hodges’s material does not directly address race, by focusing on 
these key points it conveys that race was not a factor North Carolina’s actions.  
 The State Publisher Bill Sharpe continued to advise Hodges, to whom he sent some 
suggestions from a Pennsylvania-based advertising executive, John Briggs. Briggs, who praised 
the Chester Davis article and wrote that the Monroe authorities were merely “trying to protect 
the young hoodlums,” recommended that Hodges send his documents to US News & World 
Report due to its willingness to present both sides of an issue, as well as to “key editors and 
executives of the New York dailies, newsmagazines, columnists, radio-TV news commentators, 
wire services, etc.—the point being to advertise the smear within the trade.”162 Briggs believed 
that Hodges’s material was “such wonderful ammunition that I wish someone would hit the 
NAACP over the head with it—hard.” Briggs added that an “opportunity to give the NAACP a 
taste of its own medicine does not come along very day. Pour it on; you will place the whole 
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Confederacy in your debt.”163 Although there is no record that Hodges sent material to US News 
& World Report, and the magazine did not report on the kissing case, he later commented that 
Briggs’s suggestions were good and had already been followed.164 
 Once the CCRI became aware of the Davis article, it pondered how to respond. 
Ultimately, it determined the best course of action was to remain silent, as a response would only 
draw additional attention to the invidious claims in the article. Braden advised, “This sort of 
trash is not going to influence anybody who is inclined to be on our side anyway. In fact, it might 
convince some fence-sitters that we’re right. I can see no reason to bother about it.”165 
 While Hodges provided information to the news media in his press conferences and the 
southern press was favorable to him, he had no direct control regarding which aspects of his 
statements and press releases a reporter would choose to cover, if it was covered at all. 
Therefore, part of his media strategy involved taking a more direct approach—one that would 
assure not only coverage, but one in which Hodges determined the messages and the tone. 
Although the Chester Davis article appeared to be written independently by an objective reporter, 
it was not, although Hodges presented and used it as if it had been. The article was another way 
to present Hodges’s facts and would hopefully convince protesters to see that North Carolina 
authorities had taken the right actions. 
The Public’s Response to Hodges’s Public Relations Strategies and Tactics 
 Hodges believed those who wrote to him to protest the kissing case did so because they 
had been given misinformation. If they had the facts, surely they would understand and accept as 
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reasonable the boys’ sentencing and punishment. He was wrong. His use of facts attempted to 
justify the boys’ sentencing, thereby masking the racism behind it. However, those who wrote to 
him remained unconvinced that North Carolina authorities acted in the boys’ best interests. 
 In some instances, correspondents sent the governor a second letter after they received his 
public relations material, thanking him for providing clarification.   
 The reports enclosed give a very different picture of the case to that given in the 
 newspapers, and one which indicates that the action taken was fully justified. 
 If I may say so without offence, it is unfortunate that they had to be sent away on this 
 particular charge. I think that if this had been done on an earlier charge of stealing there 
 would probably not have been any fuss. I will give your reports as much publicity as I 
 can though I admit frankly that I am not in sympathy with the policy of your Southern 
 States on the question of white and coloured education and sincerely hope that they will 
 arrive at some just solution of the problem.
166
 
 
 Perhaps these missives buoyed Hodges. He wrote, “Where I have reached them, I find  
 
that a lot of good is done as the answers indicate that they had been misled by the newspaper  
 
stories or by other things they had heard.”167 More often, however, correspondents thanked  
 
Hodges and renewed their protest against the boys’ sentencing. A New York physician refuted  
 
Hodges’s arguments.   
 Careful reading of all the detailed information which you have sent me has not lessened 
 my distress at the severe action of the North Carolina courts which apparently does not 
 seem to distress you at all. It is evident that these boys have not had the opportunities or 
 the stimulus of a good home environment which the average child should expect, but the 
 fact undeniably remains that these boys were sent to a reform school for an indeterminate 
 sentence for an action, which, I believe, your conscience would find it difficult to call 
 criminal in any sense of the world.
168
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 Hodges’s emphasis on what he claimed were the boys’ dreadful living conditions 
backfired, with some protesters suggesting the state was obliged to find better homes for them. 
One North Carolinian wrote, “Certainly the offense committed is not something for which two 
little boys should be sent to reform school, and if it is really true that their homes are such that 
they should not be sent home, some better way should be found to take care of them.”169 An 
editorial in the Charlotte Observer echoed this point, proclaiming that the Morrison Training 
School is a school, not a home, and a foster home may have been an alternative. While 
concurring that “something had to be done” and the Morrison reformatory serves a purpose, the 
editorial argued that “the Monroe affair called for something better.”170 
 From Italy, a writer thanked Hodges for sending the material, but said that he regretted 
the publicity given to the “very disgraceful” articles by Chester Davis. The letter writer, who was 
a Harvard graduate as was Davis, was surprised that Davis “could have come from the same 
distinguished institution.”171 The president of the Interdenominational Ministers’ Alliance 
challenged Hodges’s account with a series of questions. 
 Why are all who disagree with deep seated [sic] prejudices smeared as communists? 
 With salaries of $15 to $20 per week, how could the parents of these boys live in any 
 place other than a slum? Why are Negro children treated in such a way that they may 
 never recover from the psychological injury inflicted upon them?
172
 
  
 One letter writer, a public relations practitioner from New York, criticized Hodges’s 
public relations efforts. He wrote, “As a public relations counsel who has for forty years 
practised [sic] the art of influencing opinion, I think I am qualified to give you some sound 
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advice in this controversy over the two Negro boys.”173 He urged Hodges to “get a new (and 
better) public relations policy and counsel,” but assured him, “I don’t want the job.”174 In 
addition, he informed Hodges that, “Everybody knows the NAACP isn’t Communist (as your 
first publicity release tried to say),” and he referred to Hodges’s strategy in this regard as 
“medieval thinking that activates the South in its vain attempt to maintain the feudal status of the 
region.”175 Concluding his correspondence, he again urged Hodges to “get yourself a new PR 
man; and have him get a new theme. If he has the brains of a gnat, he’ll know that calling your 
adversary a Communist no longer goes.”176 Thus, the author agreed that a public relations 
strategy was in order, but the current one wasn’t working. 
 Hodges did not sway members of the public as he had hoped by presenting them with his 
version of the facts of the case. The boys had previous offenses, as noted in Hodges’s public 
relations material. However, Judge Price had never jailed them for those previous offenses. 
Instead, he placed them on probation for the first offense and kept them on probation with each 
subsequent misdemeanor. However, the nature of their most recent transgression, that involving 
miscegenation, was so severe that it warranted a punishment.  
 The public’s sympathy was with the children; the fact that Hodges attempted to blame 
them for their circumstances probably only worsened the public’s viewpoint of the harshness of 
North Carolina’s actions. Hodges and other North Carolina authorities took none of the blame; 
doing so would be to admit they might have erred in their actions, and it would have excused 
miscegenation. Neither Hodges’s blame frame, nor his communism frame, was changing the 
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protesters’ perceptions about the kissing case. With the communism frame, Hodges accused the 
CCRI and NAACP of communist ties. Ironically, the protesters believed North Carolina’s 
actions had provided fodder for the communists. But again, Hodges and his advisors were 
entrenched in the southern milieu, where blaming blacks for their circumstances was 
commonplace, as was branding all civil rights organizations as communist. 
 Another reason Hodges’s public relations efforts were ineffective was because they were 
not focused at stopping the letters from protesters and engaging supporters. His campaign was 
focused on persuading those who wrote to him; he did not direct any public relations efforts at 
potential letter writers in an attempt to persuade them before they voiced their protests. 
Therefore, the letters continued to arrive, as the CCRI continued with its speaking tours, letter-
writing and petition campaigns, and its outreach to the media. As fast as Hodges responded to the 
letters he received, each week a new onslaught of letters arrived. Hodges was in a quandary. His 
public relations efforts seemed focused on maintaining the status quo and defending the South’s 
racial hierarchy. However, the burgeoning civil rights movement and international attention on 
US racism were beginning to challenge the white power structure. As he had with his oversight 
of school integration in North Carolina, Hodges may have believed that any challenges to the 
Southern way of life could be easily managed.
177
 He did not consider the possibility these 
societal changes factored into the opinions expressed in the letters he received. In his short- 
sighted view, he presumed that protesters wrote to him because they had received false 
information from the CCRI or had read a newspaper story, and he thought he could easily change 
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their opinions about the kissing case. Therefore, he thought the problem was limited to those 
who wrote to him, and he targeted his public relations efforts on each member of that audience. 
The USIA  
 Through its Research and Reference Service, the USIA continually monitored world 
opinion about the United States. Based on its extensive public opinion polling of citizens around 
the world and monitoring of worldwide media coverage, the USIA had evidence of how the 
United States was perceived regarding it race relations. For example, results of its opinion 
surveys conducted from 1955 to 196l of citizens of Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Greece, India, Japan, and 
Mexico indicated that racial prejudice and discrimination against blacks was the most disliked 
characteristic about the United States.
178
 In another example, during the 1957 Little Rock school 
integration crisis, each of the USIS offices provided a detailed report of media coverage, which 
was all negative and reflected poorly on the United States.
179
 In an article about the work of the 
USIA in the Public Relations Journal, the magazine of the Public Relations Society of America, 
the author writes that the United States has the “best of all products to sell: democracy, freedom, 
human dignity, peace. And as all public relations men know, the ultimate success of a campaign 
hinges on the real worth of the product.”180 However, the USIA encountered difficulty in selling 
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these products overseas. During the Cold War, the United States was attempting to “win the 
allegiance of the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa and claim leadership of a ‘free 
world’ competition with the Soviet Union.”181 With this visible positon on the world stage, 
foreigners paid greater attention to the United States than they had before World War II. Through 
news accounts, foreigners realized that the United States did not give its black citizens the 
freedoms it demanded of other countries.  
 To help manage the country’s reputation, ensure consistent messaging, and provide its 
overseas offices with background and direction on communicating about various issues 
impacting the United States, the USIA prepared a series of guidance and planning papers. Topics 
covered included labor, science and technology, culture, the Soviet bloc, and communism.
182
 The 
USIA also prepared a guidance papers on minorities. In it, the agency noted its aim was not to 
deny America’s race relations problems, but to keep them in perspective and focus attention on 
progress made.
183
 The agency advised that the media, especially visual media, should be used to 
relay the story of advances in American race relations. Its primary target audiences were 
intellectuals, students, labor groups, editors, and commentators.  
 Highlighting the gains and progress made by African Americans is a communications 
strategy, as is the USIA’s directive to “be affirmative and objective in tone, confident of 
continuing progress but realistic in indicating the problems involved.”184 The USIA counseled its 
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offices to explain that America’s racial problems were not only emotional or social, but were 
rooted in economic and educational “maladjustments” which were being overcome.185 To relay 
this information, the USIA urged its offices to have personal discussions with editors and 
commentators and to arrange interviews with recent Institute of Education Sciences grantees or 
Fulbright students who have witnessed racial progress first hand. In addition, it provided more 
detailed guidance, such as using the world “Negro” instead of “colored” when referring to 
progress in integration, and showing segregated situations “only when the evidence of progress 
clearly outweighs any adverse impact on segregation.” Local offices were encouraged to 
“identify, but without too much obviousness, each newsworthy instance of achievement by 
Negro Americans, or by members of any other minority race or of any group of foreign born or 
of foreign parentage.”186 Although one of the USIA’s strategies regarding the United States’ 
racial problems was to highlight progress, communicating African American achievements was 
not one of the agency’s priorities in 1958. In his New York Age column, African American 
journalist Chuck Stone denounced the USIA for this lack of focus on blacks. Stone reported that 
in the USIA’s list of seven priority topics to communicate to global audiences, African 
Americans were absent from the list.
187
 He agreed with the agency’s strategy of reporting 
African Americans’ accomplishments. He suggested the USIA produce a weekly digest of “how 
successful we colored folks are, how many judicial appointments we’re getting, how many 
homes were buying, and how many Cadillacs are in our garages.”188 However part of the 
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agency’s problem, Stone argued, was that a number of its overseas officials were “white 
southerners and bigoted white officials” and that there were no African Americans on any of the 
agency’s advisory committees. 
 The communist press was always quick to report on instances of racial injustice in the 
United States, using them to illustrate that the United States did not offer its own citizens the 
freedoms it demanded of other countries. With the kissing case, both China’s Hsinhua News 
Agency and the Soviet Tass News Agency reported on the “fantastic persecution of two Negro 
children in the United States.”189 In addition, the USIA noted the kissing case had “caused an 
eruption in the Dutch press and a wave of protest.”190 Much of this protest may have been the 
result of Operation Snowball, the letter-writing and petition campaign organized by the head of a 
youth group in Holland. In addition, the USIA reported the letters and petitions it had received 
together totaled approximately 200, with an estimated 11,000 to 12,000 signatures.
191
 The USIA 
also summarized all Dutch press coverage, concluding that it was critical of how the case had 
been handled. The agency surmised that the coverage was negative because initial stories 
reported the boys had been sentenced to life imprisonment, committed without proper legal 
proceedings, and were victims of racial prejudice. In response, the USIA in Washington prepared 
a three-page fact sheet, for discretionary use by USIS posts.
192
 The USIS post in The Hague did 
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not distribute the fact sheet “in quantity until the snowball proportions of the petitioning activity 
became more and more apparent.”193  
 By January 21, the USIS noted that the case was receiving such widespread attention that 
Dutch Queen Juliana expressed her concern to Philip Young, US Ambassador to the 
Netherlands. The next day, the USIS released the fact sheet to Dutch newspapers. In addition, the 
USIS gave the fact sheet to petitioners who protested outside the US Embassy, and it was mailed 
to those who had sent letters to the Embassy. Noting that it was impossible to mail a fact sheet to 
every school child who had signed a petition, the USIA instead mailed the fact sheet to teachers 
at schools from where the petitions had come. Furthermore, the USIA invited students from six 
of those schools to its auditorium to watch films “which indicate integration progress in the 
United States.”194 
 In the fact sheet, much of the content mirrored the information distributed by Hodges. 
With a Monroe, NC, dateline, the document began, “stripped of its emotionalism, distortion and 
heated charges, this city’s highly publicized ‘kissing incident’ essentially becomes a question of 
the rehabilitation of two problem children and their families.”195 As with Hodges’s material, the 
document described the boys’ previous offenses and claimed the boys were sent to a “state 
training school” not as a result of the kissing incident, but due to the lack of care, guidance and 
parental attention they received at home. To correct the misperception that the boys had been 
jailed, the fact sheet described the Morrison Training School as “neither a reformatory nor jail, 
but as part of an enlightened and progressive system to train boys to become useful citizens in 
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cases where their homes are incapable of providing such training.” Because the USIA was 
focused on managing the charges of racism, the fact sheet’s penultimate paragraph claimed, “The 
kissing case hardly shapes up as a local racial incident, according to Monroe officials, although 
the racial aspects may have affected the manner and speed in which the case was handled.” The 
document ended with a statement attributed to Dr. Perry, in which he posited “that he is not 
certain that the training school is not the best place for the boys.” As a member of the CCRI, 
Perry was working to free the boys, and thus it seemed more likely the remark was 
misunderstood, if Perry uttered it at all.  
 After receiving the fact sheet, Stephanus Saris, the head of Operation Snowball in 
Rotterdam, sent Perry a letter, informing him that Dutch news stories were now reporting that the 
boys were thieves, and that there was no racial discrimination involved in the kissing case. Saris 
thought the USIS released the information to the press to stop Operation Snowball. He informed 
Perry that “comments of USIS have stopped our action for a moment,” and his organization 
would await Perry’s response before proceeding.196  
CCRI Rebuttal to the USIA’s No-Racism Claim 
 As soon the CCRI became aware of the USIS’s fact sheet, it immediately dispatched a 
telegram to the USIS post in The Hague with a sharp rebuttal. In the telegram, the CCRI strongly 
protested the statements the USIS distributed to the Dutch press. It argued that the boys were in 
“reform school precisely because racial prejudice, not delinquency as you are telling Dutch 
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people. Whitewash and falsifications about case may serve Carolina authorities but not American 
people as whole nor Dutch people nor truth.”197  
 In addition, George Weissman wrote to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, protesting 
the USIS’s statements. Weissman demanded that the misstatements cease immediately. He noted 
that the CCRI, the NAACP and other individuals had issued numerous statements detailing the 
flagrant racism surrounding the case, and these statements were carried by the black press, as 
well as overseas newspapers. And yet, the USIA “chooses to accept, endorse and officially 
proclaim only the self-serving statements of North Carolina officials.” Weissman insisted the 
boys had not been sent to a reform school for their previous offenses, which consisted of 
“larceny of potato chips” and similar acts, and Judge Price had found those misdemeanors too 
trifling at the time to charge the boys. However for a kiss, they were sent to a reform school for 
the next 10 years or more. Weissman also asked how the executive branch of the government, 
via the State Department, could tell people of other countries that no racism was involved in the 
case when the executive branch had previously declared, in a letter from E. Frederic Morrow, 
that it was not within its purview to become involved. In other words, the US government would 
not get involved to help free the boys, but it would get involved to refute a racism charge. 
Weissman ended with the directive: 
 This committee demands that you immediately silence the U.S. Embassy in the 
 Netherlands on this case, and any other U.S. embassies which may be issuing similar 
 misstatements. Following that, there should be an investigation to determine how and 
 why such biased “information” came to be given official currency.198 
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 The next day, the CCRI wrote and distributed a press release that outlined the steps it had 
taken to refute the USIS’s claim that racism was not a factor in the kissing case.199 The five-page 
press release included the text of the letter to John Foster Dulles, as well as the text of telegrams 
received from Stephanus Saris and from the Women’s International Democratic Federation, 
which condemned the kissing case as racist. To further illustrate the racism in Monroe, the press 
release included other acts of racism that had been perpetrated on Monroe’s black citizens over 
the past year.
200
 In addition, the CCRI sent a telegram to Stephanus Saris informing him that 
racism was definitely involved in the kissing case. In response, Saris sent a telegram that 
Operation Snowball would continue.
201
 
 The CCRI received a response to its objections from Bernard Wiesman, USIA’s advisor 
on labor and minorities affairs. Wiesman explained the statement was based on US news stories. 
He added that the backgrounder was originally distributed only to inform USIS posts and when it 
was released to the press, the first paragraph should have been described “as editorial in 
character.”202 To correct the problem, the USIS informed all its overseas information officers 
that should they make further use of the information, the first paragraph should be deleted and 
replaced with the following: “The now widely publicized ‘kissing incident’ in Monroe, North 
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Carolina, involves more than a question of race relations. Local officials assert that action was 
taken to rehabilitate two boys who had been on probation after Juvenile Court hearings on 
alleged stealing, truancy, and unsuitable home conditions.”203 In its correction, the USIA did not 
directly state that racism was involved in the kissing case, nor did it deflect from its previous 
focus on the blame frame. Therefore, its revised first paragraph is less a correction and more a 
restatement of its previous sentence. 
 To further counter the false information distributed by the USIA that there was no racism 
involved in the kissing case and to address related inquiries it received, the CCRI held a press 
conference for United Nations press correspondents in New York on February 5. Williams and 
Perry, who both happened to be in New York at the time, participated.
204
 Reporters from papers 
in the Netherlands, Sweden, Brazil, Canada, the Soviet Union, Switzerland, and Germany 
attended.
205
 Weissman reported that French newspaper Le Figaro was unable to attend, but it 
requested that the CCRI send material to its New York office by messenger.
206
  
 Within two months, Hodges had received hundreds of letters and thousands of signatures 
from angry protesters. They expressed outrage, balked at the sentencing, demanded he free the 
boys, accused him and other North Carolina authorities of racism, and said his state’s actions 
embarrassed the United States and provided ammunition for the communists to use against 
America.  
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 One of Hodges’s public relations strategies was to engage directly with protesters by 
responding to each letter he received. He hoped to convince protesters, one by one if need be, 
that North Carolina’s actions were justified. In an effort to attenuate the public’s reaction, he 
disparaged the boys and their mothers. His public relations efforts centered on the blame frame; 
he used it in his responses to the public and to the news media. He thought the blame frame 
would address the frames in protesters’ letters by ameliorating their concerns; however, it did 
not.  
 Another problem with Hodges’s public relations efforts was that the public viewed the 
boys as the children they were; North Carolina authorities treated the kissing game as adult 
behavior. To Southerners, they had committed an adult act –  assault and molestation. They 
violated a tenet of southern race relations: maintaining the purity of the white race by avoiding 
race mixing. As members of a culture in which codes of race relations had long been mandated 
by written and unwritten rules, Hodges and his advisors were unable to grasp the public’s 
vehemence about the racism frame. As such, Hodges was unable to respond to the public in a 
way that adequately addressed their concerns. 
 Although the racism frame was prevalent in the letters Hodges received, he never 
engaged with it explicitly, instead referring the letter writer to Judge Price’s report, as well 
Commissioner Madison’s statement that described the boys’ family situations. “Incredible as it 
may seem, the actual facts of the case simply present a completely different picture from that 
painted by the rather lurid newspaper accounts. I regret to say that the propaganda on this case 
appears to have been scattered far and wide in an effort to stir up and exploit the racial issue,” 
Hodges wrote to one correspondent.
207
 Hodges’s attempts to explain and justify were couched in 
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what he presented as the actual facts. However, the public believed another set of facts, one that 
confirmed the injustices of the South’s racial system. Furthermore, Hodges was so focused on 
rationalizing North Carolina’s actions that he was unable to consider the possibility that Union 
County authorities may have erred in how they responded to the kissing incident. He may never 
have asked Union County officials why the boys had been remanded to a reformatory for a 
kissing game but not for stealing a bicycle. 
 Although the kissing case received worldwide press coverage, which the USIA 
monitored, the incident had not been elevated overseas to the magnitude of the 1957 Little Rock 
crisis. Therefore, the USIA’s public relations efforts in relation to the kissing case consisted of 
implementing two tactics: it prepared a fact sheet and distributed it to its posts, the press, and to 
some students and teachers. In addition, it invited Dutch students to view a film showing 
examples of what it deemed to be positive race relations in the United States. These tactics relate 
to the USIA’s broader public relations strategy of presenting progress versus highlighting 
problems. It did not deny that there were racial problems, but instead focused its efforts on 
showing improvements. However with the kissing case, the USIA deflected the racial aspects of 
the kissing case. It had not investigated the facts and instead parroted the points made by 
Hodges. In doing so, the agency denied that racism was involved, in contrast to its public 
relations strategy. 
 Hodges was evidently discomfited by the volume and content of the letters. He believed 
members of the public reacted as they did because they had been given misinformation. If they 
had the true facts of the case, they would understand and support the sentencing.  
 I can truthfully say that never in my experience has any incident been propagandized to  
 the detriment of our State so effectively and so widespread as this particular case. This 
 case, unfortunately, possesses all the simple ingredients which can be manipulated, and 
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 with half-truths and exaggerations, arouse the sentiment and disgust of uninformed 
 persons, not only against the officials in Union County but against our whole State.
208
 
 However Hodges, a product of the South and its racial mores, was unable to see things 
another way. His obdurate viewpoint was reflected in an article in the Union Mail that referred to 
the kissing case as an incident that has “no significance whatever, except insofar as they have 
been warped and misrepresented entirely out of focus by the obvious supporters of communistic 
campaigns to divide and break the South.”209 Nevertheless, the public continued to express its 
shock and outrage to Hodges. 
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Freedom is never given; it is won.
1
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: THE OUTCOME OF THE KISSING CASE 
 As a result of the initial media coverage in the New York Post and the London News 
Chronicle and the CCRI’s public relations campaign, which resulted in additional media 
coverage, Hodges received letters and petitions admonishing North Carolina authorities for their 
actions in the kissing case. In defense, Hodges launched a public relations campaign, but he was 
unable to convince correspondents that the state’s actions were justified. Despite the 
remonstrance, Hodges stood fast in his refusal to release Hanover and Fuzzy. The CCRI vowed 
to continue its work until the boys were freed. 
 Chapter four examines the outcome of the CCRI’s public relations efforts. In addition, it 
summarizes the four groups’ public relations strategies and tactics and reviews their 
effectiveness. In addition, this chapter explores reasons for the NAACP’s minimal involvement 
in the kissing case.  
The Outcome 
 On February 10, the boys’ families moved to a housing project in a black neighborhood 
in Charlotte, where the NAACP had secured four-room apartments for them and provided basic 
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necessities.
2
 They had previously been in temporary housing in Charlotte until the NAACP could 
find better accommodations. On February 13, Evelyn Thompson opened the door to her 
apartment and unexpectedly saw P.R. Brown, superintendent of the Morrison Training School, 
along with Hanover and two social workers. The same scene was repeated at Jennie Simpson’s 
apartment. To their mothers’ astonishment, both boys had been freed.3 The boys also were 
surprised. At Morrison, their days comprised attending classes and working. They were working 
in a field when they received word they would be released after almost 15 weeks in the 
reformatory.
4
 
 The same day, Blaine Madison, director of the North Carolina Department of Correction 
and Training, issued a statement announcing the boys’ release. He described the conditions 
required for discharge from the training school: the finding by school officials that a child’s 
behavior, attitude, and conduct has improved, and a determination by the local welfare 
department that the child’s home and family situation provided enough stability to justify 
release.
5
 The boys were discharged conditionally, meaning that if they did not receive proper 
care and guidance from their mothers, the local welfare department would “recommend that 
appropriate action be taken in their interest.”6 The Fredericksburg Free Lance-Star reported that 
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the boys had been “released…for good behavior,” and that “their mothers say the lads won’t get 
into trouble again.”7 
 Even with the boys’ improved home environments and their mothers’ guarantees, the 
release of Hanover and Fuzzy might have been precipitous. Their mothers had been in their new 
homes for only three days and may not have had a chance to get settled. Evelyn Thompson and 
Jennie Simpson were unemployed at the time; they were receiving temporary financial assistance 
from the NAACP while the organization sought jobs for them.
8
 On February 12, the day before 
the boys were released, Hodges began distributing his cover letter with Chester Davis’s Winston-
Salem Journal-Sentinel article, which ran only five days before the boys were freed. If Hodges 
had planned to release the boys on February 13, he may not have needed to mail the Davis article 
and cover letter a day earlier, although he may have done so to justify his actions, excoriate press 
coverage and discredit the CCRI and the boys’ mothers. The historical documents do not reveal 
why the boys were discharged suddenly. Regardless, their release represented a significant 
victory to those who had been working diligently to free them, and it was the culmination to a 
case that illuminated US racism and caused embarrassment to North Carolina authorities. For 
these reasons, many rushed to claim credit for the boys’ freedom. 
Taking Credit 
 CCRI Attorney Conrad Lynn attributed the boys’ release to Eleanor Roosevelt’s efforts; 
Lynn claimed he asked her to intervene. According to Lynn’s account, she agreed and called 
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President Eisenhower, who contacted Hodges and asked him to free the boys.
9
 Although Lynn 
and Roosevelt were acquainted and had exchanged correspondence over the years, there is 
nothing more to indicate she intervened in the kissing case. Although she often wrote about civil 
rights in her syndicated newspaper column, “My Day,” she did not write about the kissing case.10 
Historical documents indicate she was aware of the case, but did not take direct action. For 
example, when she received a letter protesting the boys’ sentencing from the headmaster of the 
Franklin D. Roosevelt High School in Rotterdam, which included 407 signatures from students 
and teachers, she forwarded the letters and signatures to Roy Wilkins with a note: “I thought you 
might be interested in seeing the enclosed and perhaps you could put it to good use.”11 Wilkins 
then forwarded the headmaster’s letter and signatures to Hodges.12  
 In Lynn’s recollections, which are included in his 1979 biography, he wrote that he 
arranged to have the students in Rotterdam send the petitions, with 15,000 signatures, to Mrs. 
Roosevelt on the occasion of Lincoln’s birthday.13 However, the petitions appear to have been 
sent independently, without any provocation from Lynn. Moreover, they contain 407 signatures, 
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not 15,000, and the letter from the Dutch headmaster is dated January 21, 1959.
14
 Abraham 
Lincoln was born on February 12. Roosevelt forwarded the petitions to Roy Wilkins on January 
31.
15
 Although Lynn was actively involved in the legal aspects of the kissing case, his 
recollections suggest braggadocio or memory lapses at play. 
 Harry Golden, the Charlotte-based publisher of the Carolina Israelite and an occasional 
advisor to Hodges on civil rights issues, may have played a role in the boys’ release. Golden had 
received a letter from a New Yorker about the kissing case and on February 3, he forwarded that 
letter to Hodges. Golden also wrote a confidential letter to Hodges in which he commented on 
the “unwise Negro leadership in Monroe,” indirectly referring to Robert Williams. Golden ended 
his letter to Hodges with the following suggestion: “There are interested people in Charlotte who 
would like to do anything possible to resolve this matter.”16 Without being specific, Golden was 
informing Hodges about the desire to resolve the kissing case, although he doesn’t hint as to 
what that resolution might be. 
 In his 1969 autobiography, Golden took credit for the boys’ release. He alleged that he 
talked to Hodges about the kissing case, saying he did so at the request of Kelly Alexander, head 
of the NAACP in North Carolina. Specifically, Golden said he called Hodges and told him that 
Robert Williams had recently collected $10,000 at a speaking tour in Cleveland and was due in 
Detroit the next night, where he would collect another $10,000.
17
 Golden’s assertion about the 
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money collected is inaccurate.
 18
 With the NAACP’s agreement to provide financial support for 
the boys’ families and to assume legal fees, the CCRI decided not to direct attention to 
fundraising and instead focused on raising awareness and arousing public opinion. Golden’s 
allegation about the money raised was more likely related to animosity towards Williams rather 
than it was a statement of fact. Believing that Williams was being paid for his speaking 
engagements about the kissing case, Golden told Hodges that Williams should not receive 
monetary benefit because the boys had been imprisoned, “So let’s get them out of jail.”19 Golden 
claimed that Hodges wanted the boys released, but did not know how to tell his constituents that 
the courts had been wrong in sentencing Hanover and Fuzzy. Golden suggested improving the 
boys’ home environments, which would allow Hodges to tell his constituents that the situation 
had changed, and the children were being returned to improved, decent homes. Golden wrote, 
“That afternoon Kelly got the mothers jobs, rented two apartments, paying a month’s rent on 
each, and in the morning Luther Hodges was as good as his word and sent Hanover and Fuzzy 
home.”20 The dates Golden outlines are imprecise; the mothers moved into their apartments on 
February 10 and the boys were released on February 13. Although the North Carolina 
Department of Correction and Training announced that the boys had been released because their 
home environments had improved, there is nothing in the historical records to corroborate 
Golden’s recollection that he and Hodges spoke about using the home environments as a reason 
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to release the boys. Nevertheless, Hodges and Golden met for breakfast on February 12, and 
certainly they might have discussed the kissing case.
21
  
 A social worker from the Mecklenburg County Department of Public Welfare visited the 
families in their new apartments on February 11, the day after they moved in. In his report, the 
social worker commented on the families’ improved living conditions, even though they were 
still getting settled.
22
 It is unclear why the social worker visited the families so soon after they 
moved in instead of waiting for them to get established; there may have been an urgent need to 
report on how the families were faring in their new residences. The suddenness of the social 
worker’s visit and the suddenness of the boys’ release appear to be related. Once Hodges had 
made the decision to free the boys, the conditions for their release needed to be in place.  
 With the announcement of the boys’ discharge from the training school, Hodges appeared 
to distance himself from the decision, as if he had no involvement in or advance knowledge of it. 
“I have been informed today by Mr. Madison that the two boys have been returned to their 
mothers who have now established new homes since moving from Monroe to Charlotte,” Hodges 
said in response to a media inquiry. “I am glad, of course, that the home situations have 
improved to the extent that the boys can be given a conditional release. I hope that the mothers of 
these two boys will meet their responsibilities as bothers [sic].”23 Hodges’s statement contains 
only three sentences, but in each sentence he refers to the home environments, reiterating the 
state’s reason for releasing the boys. This emphasis underscores the position that the boys were 
released because their mothers’ improved their living conditions, not because North Carolina 
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authorities erred in sentencing them. Reflecting a blame frame, Hodges’s statement removes any 
admission of wrongdoing from state and local authorities and assigns responsibility for the boys’ 
release to the mothers, thereby conveying that the mothers also were responsible for the boys’ 
delinquency and hence, for their sentencing. 
 Robert Williams was on a speaking tour in Chicago the day the boys were released.
24
 At 
7 p.m. on February 12, he received a telephone call from New York with the news.
25
 Delighted 
that the boys had been returned to their mothers, Williams said the release was a great moral 
victory attributable to the mass pressure that worldwide protest had placed on Hodges and the 
US State Department.
26
 In his autobiography, Golden claimed that Williams felt differently about 
the boys’ release. Golden contended that because Hodges freed the boys, “We had usurped 
Robert Williams [sic] cause. He was mad about it.”27 The implication is that Williams would 
have preferred a longer incarceration so that he could glean maximum benefits as part of a 
successful public relations campaign. Yet there is no indication Williams felt as Golden claimed.  
The CCRI did not take direct credit for the boys’ freedom, instead stating it offered “palpable 
proof of the power of aroused public opinion.”28 In a letter to a Californian, Weissman wrote, “It 
was precisely such pressure on a national and international scale that forced the North Carolina 
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authorities to release the boys.”29 In a letter to a Texan, Weissman wrote, “It was the sending of 
such letters by thousands of people that forced the release of the two little boys.
30
 
 The day after the boys were returned to their families, the CCRI distributed a three-page 
press release announcing the news, writing that the sudden liberation of Hanover and Fuzzy was 
due to the mounting volume of protests at home and abroad.
31
 One of the first groups the CCRI 
notified was Operation Snowball in Holland; Weissman thanked the Dutch children for their 
support.
32
 In a follow-up letter, Weissman wrote, “You must realize that your activity in Holland 
greatly stirred the conscience of America and as a result, many trade unions, religious groups and 
individuals raised their voices for freeing the two boys. It was this, more than our court actions, 
which brought about their release.”33  
 Of those who took credit for the boys’ release, the NAACP’s overstatement of its role 
was most surprising. In informing its branches, youth councils, and college chapters of the case’s 
outcome, the NAACP wrote, “As you know, this case has attracted wide attention primarily 
because of NAACP action and because of publicity in the foreign and domestic press. There is 
no question that the release was effected because of these pressures.”34 Despite the fact that it 
had done little to create and maintain awareness of the case, the NAACP acknowledged the role 
that public opinion and mass pressure played in the boys’ release. In its departmental report to its 
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board of directors, the summary of the association’s work on the kissing case includes relocating 
the families and providing them with financial assistance.
35
 The report makes no mention of any 
publicity, because the NAACP’s work in this regard was limited to sending two press releases. 
The NAACP reluctantly supported the kissing case and initially did not want to do so. However, 
its eventual involvement in the case provided an important endorsement by an organization that 
was trusted by African Americans. The NAACP relocated the families, and North Carolina 
authorities claimed the improved home environments were the reason the boys were released. A 
NAACP summary of its work, distributed to chapters across the nation, was congratulatory. 
 In handling this case, we have worked in our usual manner and have thus succeeded in 
 freeing the boys from an institution to which they should have never been sent. The 
 NAACP, through it National Office and State Conference, assumed full responsibility for 
 the case, including legal fees and costs and assistance to the families, including relocation 
 in a new community. As a result of our continued activity and support, the families are 
 now in a better position to become self-supporting.
36
 
  
 After Hanover’s and Fuzzy’s return to their mothers, the NAACP considered the case  
 
closed and notified its branches. 
 
 With the release of the boys to their mothers and the subsequent adjustment of the 
 families in a new environment, we see no good purpose to be served in further carrying 
 on a publicity campaign or using the case in any way which could be construed as 
 exploitation of the children. We are not working with any other group or groups in the 
 promotion of mass meetings and fund-raising around this issue, for, with the release of 
 the children, we consider the public phase of the case to be ended.
37
 
 With this statement, the NAACP stressed its autonomy, likely an effort to distance the 
organization from the CCRI and its public relations efforts on behalf of the kissing case. Given 
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the proclivity of racists to attempt to link civil rights organizations with communism, the 
NAACP wanted to continue to avoid association with the CCRI due to the socialist backgrounds 
of two founding members of the CCRI.  
 On March 8, the North Carolina NAACP issued a press release announcing the boys were 
enrolled in public school and were “on the way to a good life.”38 The press release referred to the 
NAACP’s legal defense of the boys, as well as the association’s work in relocating the families. 
In addition, the press release noted the worldwide protest, creating the impression that it was the 
result of the NAACP’s efforts when it was not. The boys’ release in this high-profile case 
represented a triumph for those who worked on their behalf. Under the circumstances, it is not 
surprising that the NAACP embellished its role. 
 After the boys were released, Harry Golden penned a column in his newspaper, Carolina 
Israelite, in which he surmised that “North Carolina did not make a judicial mistake in retaining 
the boys, nor did it make a ‘humanitarian’ mistake. It did make a mistake in public relations and 
for this some of the local authorities in Monroe must take responsibility.”39 Golden does not 
describe this public relations mistake, but instead writes that the boys were returned to their 
parents as soon as their mothers’ living conditions improved, which “happened in thousands of 
cases in North Carolina, although none of these cases had any attendant publicity.”40 He added, 
“Neither the State nor the boys deserved to have the affair exploited. Exploitation solved nothing 
about the great problem which confronts us—the end of racial discrimination in the public 
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schools.” 41 According to Golden, the CCRI public relations effort drew attention to a matter that 
was trivial in light of broader racial problems. Although he does not mention Hodges by name, 
Golden’s editorial seems to be defending the governor. Golden places blame on Monroe 
authorities, thereby removing it from Hodges. But again, Golden did not describe the mistake 
that he alleged Monroe authorities made in the kissing case. Golden may have been referring to 
that fact that Monroe authorities remanded the boys to a reformatory instead of seeking 
alternative arrangements. Based on Golden’s thinking, if Monroe authorities had secured these 
other living arrangements, there would have been no kissing case and therefore, no adverse 
publicity. 
 In a letter to George Weissman, Carl Braden offered a possible motivation behind 
Golden’s column was an effort to curry favor with the governor. 
 First, let me dispose of Harry—poor, scared soul. All you have to do is read the lead 
 article on Page 2 of the Jan.-Feb. issue of The Carolina Israelite about the Kissing Case. 
 I guess Harry had to make peace with the Carolina bosses because it is becoming 
 generally known that he tipped off the New York Post about the story in the first place. 
 He never thought somebody with nerve and verve would take hold of the situation and do 
 something.
42
  
 
 Braden’s assertion about Harry Golden and the New York Post conflicts with other claims 
that the Post was first informed of the kissing case by a New York community leader, who heard 
of the situation from one of the boys’ New York-based sisters. Braden does not clarify how it 
was known that Golden alerted the New York Post, and the historical documents contain no 
further information on this aspect of the kissing case. Therefore, exactly how the Post heard of 
the kissing case cannot be definitively determined.  
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 In his Carolina Israelite editorial, Golden also asked “whether anyone has ever heard of a 
Southern governor or a Northern governor who has been ‘forced’ into a decision by worldwide 
protest?”43 His question seems intended to undermine the CCRI’s assertion that worldwide 
protest and mass pressure—orchestrated by the CCRI—resulted in Hodges’s freeing the boys. In 
response to a college newspaper editor who had read Golden’s editorial, Williams provided two 
examples of the power of protest.
44
 He concluded,  
 But in any event what is the alternative to petition and protest when one sees an injustice 
 being done? Certainly here in Union County there is little difference of opinion about 
 why the boys were released. It is ascribed to the efforts of the NAACP, the Committee to 
 Combat Racial Injustice and, most of all, to the world-wide protest. Negroes here are 
 greatly encouraged over it, the white supremacists bemoan and curse it, but all agree as to 
 its power.
45
 
 
 Although the historical record does not provide the definitive reasons Hodges released 
the boys, they likely would not have come to his attention had it not been for the mass protest. 
Authorities and the majority of white citizens in Monroe believed the boys’ situation had been 
effectively handled and did not warrant outside attention. Local activists formed the CCRI, 
which developed a public relations campaign that created awareness of the kissing case well 
beyond Monroe. As a result, proponents of racial equality expressed in continuous and 
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voluminous letters their shock, outrage, and concern to Hodges, demanding he free the boys. If 
the CCRI had not advocated on the boys’ behalf, Hanover’s and Fuzzy’s story would not have 
been thrust onto the world stage. Although Golden wrote to Hodges about the need to resolve the 
kissing case, had there been no worldwide attention directed to the boys’ dilemma, there would 
have been no need to resolve the case. In other words, the boys’ situation would not have been a 
case. It was the press coverage and the public relations campaign that turned the events into the 
kissing case. 
Summary and Analysis of Public Relations Strategies and Tactics 
 This dissertation asked how the CCRI, NAACP, USIA, and North Carolina Gov. Hodges 
used public relations in regards to the kissing case, specifically asking what strategies and tactics 
the groups employed. This dissertation also asked what frames the four groups used in their 
public relations material, and how these frames were reflected in the letters members of the 
public sent to Hodges. 
 Based on this study’s findings, of the four groups, the CCRI developed the most 
comprehensive public relations campaign. Part of the reason for its success was that before it 
began its public relations efforts, the CCRI developed a clearly articulated goal regarding the 
kissing case: it would create awareness of the boys’ situation in order to mobilize public opinion, 
as a means to pressure Hodges into freeing the boys. CCRI leaders knew exactly what they 
wanted to accomplish, and their desired outcome was the boys’ freedom. To achieve its goal, the 
CCRI did not focus on attitude change. The committee did not target those who were opposed to 
racial equality, nor did it focus on those who questioned racial inequality but had not taken a 
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stance about it.
46
 In other words, it was neither attempting to change the beliefs of those who 
were opponents of racial equality, nor was it trying to convince those who were noncommittal. 
Instead, the CCRI identified and engaged audiences who were already receptive to its mission to 
combat racial injustice. By doing so, it did not need to persuade this audience of the merits of 
civil rights and could instead focus its efforts on mobilizing them to apply pressure on Hodges to 
free the boys.  
 As part of its public relations campaign, the CCRI simultaneously employed five 
strategies. One strategy involved engaging opinion leaders and using those individuals to cascade 
its messages. With this strategy, the CCRI identified religious, academic, civil rights, and labor 
leaders who were civil rights supporters. After informing this audience of the kissing case, it 
asked these leaders to communicate the message to their constituents, which allowed the 
committee to reach a broader audience. Another strategy involved engaging youth, specifically 
high school and college students, which further expanded the CCRI’s outreach and network of 
supporters. Using the news media as a channel to reach its audiences was another strategy the 
CCRI used. Tactically, the committee distributed press releases, held press conferences, and 
distributed reprints of news articles. It complemented its news media strategy with another 
strategy: the use of face-to-face communication to relay its messages. Robert Williams, Conrad 
Lynn, and Albert Perry spoke to groups of supporters at labor rallies, community meetings, and 
church gatherings. These strategies were supplemented by print material the CCRI produced 
about the case, including fact sheets, brochures, flyers, and posters. 
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 One of the CCRI’s most important and effective strategies was its call to action, in which 
it urged supporters to sign a petition, send a postcard, or write a letter to Hodges demanding that 
he free the boys. Instead of merely creating awareness of the kissing case, which was 
accomplished by the CCRI’s other strategies, the call-to-action strategy focused on asking the 
public to place pressure on Hodges. As a result, Hodges received a deluge letters in which the 
public expressed its opinion. The volume and content of these letters caused Hodges particular 
consternation.  
 Objectives in a public relations campaign can be broadly placed within one or more of 
these three categories: to know, to do, to feel. An organization wants it target audience(s) to 
know something, to do something, or to feel something. Often, public relations objectives are 
focused on all three categories. One of the reasons the CCRI’s public relations campaign was 
effective was its clear articulation, via its strategies and tactics, of these three categories. It 
wanted its audiences to know about the kissing case and the racism behind it; it wanted them to 
sign a petition or write to Hodges demanding that he free the boys, and it wanted them to feel 
empathy for the boys and their families, and outrage over the sentencing. The CCRI’s strategies 
were all focused on these three categories, which related to the most prominent frame in its 
public relations material—a racism frame. This racism frame reflected the CCRI’s ultimate 
mission of combating racial injustice.  
 The CCRI was formed to illuminate incidents of racial injustice and help those who had 
suffered from it. With the kissing case, it wanted the public to be aware of the racism behind the 
case, hence its focus on the racism frame. The letters from the public to Hodges reflect this 
frame. After expressing their shock and disbelief, protesters believed that racism was the only 
reason for the boys’ treatment. In addition, the protesters expressed concern about the reputation 
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of the United States and the contradiction between its demand for global freedom and its 
treatment of its black citizens. 
 In examining Hodges’s public relations, his campaign was clear on what it wanted its 
audiences to know, namely what Hodges believed were the facts of the case. However, his 
campaign was focused on attitude change with an audience whose attitudes about the kissing 
case were in opposition to Hodges’s attitudes. Hodges was fixated on presenting his facts and 
was unable to see an alternative position. He was attempting to justify racism to an audience 
committed to combatting the racial injustice that undergirded the kissing case, although he most 
likely did not realize he was doing so. He was so focused on preserving the prevailing power 
structure and so steadfast in his beliefs that he was unable to understand the public’s vehement 
response to the boys’ sentencing. It was this lack of understanding that shaped Hodges public 
relations efforts in the kissing case. One of his strategies was to engage directly with protesters 
and attempt to convince them of his position. To do so, he wrote to each person who wrote to 
him. In his correspondence, he did not ask that the protesters pass his facts on to other protesters. 
Instead, he sent what he thought was the correct information about the kissing case, believing 
that this information would result in protesters agreeing with or understanding the actions of 
North Carolina authorities.  
 Hodges’s other strategies included enlisting expert opinion and using the news media, 
while incorporating a blame frame in which he vilified the boys and their mothers. Rather than 
convincing or persuading protesters, this strategy reinforced the racism behind the kissing case, 
which only served to increase protesters’ demands that he free the boys. Therefore, Hodges’s 
public relations strategies and tactics did not change protesters’ attitudes and cause them to 
support the boys’ sentencing. Had Hodges not freed the boys when he did, the CCRI presumably 
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would have continued its campaign, resulting in continued public protest. News coverage in the 
black and international press likely would have remained unfavorable to Hodges and to North 
Carolina.  
 After he freed the boys, Hodges responded to a letter he received from Reverend 
Theodore Webb of the Universalist-Unitarian Church in Massachusetts, who asked Hodges if the 
boys had been sent to the reformatory because they “were Negroes or because they were 
delinquent.”47 Hodges responded, “The only answer I can give to you is that both these boys are 
Negroes and it is an established fact that they were delinquent.”48 Hodges added that Judge Price 
acted in good faith based on what he thought were the best interests of the boys.  
 In retrospect, reasonable men can now question the advisability of the commitment to the 
 training school and can express the view that it would have been better if the boys could 
 have been placed in a foster home or continued on probation. In my own view, the main 
 “wrong” in the commitment to the training school was the fact that it was subject to 
 misunderstanding as to motive.
49
  
 
 Surprisingly, Hodges admitted that remanding the boys to the reformatory may not have 
been the best solution. Although he conceded the decision in hindsight, he still did not yield his 
position because he couched the decision in terms of misunderstanding as to motive. In other 
words, Hodges believed the problem was not that the boys were sentenced to a reformatory; the 
problem was the reason protesters thought the boys were sentenced—for child’s play. Actually, 
the problem is both. The protesters did not view a kiss exchanged between children of different 
races as a crime. But in the South, miscegenation was a crime and southerners believed its 
outcome was the elimination of the white race. This viewpoint was so ingrained that Hodges and 
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other southerners were unable to comprehend the outsized penalty levied for a misdemeanor 
offense. The interracial peck crossed racial boundaries and was illegal, regardless of the ages of 
the supposed perpetrators. In his responses to the public, Hodges never acknowledged the 
southern proscriptions regarding interracial romantic or sexual interactions, possibly because he 
did not see them as such and instead merely viewed them as a way of life or the natural order of 
things. Furthermore, Hodges would not want to risk alienating his constituents, most of whom 
likely supported North Carolina’s actions in the kissing case. Despite conceding that it would 
have been better had the boys been placed in foster care, Hodge nevertheless ended his response 
to Rev. Webb by referring him to the Chester Davis article “so that you will better understand the 
case.” Ultimately, Hodges still believed in his position. 
 In later reflecting on Hodges’s public relations strategies, Weissman wrote: 
 The state officials tried to cover up the scandal by causing a report to be issued stating 
 that the boys had not been sent to reform school because of the kissing incident but 
 because they were incorrigible juvenile delinquents with long records. Williams and the 
 CCRI blasted this shabby evasion by showing that the alleged incidents involved such 
 matters as stealing a ride on another boys’ bicycle and taking some ham. Moreover, these 
 alleged examples of the depravity of the eight and none [sic] year old children had never 
 been entered on juvenile court records until after the campaign for the boys’ release had 
 begun.
50
  
 
 The only frame Hodges employed that related to one of the public’s frames was that of 
communism. The public believed the kissing case besmirched the reputation of the United States, 
which could be used by communists to point out US hypocrisy regarding its standing as a pillar 
of democracy and its treatment of its black citizens. In contrast, as shown in the Chester Davis 
article, Hodges painted the CCRI as a communist front, hoping to discredit its work. Ironically, 
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Hodges was unable see that while he was falsely denigrating the CCRI as a communist 
organization, the actions of North Carolina authorities had provided fodder to the Communists.  
 After the boys were freed, Carl Braden urged Davis to revisit the allegations he had made 
and “present a more balanced version of this situation.”51 Davis responded that he had received a 
similar request from Robert Williams.  
 I made no apologies to him and I’ll make none to you because I am convinced that the 
 central theme of my piece was valid. You people, either unwittingly or deliberately, come 
 to North Carolina and interjected the issue of Communism in our already tense racial 
 situation. You managed to do that in a manner that could not help but hurt the NAACP in 
 this state. I don’t care how idealistic your motives are. The fact is that your Committee 
 To Combat Racial Injustice served no purpose other than that of a propaganda tub. It 
 contributed nothing except to raise confusion regarding the one organization which has 
 truly stood up and fought for the rights of colored people. 
 
 The tone of Davis’s response to Braden reflects his hostility towards the CCRI, although 
it does not appear that he engaged in outright subreption. Instead, Davis believed that North 
Carolina authorities were fully justified in their actions. It another letter to Braden, Davis 
admitted, “I recognize that as a soutgern [sic] newspaperman I am going to be confronted with 
instances where, in reporting Communist infiltration in the race movement, I may be guilty of 
witch hunting.”52 In that sentence, Davis seemed to acknowledge that he may have been red 
baiting. The CCRI did not inject the issue of communism in the South’s racial problems. Its 
communications were focused on raising awareness of the kissing case and encouraging the 
public to write to Hodges. Instead, it was Davis who sought an opportunity to use communism to 
disparage the CCRI’s work by falsely accusing Braden of being a communist. When Braden sent 
Davis proof he was not a communist, Davis rebuffed his claim. 
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 I appreciated the temperate tone of your letter and you must forgive me if I falter 
 somewhat on that score. My reaction to the letter and it enclosures was about like that of 
 the farmer who watched his prize bull attempt to derail and express train. He said he 
 couldn’t give the bull much credit for judgment but he had to admire his courage.53  
 
 Hodges enlisted Davis and used his articles as tactics in his public relations campaign, 
although they did not convince protesters that the state’s treatment of Hanover Thompson and 
Fuzzy Simpson was justified. Still, USIA Director George Allen wrote in 1959 that he was 
impressed by the Davis articles.
54
 He informed Hodges that the articles, along with Hodges’s 
cover letter, had been sent to USIA overseas posts “to give our Information Officers material 
with which to set inquirers straight.”55 He also commended Hodges on handling the case with 
“remarkable restraint, patience, and good judgment.”56Allen’s comments reflect the USIA’s 
public relations tactics.  
 The USIA had a significant reputational issue to manage abroad: The United States did 
not provide many of its citizens with the equality and freedom it was championing around the 
world. As a result, the US faced criticism from other countries over the mistreatment of its black 
citizens. To help manage this problem, one of the USIA’s public relations strategies was to 
present progress in race relations rather than highlight difficulties. The kissing case illuminated a 
racial problem; therefore, the agency readily accepted the material Hodges provided and denied 
the boys’ sentencing was motivated by racism. It even issued a statement that racism was not 
involved in the boys’ sentencing. Upon learning of the USIA’s claim, the CCRI informed the 
USIA that its information was inaccurate—that the case was racially motivated. The CCRI 
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demanded the USIA distribute a revised statement, and it communicated in a press release what 
it believed was the USIA’s error and its demand for a correction. As a result, the USIA 
distributed a revised version of its statement to its USIS posts. The USIA did not want to draw 
additional attention to yet another racial incident, therefore its public relations activities were 
limited to informing its overseas posts of the incident, issuing a statement to the Dutch media 
that included Hodges’s justifications, and monitoring media coverage.  
 The NAACP implemented few public relations tactics, despite claiming success for the 
worldwide protests. At the time of the kissing case, the organization was heavily involved in the 
national issue of school integration, and the case in Monroe seemed a local problem best dealt 
with by social workers. Nevertheless, the NAACP issued two press releases, one announcing that 
it had thrown its “full weight” behind the kissing case.57 Such a statement constituted an 
important endorsement to African American audiences. As a new organization, the CCRI did not 
enjoy the same name recognition. The NAACP’s second press release announced it planned to 
seek a new hearing in the boys’ legal case.58 Therefore, the NAACP’s key contribution—which 
was not a public relations tactic—was moving the families to a new home and providing them 
with financial support. In doing so, it assumed a role similar to that of a social services agency, 
taking action on behalf of the families that the Union County Department of Welfare had not.59 
With the move and appearance of financial stability, Hodges was able to attribute the boys’ 
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release to the families’ improved living conditions rather than admit a misjudgment or mistake 
had been made. 
 The NAACP’s lack of involvement in the kissing case warrants further exploration, as it 
illustrates challenges the NAACP faced from leftist organizations that supported African 
American civil rights, and it reflects the association’s position in the evolving civil rights 
movement. 
NAACP Reticence About the Kissing Case  
 This study’s finding show that the overwhelming bulk of the public relations work to free 
the boys was implemented by the CCRI. Although the CCRI and the NAACP both wanted the 
boys’ freedom, they had different approaches to obtaining it. The NAACP’s lack of involvement 
in the kissing case illustrates how its organizational structure limited its ability to adapt to 
changes in the civil rights movement, allowing other organizations to form and tackle issues it 
was unable or unwilling to handle. In addition, the organization’s previous experience with 
Communist-affiliated organizations, as well as its earlier work on miscegenation laws, also 
played a role in its reticence to support the kissing case. One such case was that of the Scottsboro 
boys. 
 In 1931, nine African American teenagers, later referred to as the Scottsboro boys, were 
accused of raping two white women on a train in Alabama. The boys were convicted by an all-
white jury and sentenced to death. As with the kissing case 27 years later, the NAACP was slow 
to lend its support to the Scottsboro boys. The Communist Party USA (CPUSA) heard of the 
Scottsboro boys and began actively protesting their sentence. The CPUSA believed African 
Americans were an oppressed class, and it therefore added US race relations to its agenda.  
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While the CPUSA immediately immersed itself in the Scottsboro case, the NAACP “failed 
initially to see clear-cut evidence that the boys’ constitutional rights were being abused.”60 The 
NAACP’s cautious approach left a void that the International Labor Defense (ILD), a 
communist-affiliated legal advocacy organization, eagerly filled by providing legal 
representation. When the NAACP later decided it wanted to handle the case, the ILD refused to 
step aside, resulting in name calling and ill will between the two organizations. The CPUSA and 
ILD accused the NAACP of ignoring black workers and focusing instead on the “Negro 
bourgeoisie.”61 The CPUSA believed America’s race problems reflected a class and labor 
struggle to be solved by revolution and unity between black and white laborers. On the other 
hand, the NAACP, “associated with a tradition of abolition and democracy consonant with the 
founding traditions of the nation—acted out of the belief that what black people wanted was 
equal rights and equal access to American society, not a revolution to topple it.”62 The two 
organizations had underlying differences in their principles. “The NAACP worked within the 
framework of the Constitution with the goal of having constitutional guarantees enforced, while 
the Communists challenged the entire American system.”63 
 During subsequent trials, the Scottsboro boys’ death sentence was upheld, despite 
medical evidence that the boys had not committed the rape. After an appeal to the US Supreme 
Court followed by additional trials, four of the boys were released in 1937. The last defendant 
was released in 1950 and in 1977 the state of Alabama acknowledged their innocence with an 
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official pardon, despite the fact that only one of the boys was still alive to hear of his 
vindication.
64
 Despite disappointment that the NAACP did not act sooner and therefore did not 
handle the Scottsboro case, “most civil rights supporters came to feel that the ILD did perform 
heroically in making the boys’ plight an international cause.”65 
 By the time two boys were accused of molesting a white girl in a culvert in North 
Carolina, the NAACP and CPUSA were opponents, despite wanting similar outcomes in cases of 
racial injustice. Although none of the CCRI’s founders were members of the CPUSA in 1958, 
Conrad Lynn had been a member in the 1920s and 1930s, and George Weissman was a member 
of the Socialist Workers Party. The NAACP wanted to avoid association with organizations 
linked in fact or by rumor to communism. Because white supremacists tried to discredit the civil 
rights movement as a Communist conspiracy, the NAACP had to continually defend itself 
against charges that it was infiltrated and led by Communists. These allegations increased during 
the red scare following World War II.
66
 As part of its defense, the NAACP “distanced itself from 
all groups and individuals suspected of Communist affiliations.”67 For example in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, the NAACP refused to work with the Civil Rights Congress (CRC), a successor 
organization to the ILD and the National Negro Congress. Recalling the criticism leveled by the 
ILD during the Scottsboro case, the NAACP declined offers from the CRC to cooperate on 
various cases.
68
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 Another reason for the NAACP’s cautious approach and dearth of involvement in the 
kissing case relates to the structure of the association. The NAACP “did not emerge within the 
black community, nor were the black masses involved in shaping the organization at the 
outset.”69 Instead, it was founded by black and white intellectuals. It was a bureaucratic 
organization, with centralized decision making emanating from its New York headquarters.
70
 
The association’s leadership established policies and procedures that guided the activities of the 
headquarters, as well as the branches. Also, despite being the preeminent black civil rights 
organization, the NAACP was not a mass membership organization, and its ranks “seldom 
included more than two percent of the black population.”71 The NAACP sought reform primarily 
through legal action and political reform. This approach did not foster individual involvement, 
which was often “limited to making financial contributions and reporting incidents of racial 
injustice and discrimination to the local branch.”72  
Reginald Hawkins, a civil rights activist who worked with Kelly Alexander in the 
Charlotte chapter of the NAACP, later explained that the NAACP was an organization for the 
bourgeoisie that “did not want to deal with the underclass.” 73 This focus on the middle class may 
have been another reason the association was not eager to support two boys from impoverished 
families.  
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 The NAACP’s bureaucracy also impacted the type of protest tactics it implemented. 
According to Aldon Morris, bureaucratic organizations are usually unable to “accommodate 
mass grassroots insurgency and the attendant uncertainty and experimentation.”74 Instead of 
pursuing alternative tactics such as those involving mass protest, bureaucratic organizations 
avoid uncertainty and operate within the status quo. With its focus on legal redress, the NAACP 
believed it needed to operate within the prevailing legal and political system. Therefore when 
Union County officials claimed they would consider freeing the boys if their home environments 
improved, the NAACP worked within the parameters outlined by authorities and directed its 
efforts to making those improvements. It did not get involved in the mass protest campaign to 
free the boys. 
 Additionally, after World War II, the fight for black civil rights was marked by 
frustration at the slow pace of progress and a corresponding assertiveness in affecting change.
75
 
During the war, black soldiers overseas had experienced better treatment by foreigners than by 
US citizens. They had demonstrated their willingness to die for their country and believed their 
sacrifice afforded them equal citizenship. Many black Americans also had rallied around the 
Double V campaign, which sought victory in the war overseas and against racism and inequality 
at home. Moreover, Americans were becoming aware that after the war, the United States did not 
afford all its black citizens the freedoms it demanded other countries offer their citizens. As a 
result, “blacks began to understand their collective predicament as well as their collective 
strength.”76 As blacks’ level of conscious increased, some local NAACP leaders, such as Robert 
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Williams, wanted to take a more aggressive approach than did the national NAACP office, which 
continued to rely on the legal approach it had used since its founding. 
 During the 1950s, the NAACP’s chief concerns were voter registration and attacking 
segregation, primarily in the schools, and it did so through its usual means. Also during this time, 
the white power structure in a number of southern states was attempting to put the NAACP out 
of business, and the association was actively defending itself from these attacks.
77
 For the 
NAACP’s national leaders, the kissing case was unrelated to its larger initiatives. It was not an 
organization that was committed to fighting small, local problems, unless they were linked to the 
organization’s more immediate objectives. The kissing case was an example of a particular local 
problem, which is why NAACP national and regional leaders dismissed it as a concern for social 
workers, not for civil rights leaders. It wasn’t until the case became a larger problem that the 
NAACP got involved, albeit reluctantly. 
 Still another reason for the NAACP’s cautious approach to the kissing case relates to its 
history with miscegenation law. From 1913 to 1929, the NAACP’s efforts helped defeat such 
laws in a number of northern states and the District of Columbia.
78
 However by the late 1930s, 
the NAACP’s legal team targeted its efforts at ending segregation, and it won a number of cases 
involving voting rights and equal housing. The association then began devoting significant 
attention to ending segregation in education. Although NAACP leaders did not agree with 
miscegenation laws, they thought asserting that these laws “were unconstitutional would bring 
down a firestorm of criticism and possibly intimidate the Court or some of its justices.”79 In other 
                                                 
77
 Ibid., 30-35. 
 
78
 Pascoe, What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America, 172. 
 
79
 Ibid., 203. 
216 
 
words, addressing interracial marriage laws would impede the progress the NAACP was 
beginning to see in its efforts against segregation. This focus on ending segregation would lead 
to one of the NAACP’s most important legal victories, the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education 
decision. However, the Brown decision did not result in an immediate integration of schools. 
Therefore, at the time of the kissing case, the NAACP was still fighting its school integration 
battles. 
 The CCRI developed and implemented a public relations campaign to free the boys, 
which involved creating awareness of their situation and fomenting public protest to demand 
their release. However, the initial publicity surrounding the kissing case drew attention to the 
NAACP’s dearth of support, which forced the association to become involved when it would 
otherwise not have done so. The NAACP’s organizational structure, as well as its history with 
miscegenation law and with communist organizations in a climate in which civil rights 
organizations were frequently red baited, all contributed to its reluctance to champion the boys’ 
cause. When it was finally forced to get involved, it did not draw significant attention to its 
involvement with an extensive public relations campaign, and its public relations efforts were 
minimal. Instead, it concentrated on relocating the families to better homes and providing them 
financial support. Hodges chose to free the boys, citing the improved living conditions.  
Ultimately, it may have been the significant attention paid to the kissing case due to the CCRI’s 
work, as well as the families’ new homes provided by the NAACP, that together contributed to 
Hodges’s decision. Whatever the combination of factors, the CCRI had achieved its outcome. 
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Superiority? Inferiority?   
Why not simply try to 
 touch the other,  
feel the other,  
discover each other?
1
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 Using racial formation theory as a foundation, this dissertation asked how race, as it was 
socially constructed and codified via 1950s-era Jim Crow practices, was reflected in the groups’ 
public relations material and in the opinions the public expressed in letters to Hodges. Despite 
Hodges’s and the USIA’s assertions to the contrary, race played a role in the kissing case. The 
CCRI wanted to ensure that its audiences were aware of the racism that undergirded the case, 
and it did so in its public relations material. When examined through the lens of Omi and 
Winant’s racial formation theory, the CCRI’s focus on illuminating racism and Hodges’s 
avoidance of it reflect significant shifts that were occurring in racial meanings at the time.  
 Chapter five discusses the kissing case and its public relations, including the frames in 
the public relations material, in relation to racial formation theory. It also discusses the public 
relations implemented on behalf of the kissing case in the context of the role of public relations 
in society. In addition, this chapter presents what contemporary public relations practitioners can 
learn from the kissing case public relations campaigns. Finally, this chapter presents 
opportunities for further study. 
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Racial Formation Theory, the Kissing Case, and Public Relations 
 Omi and Winant’s theory defines “racial formation” as “the process by which social, 
economic, and political forces determine the content and importance of racial categories, and by 
which they are in turn shaped by racial meanings.”2 They posit that race is not a biological 
manifestation, but instead is a social construct subject to historical changes. Stated another way, 
race must be understood “as something more than skin color or biophysical essence, but 
precisely as those historic repertoires and cultural and spatial, and signifying systems that 
stigmatize and depreciate one form of humanity for the purposes of another’s health, 
development, safety, profit and pleasure.”3 Race is a fluid concept shaped by societal systems 
and interactions, and it is “neither an essence nor an illusion, but rather an ongoing, 
contradictory, self-reinforcing process subject to the macro forces of social and political struggle 
and the micro effects of daily decisions.”4 
 The notion of black as a race was developed “by dominant groups, socially reproduced 
over generations, and remains embedded within the institutions, culture, and social 
consciousness of American society.”5 However, this representation of race relied on biology, 
including skin color, to develop a “eugenic assumption that race is genetic, unchangeable and 
determinative of the superiority of the white race.”6 From this belief, whites developed a two-
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tiered racial hierarchy. This classification determined that blacks’ position in society would be 
one of inferiority, with a concomitant limitation or denial of resources. The focus on the 
physical, genetic, and biological aspects of a racial caste necessitated that the dominant group 
define “white” and “black,” and they did so legally and culturally with the one-drop rule, which 
mandated that anyone with one drop of blood was placed in the black caste. White supremacy 
was contingent on white purity; therefore, in addition to the one-drop rule, miscegenation laws 
were developed to maintain the racial order. The laws were written to prohibit whites from 
marrying blacks, Asians, and Indians, but not to prohibit blacks, Asians and Indians from 
marrying each other.
7
 Although the list of races named in the law varied from state to state, 
blacks and whites were always barred from marrying, reflecting the black/white binary.
8
 In the 
United States, “anti-miscegenation laws were more extensive than either legalized segregation or 
slavery, existing in 41 of the 50 states at one point or other. They also outlasted the de jure end 
of Jim Crow in the Supreme Court’s Brown decision by more than a decade, and extended not 
simply in the Deep South, but across regional divides, paralleling the western expansion of 
American territory.”9   
 The one-drop decree and laws prohibiting black/white unions served as the foundation for 
white supremacy, and they rested on the popular notion that “race actually existed, that it was a 
thing that could be measured, determined, gotten to the truth of.”10 Because white racial 
supremacy also “provided an epistemological template for the order of things,” the one-drop 
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ideology provided structure when this order was challenged. A mixed-race person disturbed the 
order, but the one-drop rule provided “specific mechanisms for bringing deviations back into the 
explanatory framework of racial classification.”11 Thus, the mulatto, quadroon or person with 
any amount of black blood is placed at the bottom of the hierarchy, as are their descendants. 
 Even in states were black/white unions were legal, those who crossed the color line were 
often castigated. Such an outcome occurred in 1955 when four assembly line workers at a Detroit 
auto factory, two white women and two men—one black and one white—decided to give each 
other a peck on the cheek during a Christmas party at work.
12
 The four, who had long been 
friendly, worked in a department that had seen an influx of black men and white women, 
disrupting a labor market that had been a bastion for white men. Of the foursome, a 35 year-old 
African American man kissed his 32 year-old white female co-worker. Two white male 
employees later harangued the women for allowing the buss. As a result, she filed a complaint 
against her black co-worker, saying she had been kissed unwillingly. Despite appeals, the 
African American man was fired, and the other white woman involved, who had suggested the 
kiss and had a long-standing friendship with the black man, received a disciplinary layoff but 
was later allowed to return to work. The white men’s action reflects the struggle to maintain 
power in the midst of shifts in economics, politics, and culture.
13
 Three years later in Monroe, 
North Carolina, there would be a similar struggle, for similar reasons.  
 The prohibition against sexual relations and intermarriage between blacks and whites was 
another form of Jim Crow, yet it did more than mandate physical separation and regulate social 
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relationships. It provided a way to signify racial meaning. In other words, miscegenation law 
presented another means to equate black with being subordinate and unworthy. At the same time, 
it reinforced white as its opposite: superordinate, and worthy. Despite laws and rules defining 
blackness, race mixing also presented the possibility of redefining whiteness. Had there not been 
strict rules and laws, adding a drop of black blood to white could have changed the definition of 
white based on shades and variations in skin color.
14
 Miscegenation law provided a social 
boundary and racial boundary; it was a means to maintain the racial order.
15
 From a macro 
perspective, “dominant groups maintain and police racial boundaries through social closure and 
violence—symbolic or otherwise—to maintain status and power.”16 Regulating intimate 
relationships served as a form of boundary making for the dominant group, which impacted 
personal interactions which were at the micro level. 
 The kissing case involved more than a peck between children during a game. Hanover 
and Fuzzy had previously stolen a ham; they were on probation for similar delinquencies but had 
never been charged for those transgressions. However, they were charged with molesting a white 
girl. This act violated laws and threatened the caste system. This dissertation’s finding show the 
kissing case is ultimately about miscegenation, despite the ages of the children involved. As 
such, it is about power. In jailing Hanover and Fuzzy, the dominant group asserted its power and 
in response, the subordinate group demanded justice it had long been denied. As miscegenation 
law provided a way to codify race socially and to maintain white dominion, the kissing case 
represents a struggle over the meaning of race, which in the end, is a struggle over hegemony. As 
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Omi and Winant proffered, race is “an unstable and decentered complex of social meanings 
constantly being transformed by political struggle.”17 Had North Carolina authorities not taken 
action against the boys, they would have condoned race mixing, which would upend the race 
binary. Allowing black/white unions would move blacks to a more equal position in the 
hierarchy in that their personal relationships would not be regulated by dominant whites, and 
they would been see as worthy of entering into unions with whites. The boys’ action was a threat 
to white supremacy, as was the demand for their freedom. This demand reflected blacks’ 
intolerance of the inferior social positon and their motivation to take action to get the political, 
legal, economic, and social resources they had been denied. 
 Central to Omi’s and Winant’s theory is the “racial project,” which they define as 
“simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics and an effort 
to organize and distribute resources along racial lines.” The modern civil rights movement is a 
racial project; however, racial projects can be large or small and can come from any point on the 
political spectrum.
18
 Racial projects ultimately involve contests over hegemony, with a 
subordinate group contesting its status and pressing a claim for political, economic, and social 
equality. As such, the kissing case was a racial project. In racial projects, the dominant group 
may concede some of its power, or it may fight to maintain its position. 
  The kissing case tackled race at the level of social structure, which includes social 
stratification, institutional arrangements, political systems, and laws. It also challenged what 
Winant refers to as social signification, or the production of meanings, which is how race is 
culturally configured and how it is a descriptor of group or individual identity, social issues and 
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experience.
19
 Most southern whites “could not envision a society in which blacks had rights—in 
which blacks were treated as human.”20 Giving blacks equal rights would create a different 
society, one without a two-tiered racial hierarchy in which whites would occupy the top position. 
In addressing this power struggle, historian John Stauffer stated of whites, “They assumed that 
black supremacy would replace white supremacy. It would be one or the other, and that fueled 
their desire to do anything to prevent that from happening.”21 The CCRI demanded the boys not 
be viewed as subordinate actors in a milieu of white dominion. The boys had been denied their 
rights because they were black, reflecting a racist society in which black was constructed as 
unworthy of receiving civil rights. The CCRI insisted that Hanover and Fuzzy not be treated 
differently because they were black. With this demand, CCRI leaders were attempting to change 
the social meaning of what it was to be black. In other words, it asked that they be treated as if 
they were white, thereby skewing racial significations. With subordinate group challenges to 
existing racial schemes, racial meanings and categories are subject to change, reflecting their 
instability. Thus, notions of race are a form capital in political struggles, as subordinate groups 
challenge racialized social systems.  
Racial Projects and Communication 
 Social movements involving race can be considered racial projects, and social 
movements do not happen without communication. Racial projects “connect what race means in 
a particular discursive practice and the ways in which both social structures and everyday 
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experiences are racially organized, based upon that meaning.”22 With social movements, 
discursive processes “refer to the talk and conversations—the speech acts—and written 
communications of movement members that occur primarily in the context of, or in relation to, 
movement activities.”23 These speech acts and written communications often manifest as public 
relations strategies or tactics. Therefore, public relations can be essential to fostering the 
discourse necessary for racial meanings to change in racial projects.  
 The success of social movements necessitates attracting the attention of people, arousing 
interest in a cause, winning audiences’ consent to consider messages, and stimulating audiences 
to desired action. These practices comprise a definition of public relations.
 24
 One of the 
challenges marginalized groups face is creating awareness of their dilemma and its possible 
solutions to those outside their collective group. In the Jim Crow South, segregationist mandates 
impacted all areas of blacks’ lives, including communication and “although the pressures from 
the dominant white majority have not been successful in molding Negro opinions, they have 
been successful in inducing many Negroes to refrain from expressing those opinions—or even to 
express contrary opinions—in contacts with local whites.”25 This reticence to communicate and 
the resulting silence contributed to whites’ belief that blacks were content with their 
subservience. As a result, “the pattern of communication in the South leaves the superordinate 
group as a whole less informed about the other race’s aspirations, while permitting them greater 
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freedom to project their own views to others.”26 This resulted in a “great inaccuracy of whites in 
estimating the views of Negroes,” and “inaccurate information about the views of the 
subordinate group may be viewed as one of the prices the superordinate group must pay for a 
repressive social system.”27 Stated another way, the communication process permitted the 
dominant group the luxury of ignorance about the wishes of those who were dominated. As an 
example, although most whites thought that blacks agreed with segregation, research conducted 
by Matthews and Prothro in the early 1960s found that the opposite was true. Blacks “support 
integration as solidly as whites support segregation. The percentage of Negroes who favor 
integration actually exceeds the percentage of white who favor strict segregation.”28 Based on 
their findings, the researchers concluded that “the prospects for change in white racial attitudes 
seem to be fairly good only if one takes a very long-run view.”29 But blacks were growing 
increasingly frustrated by the slow pace of progress, and to expedite change “within a viable 
democratic system would appear to depend on a change in white perceptions of the nature of 
Negro demands.”30 This change in perceptions could not occur without communication. 
Addressing the importance of communication, Matthews and Prothro suggest that “even if the 
dominant group does not agree with the demands of a sizable faction in its midst, its members 
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may respond to those demands if they know what they are.”31 In addition, “even whites who are 
appalled at Negro demands may be forced at least to recognize that the demands exist.”32 
Communication within marginalized groups helps shape collective identity, shared goals, 
and direction. But to affect change, the subordinate group also must find a way to communicate 
externally in order to share its plight and desires to both detractors and supporters in the 
dominant group. With social movements, this communication is often delivered via public 
relations strategies and tactics. By employing public relations strategies and tactics, the CCRI 
brought news of the boys’ dilemma to an audience well beyond Monroe, North Carolina. Rather 
than remaining one of countless episodes of racial injustice that would remain hidden within the 
confines of the Southern town in which it occurred, public relations helped create worldwide 
awareness of racial marginalization and it made the dominant group aware of blacks’ thoughts 
and demands. Through written and verbal discourse, the CCRI questioned the prevailing social 
structure and fought for a new meaning of black—one that sought to associate it with worthiness 
and equality. 
Framing Race in the Kissing Case Public Relations Materials 
 One of the ways that actors in racial projects or social movements shape discursive 
practices is with framing. In developing frames, “movement actors are viewed as signifying 
agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, 
antagonists, and bystanders or observers.”33 When used in social movements, framing “calls 
attention to the grievance, names it as unjust and intolerable, attributes blame and responsibility, 
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and suggests how best to ameliorate the situation.”34 These frames are referred to as collective 
action frames, and they perform an interpretive function by simplifying and condensing aspects 
of “the world out there,” in ways that are “intended to mobilize potential adherents and 
constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists. Thus, collective action 
frames are action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities 
and campaigns of social movement organizations.”35 
 This dissertation examined the frames in the groups’ public relations material, and its 
findings show that the CCRI’s most prominent frame—race and racism—was used to focus the 
audiences’ attention on the injustices blacks experienced in order to mobilize supporters to help 
eliminate these injustices, drawing attention to the crux of the problem. By employing the racism 
frame, the CCRI linked the meaning of black with equal rights, democracy, and freedom. The 
public coalesced around this frame and repeated it in correspondence to North Carolina Gov. 
Hodges. In contrast, Hodges avoided the race frame, but in doing so, he drew attention to its 
absence. Many letter writers who corresponded to Hodges questioned why he did not answer 
their questions about the racism behind the case. Focused on maintaining the status quo, Hodges 
engaged in counterframing, resulting in a framing contest with the CCRI. This framing contest 
also was indicative of the struggle over racial meaning. Hodges sought to reverse any damage 
caused by the CCRI’s frames. His frames focused on retaining the prevailing definition of 
“black” and the existing social system, hence his emphasis on the inferiority of the boys and their 
mothers. Hodges’s framing contest with the CCRI was part of the discursive struggle in the 
kissing case racial project. The discursive contest mirrored the broader struggle over the 
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subaltern group’s demand that whites concede some of their power in order to create a society in 
which all citizens were treated equally. 
  One of the reasons the CCRI’s public relations campaign was successful was that it 
targeted adherents of racial justice. The fact that the CCRI’s key frame—racism—was also one 
of the frames in the letters members of the public sent to Hodges indicates that the CCRI chose 
targets whose beliefs were aligned with the committee’s mission. “Given that one of the key 
factors affecting whether or not a proffered frame resonates with potential constituents has to do 
with the extent to which the frame taps into existing cultural values, beliefs, narratives, folk 
wisdom, and the like, it is not surprising to find that most movements seek to amplify extant 
beliefs and values.”36 In writing about social movements, Klandermans argues that “the public 
can be persuaded if one of the three following conditions prevails: the public adheres to the 
collective belief system of the persuading agent; the persuading agent can, in one way or another, 
anchor its arguments in the collective beliefs of the public; or the persuading agent succeeds in 
transforming the collective beliefs of the public.”37 In addition, “the more central or salient the 
espoused beliefs, ideas, and values of a movement to the targets of mobilization, the greater the 
probability of their mobilization.” 38 Hodges did not direct his communications to an audience 
that shared his beliefs. Instead, he communicated with the audience the CCRI had mobilized. 
Therefore, Hodges’s key frame—blame—caused dissonance among this audience. He was 
unable to persuade those with whom he corresponded and thus, his public relations campaign 
was ultimately ineffective.
 
Hodges relied on the strength of his beliefs. When the Southern racial 
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ethos was threatened, Hodges tried to use public relations to preserve it, thinking he could 
persuade those who questioned his racial ideology. 
The Kissing Case and the Role of Public Relations in Society 
 To help change its status, a subordinate group must communicate its oppression to a 
broader audience. Thus, it was not the kissing case itself, but the national and global attention 
paid to the kissing case that caused a fissure in the South’s social structure. As this dissertation’s 
findings have shown, public relations played a significant role in creating awareness of the 
kissing case and mobilizing action. The relationship between awareness, action, and political 
struggle reflects one of the roles public relations plays in society. In describing the societal role 
of public relations, Robert Heath posited: 
 Public relations is one of the many instances of social influence by which entities 
 (corporate and individual) vie to cocreate shared social meaning, negotiate relationships, 
 influence and yield to influence, create and resolve conflict, distribute resources, manage 
 power resources, exert and yield to control, manage risks, shape and respond to 
 preferences, work to resolve uncertainty, foster trust, engage in support and opposition, 
 distribute rewards and costs, foster interdependency, and make enlightened choices.
39
 
  
 Public relations fosters dialogue and facilitates two-way relationships between 
organizations and their publics. With a cocreational view of public relations, “publics are not just 
a means to an end. Publics are not instrumentalized but instead are partners in the meaning-
making process.”40 Therefore, public relations goes beyond merely disseminating information in 
order to help an organization achieve its goals. The kissing case illustrates the co-creational role 
of public relations, which “uses communication to help groups to negotiate meaning and build 
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relationships.”41 Instead of one-way communication in which the superordinate white group 
communicated its power position to blacks, public relations provided a means for blacks to 
communicate their rights and insistence for an equal position in the hierarchy. However, 
“relationships are not inherently positive,” and “as dialogue, they arise from and help shape 
shared meaning, enactable narratives, which is not always a path to harmony.”42  
 Writing in 1952 about the role of public relations in society, Edward Bernays proffered 
that “public relations is a vital tool of adjustment, interpretation, and integration between 
individuals, groups, and society.”43 Noting the two-way aspect of public relations, Bernays added 
that “public relations counteracts the tyranny of the majority and helps re-establish the inherent 
pluralism of America. Majority ideas often begin as minority ideas. Both are important.”44 
Addressing social change that had been effected by public relations, Bernays wrote that 
“progressive laws regarding child labor, working hours, wages, and women suffrage were 
brought about by effective public relations activities, which won the support of people who were 
passive or opposed to such laws. Small groups have worked effectively for the social interest by 
application of public relations research, strategy, and tactics.”45  
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 Democracy requires an informed public, and it requires language that co-manages 
meanings as social construction without privileging one interest at the disadvantage of another.
46
 
According to Bernays, “to citizens in general, public relations is important because it helps them 
to understand the society of which we are all a part, to know and evaluate the viewpoints of 
others, to exert leadership in modifying conditions that affect us, to evaluate efforts being made 
by others, and to persuade or suggest courses of action.”47 Rather than societal discourse being 
solely the purview of elites, public relations can provide dissenting voices and marginalized 
groups an opportunity to be heard, contributing to an informed citizenry, robust public discourse, 
and enlightened choice. “Public relations as a public advocacy function is essential to generate 
the necessary publicity for individual and organizational participation in public dialogues that 
eventuate in public opinion. Public relations is necessary to ensure the existence of competing 
interests in the public sphere, as these interests ensure the fair debate of public issues.”48 Public 
relations helps groups “create shared meaning, voice collective opinion, and build 
relationships.”49 Although the groups involved in the kissing case had competing goals involving 
different racial ideologies, public relations provided the means for their discursive negotiations. 
With this particular negotiation, Hodges conceded, although he most likely did not view it as 
such. On other hand, the CCRI viewed the outcome of the kissing case as a victory for racial 
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justice. As part of a long civil rights movement, it was one of many such negotiations indicative 
of political struggle focused on toppling social structures that subjugated black citizens. 
The Kissing Case and Lessons for Contemporary Public Relations Practice 
The Kissing Case as a Case Study 
 The CCRI’s work on behalf of the kissing case can be viewed as a case study of a 
successful public relations campaign, as it contains the key elements of a public relations plan: 
goals, objectives, audiences, strategies, tactics, key messages, and evaluation. The strategies and 
tactics used by the CCRI, Gov. Hodges, the NAACP, and the USIA are still being used by 
practitioners today.
50
 Therefore, notwithstanding changes in media technology, many of the 
CCRI’s strategies and tactics would be recognizable to contemporaneous public relations 
practitioners. In addition, the CCRI implemented a very effective public relations campaign that 
achieved its outcome.  
 The kissing case provides lessons on choosing the right audiences, and then developing 
strategies and tactics that align with goals and objectives that resonate with the audiences. 
Additionally, for those who may have difficulty differentiating between strategies and tactics, 
this case allows one to see and differentiate those activities that were strategies and those that 
were tactics. Also, it demonstrates that campaigns can be effective without an overreliance on 
publicity-seeking efforts.
51
 In addition, there are further aspects of the kissing case that provide 
lessons in crisis communication, reputation management, government relations, media relations, 
and campaign measurement and evaluation. 
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Crisis Communication and Reputation Management 
  Another lesson of the kissing case public relations relates to crisis communication and 
reputation management, which fall within the scope of public relations. Although these terms 
were not in use in the late 1950s, aspects of the kissing case and the corresponding actions taken 
would today be given those labels. Specifically, the kissing case illuminated America’s racial 
problems, and Gov. Hodges, North Carolina and the United States were seen in a negative light 
by citizens in other countries. This sentiment was echoed in many of the letters received from 
concerned citizens, who wrote that the kissing case besmirched the reputation of North Carolina 
and the United States, as well as that of Hodges himself.  
 Hodges and his aides admitted they were overwhelmed by the number of letters received 
from outraged citizens around the world. The governor had a crisis on his hands. However rather 
than attempt to understand the reasons for the outrage, Hodges was so entrenched in the Southern 
ethos that he was unable to see an alternative viewpoint. The public believed the boys’ crime did 
not fit the punishment, and they therefore wanted to know why the boys’ were given such a harsh 
sentence. Hodges thought the public outcry was based on inadequate facts about the boys’ 
situation. However Hodges’s attempts to explain and justify using supposed facts was a strategy 
that backfired because the public believed the actual facts of the case highlighted the injustices of 
the South’s racial system. Hodges did not attempt to understand his audience. Instead, he blamed 
the victim for his circumstances, and blamed the negative attention on communists. Interestingly, 
one of the many letters Hodges received was from a public relations practitioner in New York, 
who wrote that Hodges should get himself a better public relations team. The letter writer told 
Hodges that using the communist angle was a poor strategy, and highlighting the boys’ 
impoverished living conditions did not justify their being sentenced to more than 10 years in a 
reformatory. 
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 Hodges’s response to the crisis and attempts at reputation management presents 
communication scholars and practitioners with a clear lesson in what not to do, although some of 
Hodges’s actions were shaped by the racism of the 1950s and must therefore be examined within 
that context. Hodges took a defensive position and in doing so, he was not only defending the 
actions of North Carolina authorities, he was defending the southern racial hierarchy. Therefore, 
he was unable to fathom the possibility that authorities may have made a mistake in their 
treatment and sentencing of the boys. It was not until after the boys had been freed that Hodges 
acknowledged as much, reluctantly admitting in hindsight that Monroe authorities should have 
sought an alternative to the reformatory. 
Government Relations 
 Another lesson to scholars and practitioners concerns government relations. One of the 
key learnings is that the CCRI was very targeted in its communication with government 
officials.
52
 For example, George Weissman corresponded with USIA officials and in his capacity 
as CCRI chairman, Robert Williams wrote letters to Union County Superior Court Judge J. 
Hampton Price, to Gov. Hodges, and to the White House. Williams’s letter to President 
Eisenhower was answered by E. Frederic Morrow, administrative officer for special projects and 
the first African American to hold a White House executive position. Morrow responded that the 
kissing case was not a federal matter and could only be resolved in the North Carolina courts.  
Williams accused Morrow of being a White House pawn, and he communicated his views to the 
press. As a result, the black press ran a number of stories conveying Williams’s position and 
Morrow’s subsequent defense. Despite Morrow’s protest to the contrary, readers of the black 
press were ultimately left with a reinforcement of Williams’s viewpoint: The federal government 
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once again was unconcerned and unsupportive of black citizens’ civil rights. Correspondence by 
Williams and other CCRI members helped ensure government officials were not only aware of 
the case, but aware of the strong opposition to the boys’ sentencing.  
 In addition, as an elected official, Hodges needed to ensure that his public relations 
efforts aligned with the needs and expectations of North Carolina voters. For example, with the 
Brown v. Board of Education decision, Hodges complied with the ruling while allowing his 
constituents to maintain segregated schools. In the kissing case, conceding that North Carolina 
officials may have made mistakes would likely not have resonated with the majority of white 
North Carolinians, who viewed blacks as subordinate to whites. Hodges was an astute politician, 
and as he sought to manage North Carolina’s reputation by defending its actions, he considered 
white voters’ viewpoints about race relations. 
Media Relations 
 The kissing case also affords lessons to contemporary practitioners about media relations. 
Each of the four groups used the media to varying degrees to communicate its messages. Hodges 
enlisted a reporter for the Winston-Salem Journal-Sentinel to write a story that vilified the boys 
and the CCRI, while upholding Hodges’s reputation and that of North Carolina. With the 
Journal-Sentinel article, which Hodges distributed to other media outlets and those who wrote to 
him, the CCRI made a strategic decision not to directly refute the allegations in the article. It 
recognized that only incontrovertible segregationists would accept the claims in the article. 
Rather than draw more attention to the false assertions, the CCRI believed that others readers 
would see the bias in the article. Instead, it decided to continue its focus on communicating its 
messages. However in other instances, the CCRI corrected what it believed was misinformation.  
When the USIA, in an attempt at reputation management, distributed a media statement asserting 
that racism was not involved in the kissing case, George Weissman sent a telegram refuting that 
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charge and demanding the USIA correct the misinformation, which it did. The USIA’s media 
relations efforts also focused on monitoring international media coverage about the case and 
sending reports to its international field offices, as it did with other racial incidents in the United 
States. 
Measurement/Evaluation 
 Another lesson for today’s communication scholars and public relations practitioners is in 
the area of public relations measurement, primarily because campaign evaluation is a growing 
area of scholarship and a significant concern among today’s practitioners. In addition, the kissing 
case public relations campaign provides an example of how a campaign can be evaluated. For 
contemporary public relations practitioners, guidelines for public relations measurement are 
outlined in the Barcelona Principles, first developed in 2010 by five communication 
organizations, and updated in 2015.
53
 The organizations identified seven principles of public 
relations measurement: goal setting and measurement is foundational to public relations and 
communications; measuring outcomes is recommended versus only measuring outputs; the effect 
on organizational performance can and should be measured where possible; measurement and 
evaluation require both quantitative and qualitative methods; advertising value equivalencies are 
not the value of public relations; social media can and should be measured consistently with 
other channels; and measurement and evaluation should be transparent, consistent, and valid.
54
 
Two principles of measurement, goal setting and the focus on outcomes, can be seen in the 
CCRI’s public relations work and are explored below.  
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 One of the first steps in public relations campaign development is establishing clear goals 
or measurable communication objectives. The Barcelona Principles of 2010 and 2015 
recommend doing something that the CCRI did in 1958: set goals. The CCRI established a clear 
goal: to arouse public opinion, thereby creating mass pressure that would be exerted on public 
officials to free the boys. The ultimate goal, which the CCRI stated as an outcome, was to secure 
the boys’ freedom. After creating awareness of the kissing case, one of the public relations 
campaign strategies was to ask the public to taken an action: write Governor Hodges demanding 
the boys’ freedom. This strategy was effective, and Hodges was inundated with letters and 
petitions from angry citizens. 
 Importantly, these letters provide a clear example of opinions expressed by a segment of 
the population, as the letter writers were direct in communicating their feelings about the case. In 
many public relations campaigns of the past and present, public opinion has not been evaluated 
because it has not been captured.
55
 Instead, practitioners have relied on measuring outputs, such 
as media coverage or material produced. In contrast, the kissing case provides an example of 
public opinion related to a public relations campaign. In this case, the public voiced its opinions 
in the form of letters and petitions. The letters are not the outcome; the opinions conveyed by the 
public demanding the boys’ freedom are an outcome. The final outcome of this case is the boys’ 
freedom. The volume of letters and the opinions expressed may have played a role in Hodges’s 
decision to release the boys. 
 In evaluating the effectiveness of this campaign, a public relations practitioner would first 
determine if the goals and objectives were met. Was public opinion aroused on behalf of the 
boys? Yes, as evidenced by the hundreds of letters and thousands of signatures sent to Hodges. 
                                                 
55
 See Hardy and Waters, “Identifying the Norms of Professional Practice,” 898-905. 
238 
 
What opinions did the public express in these letters? As seen in the frames in the letters, the 
public expressed shock and outrage; concern that the boys’ punishment exceeded the severity of 
their offense; concern that the case had besmirched the reputation of the United States; and the 
racism behind the boys’ sentencing. In addition, there is a relationship between the CCRI’s 
public relations material and the outcome. Specifically, the frames in the CCRI’s public relations 
material—shock, outrage, and racism—are reflected in the frames in the letters. In other words, 
the CCRI’s frames are reflected in the opinions expressed by the letter writers. This relationship 
speaks to the salience and effectiveness of the CCRI’s frames and its public relations strategies 
and tactics. 
Finally, the public had been spurred to action: they demanded Hodges free the boys. 
What was the outcome? Hodges ultimately and suddenly freed the boys, less than four months 
after the kissing game. Although Conrad Lynn claimed that Eleanor Roosevelt urged Hodges to 
free the boys and Harry Golden claimed that his urgings caused Hodges to free them, the 
historical record does not verify these claims. Even if Hodges was persuaded by Roosevelt or 
Golden, it appears from this dissertation’s findings that the worldwide awareness of the case, the 
public outcry, and mass pressure contributed to his decision to release Hanover and Fuzzy. The 
CCRI attributed the outcome to the letters and the mass pressure. Without the public relations 
efforts and the corresponding public reaction, the boys’ might have remained incarcerated and 
their dilemma might have remained hidden, as were so many other instances of racial injustice 
perpetrated on black citizens in the South. 
 As a historical study, the fact that the letters remain offers an advantage because they can 
be analyzed to see if the letter writers were in favor of the boys’ freedom or their sentencing. As 
such, they offer a way to ascertain the public’s opinions, or at least the opinions of those who 
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corresponded to Hodges. Given his concern over the letters, they may have been a significant 
factor in his deciding to free the boys. Therefore, the opinions expressed in the letters should be 
analyzed. The letters offer a way to determine and measure an outcome: the opinions of their 
authors and in some cases, the beliefs on which those opinions were based. The CCRI did not see 
most of the letters sent to Hodges, although some correspondents sent a carbon copy to the 
CCRI. However, the organization was aware of the volume of letters, and it attributed its success 
to the letters, petitions and the opinions expressed in them. The letters and petitions were 
tangible evidence that the CCRI had aroused public opinion and created a mass protest. The 
committee did not count press clippings and gauge its success on the quantity and quality of 
media coverage, as was common practice in the 1950s and continues to be used today by some 
practitioners as a measurement of campaign results.
56
 The lesson to today’s practitioner is to seek 
a method that will allow for the measurement of outcomes, thereby not relying solely on 
measuring outputs. Yesterday’s letters may be today’s social media comments, for example, and 
a practitioner can seek methods such as surveys and focus groups to measure outcomes.  
 The public relations campaigns in response to the kissing case provide lessons for 
contemporary practitioners in a number of areas including: a look at how public relations was 
practiced in the late 1950s; a comparison of public relations practice and definitions then and 
now; similarities in 1950s strategies and tactics and today’s practice; insight into how public 
relations was used to help foster social change in the United States; an example of how public 
relations was used by and for marginalized groups; how frames can be used in public relations 
material; and lessons in crisis communications, reputation management, government relations, 
media relations, public relations campaign development and implementation, and evaluation.  In 
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addition to these lessons, the public relations implemented on behalf of the kissing case provides 
insights into the historical development of public relations. 
Public Relations Models and the Historical Timeline 
 In 1984, scholars James E. Grunig and Todd Hunt developed and introduced four models 
of public relations.
57
 In the press agentry/publicity model, they proposed that propaganda is the 
primary purpose of communication, and the nature of communication is one-way. With the 
public information model, the authors posited that one-way communication focuses primarily on 
the dissemination of information. With these two models, Grunig and Hunt stated that 
communication is focused on telling, not listening. With the two-way asymmetric model, Grunig 
and Hunt suggested that the purpose of communication is scientific persuasion, and the effects of 
public relations are imbalanced in favor of the organization. The scholars proffered that instead 
of changing as a result of public relations, the organization attempted to change the public’s 
attitudes and behavior. In contrast, the two-way symmetric model included a dialogue rather than 
a monologue, with both the organization and its publics mutually persuading and changing each 
other, with a focus on mutual adjustment rather than controlling how others think and behave. 
 Grunig and Hunt examined public relations historically to develop their four models, 
positing that the press agentry/publicity model was prevalent from 1850 to 1900, followed by the 
public-information model, which they say began in about 1900 and continued until the 1920s. 
They proposed that the two-way asymmetric model followed, developing in the 1920s, and the 
more advanced and ethical two-way symmetric model emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Grunig 
and Hunt classified Edward Bernays “not only as the leading historical example of the two-way 
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asymmetric model of PR, but also as one of the thinkers who helped to develop the two-way 
symmetric model.”58 These models suggest that public relations practice of the mid- to late-
1800s was less sophisticated than practice in later years, and that there was a linear progression 
of improvement. This model presumes that public relations practice of the 1970s to today is 
better than public relations practiced in the 1940s or 1950s, as public relations has advanced over 
time. In challenging these models in relation to understanding public relations history, public 
relations historians Margot Opdycke Lamme and Karen Miller Russell referred to a “misleading 
dependence on linear interpretations of the field’s past,” and they wrote that “scholars have 
tended to organize public relations and its antecedents into time periods that present a 
progressive evolution from unsophisticated and unethical early roots to planned, strategic, and 
ethical campaigns of the current day.
59
 Other scholars also have outlined the limitations of 
examining public relations history via this timeline approach.
60
 This dissertation’s findings offer 
further support of the limitations of the timeline approach. The models developed by Grunig and 
Hunt imply that contemporary public relations practice today is more advanced and effective 
than public relations practice of the 1950s. However the CCRI’s 1958 public relations campaign 
was no less advanced that a contemporary campaign. Its effective public relations campaign had 
a clearly defined goal; it identified the audiences that would help achieve this goal, and it 
developed effective strategies and tactics targeted to its audiences, using two-way 
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communication that helped achieve its desired outcome. This dissertation’s findings show that 
the public relations strategies and tactics used by the four groups in the 1950s in relation to the 
kissing case are also used by contemporary practitioners. Thus, the kissing case public relations 
provides another example of how this evolutionary viewpoint of public relations history is 
flawed. By examining and comparing public relations definitions and practice of the 1950s and 
today, and analyzing the public relations components of the kissing case, this study’s findings 
add to the scholarship that disproves Grunig’s and Hunt’s position, while providing an example 
of how public relations was used effectively by a marginalized group to advocate for social 
change.  
Opportunities for Future Inquiry 
 This study opens a number of avenues for further inquiry. African Americans have been 
largely absent from public relations history, be it as practitioners or as the focus of public 
relations campaigns. Further research in this area would help to close that gap. In addition, 
examining public relations and social movements that focused on arousing mass protest and 
pressure provides an additional opportunity for future research. Related to this, given that 
members of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) developed a number of successful campaigns 
that focused on arousing public opinion and action, further inquiry may center on how the SWP 
used public relations to further its causes and how it may have used public relations to manage 
its reputation. Opportunities also may exist to examine how leftist organizations supported the 
civil rights movement in a time when red baiting was often used to discredit organizations that 
championed African America civil rights. 
 Through letters sent to Hodges, this dissertation was able to examine public opinion and 
its role in the outcome of the public relations campaign. The letters provide a means to ascertain 
public opinion, evaluate the outcome, and determine success. Additional areas of inquiry concern 
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the evaluation and measurement of public relations programs, including how public relations has 
historically been measured, beyond relying on outputs. Measurement continues to be a challenge 
to practitioners, and scholarship in this area is limited.
61
 Therefore, additional research focused 
on this topic would contribute to the public relations industry’s evolving guidelines on 
measurement and would assist those who practice public relations.  
 Examining the role of public relations in grassroots, civil rights activities provides 
another area of inquiry. Aldon Morris has highlighted the important role of local movements, and 
the work on the kissing case is an example of such an initiative. Much of this grassroots work 
and those who supported it have been overlooked. Instead, the focus has been on key events in 
the modern civil rights movement and on prominent figures, such as Martin Luther King Jr. In 
addition to contributing to public relations historical scholarship, further research into this area 
would show the breadth and depth of the civil rights movement, and would illustrate the many 
ways that ordinary citizens championed in their communities equal rights for African 
Americans.
62
 Additionally, many of those citizens may have been women and minorities, 
demonstrating that public relations was not practiced solely by white males, contrary to what is 
reflected in public relations textbooks. Also, further inquiry could explore how public relations 
campaigns of the past that focused on social change relate to contemporary social change and 
social justice public relations campaigns.  
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Conclusion 
 Before Robert Williams began to demand equality, the majority of whites in Monroe 
believed race relations were as they should be, with blacks occupying their position at the bottom 
of the social and racial hierarchy. The southern system, which used social, political, legal, and 
economic means to ensure that blacks remained as the subordinate caste, forced blacks to accept 
white dominion. Most southern whites thought that segregation was the natural order of things, 
and that blacks also believed in the separation of the races. However in communities across the 
south, local activism had been fomenting, led by individuals such as Williams, or citizens who 
converged to form groups such as the Montgomery Improvement Association, or through 
established organizations such as black churches.
63
 
 The kissing case occurred between pivotal events in the classical phase of the long civil 
rights movement—the 1954 Brown decision, the 1955 murder of Emmett Till, the Montgomery 
bus boycott of 1955 and 1956, the 1957 Little Rock crisis, and the apex of the sit-in movement in 
1960. The CCRI was formed partially out of Williams’s frustration with the NAACP’s national 
office, which continued to focus on traditional methods while the civil rights movement was 
moving from “legalism to direct action.”64 The association’s reliance on its usual means of 
operating paved the way for other organizations to take a key position in securing black civil 
rights. Although it had a short tenure, the CCRI was one such organization. It employed a more 
direct and confrontational style that had begun to be used more often in the mid-1950s and would 
soon be used by other civil rights organizations in the 1960s. A precursor to the CCRI’s use of 
direct action and mass pressure can be seen in the bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, in 
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which members of the black community protested segregated buses by refusing to ride them, 
thereby demonstrating the power of a collective, mobilized community. Before the boycott, 
“most blacks were unfamiliar with the techniques and principles of nonviolent direct action.”65 
Unlike the NAACP’s initiatives, the boycott allowed blacks to become directly involved as 
social change agents, and it showed them that results can be achieved by mass protest. The 
boycott also had “a wide emotional appeal that the NAACP’s carefully managed programs 
lacked.”66 In addition, the results of the bus boycott were more immediate and visible than the 
NAACP’s legal victories. However, the Montgomery bus boycott was ultimately successful due 
to mass protest and the NAACP’s legal challenge, in which the US Supreme Court upheld that 
bus segregation was unconstitutional. It was the court order that forced Montgomery city 
commissioners to desegregate the buses.
67
 Despite this significant contribution, the NAACP’s 
role in the Montgomery bus boycott was overshadowed by the more visible elements of the 
protest. The NAACP continued to be criticized as being conservative, bureaucratic, and out of 
touch with the majority of the black community.
68
 Nevertheless, the association maintained its 
focus on legal redress and political action versus embracing the mass protest and direct action 
that would characterize civil rights activities of the 1960s. When the NAACP finally became 
involved in the kissing case after the public questioned its absence, it did so within its customary 
approach and provided legal and financial support.  
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  Robert Williams’s leadership in attacking segregation in Monroe was another early 
example of direct action at the grassroots level, as was his refusal to retreat when white 
supremacists, angered at his insurgency, attempted to remind him of his position in the hierarchy. 
Williams not only believed he deserved his Fourteenth Amendment rights, he fought to get them. 
The battles in Monroe, from efforts to integrate the swimming pool, to Dr. Perry’s abortion trial, 
to the kissing case, represented a struggle over racial signification. Finally, the kissing case gave 
Williams greater visibility beyond Monroe and demonstrated to him that his assertive approach 
to obtaining civil rights could result in success. It also showed him the power of creating broad 
awareness of a cause, arousing public opinion, and mobilizing groups to action. 
 Unlike the NAACP, the CCRI was unafraid to tackle cases that targeted the core of white 
supremacy—those involving interracial sex, which included Dr. Perry’s abortion trial, the trial of 
the white man accused of sexually assaulting a pregnant black woman, and its most prominent 
work—the kissing case. In addition, the kissing case provides an example of how black leaders 
and white leftists worked together to support civil rights, despite white detractors who capitalized 
on Cold War fears and used communism as another way to discredit the civil rights movement. 
The CCRI refused to be swayed by efforts to impugn its work. Instead, by highlighting the 
racism behind the case, it illustrated the contradiction between the United States’ fight against 
communism and its mistreatment of black Americans. The CCRI’s work also demonstrated the 
power of proactive public relations, which would later play a role in the success of organizations 
such as SNCC and the Congress of Racial Equality. 
 What actually transpired in a culvert in Monroe, North Carolina between Hanover 
Thompson, Fuzzy Simpson, and Sissy Sutton in October 1958 during the course of the kissing 
game will never be known, just as what made Hodges suddenly release the boys cannot be 
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definitively determined. Nevertheless, he did release them, and the negative attention that was 
directed at North Carolina, along with the deluge of letters and petitions, appear to have played a 
role. The CCRI’s public relations campaign raised awareness of the boys’ plight, drew attention 
to the racial injustice, and mobilized the public to take action, thereby challenging a hegemonic 
system of oppression. In addition, international media coverage of the case illuminated 
America’s racial problems at a time when the country was espousing global democracy.  
 If the press and the CCRI had not created awareness of the boys’ dilemma, public opinion 
would not have been aroused on their behalf and they might have lingered in the reformatory. As 
one southern newspaper averred, the boys’ situation had “no significance.”69 In the Jim Crow 
South, any act of miscegenation in which a black male made a romantic or sexual overture to a 
white woman warranted punishment. The laws and penalties for their violation were part of the 
natural order of things in the South, hence the belief that the kissing case was insignificant. 
Without the publicity, the public relations, and the corresponding protest, it would have remained 
as such. 
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The past has been a mint 
Of blood and sorrow. 
That must not be 
True of tomorrow.
1
 
 
 
EPILOGUE 
 This dissertation has focused on public relations in regards to the kissing case. However, 
the events that transpired in 1958 and 1959 in Monroe became part of the life experience of the 
individuals involved. This epilogue completes the story of the kissing case by providing a brief 
recap of what happened to the major players after the case was concluded, focusing on the CCRI, 
its active founding members, Gov. Hodges, and the children involved in the kissing case. 
 In May 1959, Lewis Medlin was acquitted of assaulting the pregnant Mary Ruth Reid. In 
a statement to reporters, a frustrated and angry Robert Williams said it was time for blacks to 
meet violence with violence.
2
 His remarks, which were carried by the white mainstream press as 
well as the black press, caused significant controversy and led to his eventual suspension by the 
NAACP.
3
 In July 1959, Williams published the first issue of a newsletter, the Crusader, which 
focused on racial injustice.
4
 He also continued his efforts to integrate Monroe’s public facilities 
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through sit-ins and picketing. Williams and his fellow protesters were harassed by Monroe’s 
whites, and the KKK continued its night riding and shooting into black homes.
5
 In 1961, 
Monroe’s racial tensions caught the attention of SNCC, which sent Freedom Riders to Monroe to 
assist at Williams’s request.6 Mobs attacked the demonstrators, and when Williams sheltered a 
white couple who had driven into the black neighborhood, he was accused of kidnapping them.
7
 
Recognizing that blacks received no justice from the legal system, Williams and his family fled 
to Cuba, where they lived for four years before moving to China. While in Cuba, Williams 
produced a radio program, Radio Free Dixie. It featured music, interviews and commentary, and 
its objective was to “create a better understanding of the Afro-American problem in the USA, 
and to expose the true nature of U.S. racism.”8 While overseas, Williams also traveled to Africa 
and Vietnam. Williams and his family returned to the United States in 1969, settling in 
Michigan.
9
 Although Williams never again lived in Monroe, he made summer visits to see 
friends and family.
10
 Williams died of cancer in 1996 at age 71. He is interred in Monroe. 
 In October 1959, the US Supreme Court refused to hear Dr. Albert E. Perry’s abortion 
case and he was convicted of performing an abortion on a white woman, despite his adamant 
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denials. He was given a two- to three-year prison sentence.
11
 He served six months in Central 
Prison in Raleigh.
12
 The conditions of his parole forbade him from entering Union County.
13
 
After his parole period, he was granted a limited license to practice medicine in Mecklenburg 
County, where he opened an office in Charlotte. Dr. Perry died in a car accident, believed to 
have resulted from a heart attack, in 1972 at age 51.
14
 He is interred in Monroe. 
 Conrad Lynn represented Williams when he contested his NAACP suspension and 
provided legal counsel to him when he was in exile. During the 1960s, Lynn represented a 
number of Vietnam War draft resisters, as well as prominent Black Panthers, including H. Rap 
Brown. Lynn died in 1995 at age 87. He practiced law until a few months before his death.
15
 
 George Weissman remained an active member of the SWP, continuing as editor of its 
publishing arm Pathfinder Press, later serving as editor of its newsletter the Militant, and writing 
for a number of other party publications.
16
 He also served as East Coast organizer for the Fair 
Play for Cuba Committee, an activist group that supported the Cuban Revolution. In the early 
1980s, Weissman was among 100 SWP members expelled over differences in ideology. They 
formed a splinter organization, the Fourth International Tendency. Weissman died of a heart 
attack in 1985 at age 69. 
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 In 1959, Carl Braden refused to testify before the House Un-American Activities 
Committee and was sentenced to a year in prison. He was released in 1962 after serving nine 
months. Carl and Anne Braden remained active in the fight for civil rights and other causes. In 
1967, the Bradens were charged with sedition for organizing “a protest against strip mining in 
Kentucky.”17 The charge was dismissed the same year when a Kentucky federal court declared 
the state’s anti-sedition law unconstitutional. Carl Braden died in 1975 at age 60. 
 The Carolina Times continued to report on the African American quest for civil rights.
18
 
At the time of his death in 1971 at age 73, L. E. Austin had been the newspaper’s publisher for 
more than 50 years. The Carolina Times is published today by Austin’s grandson.  
 Luther H. Hodges’s term as governor ended in 1961. He served as United States 
Secretary of Commerce from 1961 to 1965. He then served as chairman of Research Triangle 
Park, a research and development center, which was established under his governorship.
19
 He 
also later served as president of Rotary International. He died in 1974 at age 76.  
 Shortly after the boys were released, the CCRI issued a press release to refute the claims 
in Chester Davis’s article that it had misused funds.20 With the successful outcome of the kissing 
case, the CCRI’s founders considered what to do next. While they did so, the committee 
continued its work in support of Mary Ruth Reid, the pregnant black woman sexually assaulted 
by a white man, as well as the case of the black hotel chambermaid who had been kicked down a 
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flight of stairs by a white patron. When the CCRI was formed, Weissman, who had implemented 
the majority of the CCRI’s public relations tactics, pledged six months free labor to the 
committee. Pondering the CCRI’s direction, he wrote,  
 Up till now the CCRI has been identified solely with Union County cases. There is more 
 to do there and undoubtedly there will be a continuing number of cases that will keep us 
 involved there. However, we think that it is important to establish in the public mind 
 the fact that it is a committee not exclusively for Union County but to combat racial 
 injustice. On the other hand as yet we are not financially able to take on the responsibility 
 of any new cases where the financial  burden would be solely on us unless the case were 
 of the type in which enough funds could be quickly raised to assure the defendant of a 
 successful defense.
21
 
 
 Braden also expressed reservations, albeit for different reasons. He responded to  
 
Weissman, 
 
  After the boys were freed, I had serious doubts as to whether the CCRI should continue 
 to be active. I thought it might proclaim the victory and go into a state of suspended 
 animation until the next atrocity came along. It could say that it was suspending 
 operations until it might be needed to fight a case that nobody else would take. I believe 
 that part of this feeling stemmed from the idea that we might become an organization 
 competing with NAACP for support and funds; that the CCRI might in fact 
 become a dual organization. You will recall that I had a discussion with some people in 
 New York who were reluctant to join CCRI because they felt it was a dual organization.
22
  
 
 In this same letter, Braden offered the following advice: “The decision lies with the 
Southern Negro leadership and not with white Southerners such as I or with anybody in the 
North. If the Negro militants in the South feel that they need an organization to do what the 
CCRI has done in the Monroe case, that that’s that.”23 However black leadership in Monroe had 
differing viewpoints on how to proceed. Williams began to operate more independently, causing 
a rift between him and Dr. Perry. When Williams announced his candidacy for mayor of Monroe 
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without alerting anyone of his plans, Perry was concerned that Williams had not involved the 
CCRI or local NAACP in his decision.
24
 Of Williams’s actions, Perry wrote, “My objection is 
based on what I am afraid will or may happen or be done with out [sic] my knowledge.”25 Just a 
few weeks after the boys were released, a disappointed Perry resigned from the CCRI on 
February 28.
26
 Although the two men later seemed to resolve their differences, with Perry 
writing in April that “Robert is seemingly himself again and I look forward to working with him 
wherever there is opportunity to do so,” Williams felt differently.27 He expressed the following 
to Weissman: “There is no personal ill-feeling between Doc and I. He just never showed any 
great desire to help the masses. We still get together and talk, but I just don’t intend to allow a 
feeling of personal frustration to frustrate the militant action of a people who show a willingness 
to fight.”28 Williams added, “Because he lacks insights into the problems facing us and displays 
no foresight whatsoever and waivers in the face of odds, I cannot allow him deter [sic] 
progress.”29 
 In addition, interactions with Williams and North Carolina’s NAACP leadership 
continued to deteriorate, as both Williams and Perry believed Kelly Alexander had cooperated 
with Chester Davis on the articles in the Winston-Salem Journal-Sentinel.
30
 In its short existence, 
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one of the CCRI’s challenges had been determining its role in relationship to that of the NAACP. 
In addition to deciding its next steps, the CCRI would also need to resolve if and how to work 
with the NAACP.  
 During the extensive publicity given to Williams’s remarks about using violence and his 
NAACP suspension, the CCRI “waited for the dust to settle.”31 Williams’s position was divisive, 
not only between him and the NAACP’s national leaders, but among the CCRI leadership. 
Braden wrote that he was more inclined to the position of nonviolence espoused by Martin 
Luther King Jr. than Williams’s stance.32 The CCRI’s leadership was fractured and while its 
mission remained combating racial injustice, it was unclear of its next steps. Williams, Braden, 
and Weissman also contemplated “continuing to let the organization lie dormant pending some 
development which would make its revival desirable.”33 By this time, it had been a year since the 
CCRI had championed a specific cause and without a directive, it had lost its raison d'être. As a 
result, the CCRI leaders decided to dissolve the organization. In his last act as CCRI secretary, 
Weissman sent the CCRI’s remaining funds—$204.28—to the Monroe NAACP, asking that it be 
used to help Williams, who had been charged in a Monroe lunch counter sit-in. Weissman ended 
his correspondence “with best wishes and with confidence in the victory of your battle against 
racial discrimination and segregation.”34 
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 After they were freed, James Hanover Thompson and David “Fuzzy” Simpson lived 
with their families in Charlotte. They were required to meet weekly with a psychologist, who 
Thompson recalled said the boys should have been castrated or sterilized.
35
 In April 1960, James 
Hanover Thompson, age 11, was with a 15-year-old companion who was charged with rape “on 
a minor Negro girl.” As a result, Thompson was again committed to a training school.36 
 James Hanover Thompson and David Simpson have spent most of their adult lives in and 
out of prison.
37
 In a 1993 interview about the kissing case, Thompson said, “I have been 
incarcerated and been in the system,” adding that the stigma of the kissing case “has followed us 
ever since.” David Simpson said similarly, “It has followed me quite a lot, because I could not 
never [sic] get out of the system.”38 Speaking about the case in 2011, Thompson said, “It has just 
destroyed our life.”39  
 Sissy Sutton has refused requests to be interviewed over the years.
40
 When asked about 
Sissy Sutton, Simpson remarked that children are taught “only what parents feed them. If you 
feed them hatred or racism, they grow up like that.”41 Concurring, Thompson said, “I don’t think 
it was her fault because kids do innocent things. We were just innocent children.” 
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